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Abstract
This paper concerns the local stability and convergence rate of gradient descent-ascent in two-player
non-convex, non-concave zero-sum games. We study the role that a finite timescale separation parameter
τ has on the learning dynamics where the learning rate of player 1 is denoted by γ1 and the learning
rate of player 2 is defined to be γ2 = τγ1. Existing work analyzing the role of timescale separation in
gradient descent-ascent has primarily focused on the edge cases of players sharing a learning rate (τ = 1)
and the maximizing player approximately converging between each update of the minimizing player
(τ →∞). For the parameter choice of τ = 1, it is known that the learning dynamics are not guaranteed
to converge to a game-theoretically meaningful equilibria in general as shown by Mazumdar et al. (2020)
and Daskalakis and Panageas (2018). In contrast, Jin et al. (2020) showed that the stable critical points
of gradient descent-ascent coincide with the set of strict local minmax equilibria as τ →∞. In this work,
we bridge the gap between past work by showing there exists a finite timescale separation parameter τ∗
such that x∗ is a stable critical point of gradient descent-ascent for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) if and only if it is a
strict local minmax equilibrium. Moreover, we provide an explicit construction for computing τ∗ along
with corresponding convergence rates and results under deterministic and stochastic gradient feedback.
The convergence results we present are complemented by a non-convergence result: given a critical
point x∗ that is not a strict local minmax equilibrium, then there exists a finite timescale separation
τ0 such that x
∗ is unstable for all τ ∈ (τ0,∞). Finally, we extend the stability and convergence results
regarding gradient descent-ascent to gradient penalty regularization methods for generative adversarial
networks (Mescheder et al., 2018) and empirically demonstrate on the CIFAR-10 and CelebA datasets
the significant impact timescale separation has on training performance.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study learning in zero-sum games of the form
min
x1∈X1
max
x2∈X2
f(x1, x2)
where the objective function of the game f is assumed to be sufficiently smooth and potentially non-convex
and non-concave in the strategy spacesX1 andX2 respectively with eachXi a precompact subset of Rni . This
general problem formulation has long been fundamental in game theory (Bas¸ar and Olsder, 1998) and recently
it has become central to machine learning with applications in generative adversarial networks (Goodfellow
et al., 2014), robust supervised learning (Madry et al., 2018; Sinha et al., 2018), reinforcement and multi-
agent reinforcement learning (Rajeswaran et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2019), imitation learning (Ho and Ermon,
2016), constrained optimization (Cherukuri et al., 2017), and hyperparameter optimization (Lorraine et al.,
2020; MacKay et al., 2019) among several others. From a game-theoretic viewpoint, the work on learning in
games can, in some sense, be viewed as explaining how equilibria arise through an iterative competition for
optimality (Fudenberg et al., 1998). However, in machine learning, the primary purpose of learning dynamics
is to compute equilibria efficiently for the sake of providing meaningful solutions to problems of interest.
As a result of this perspective, there has been significant interest in the study of gradient descent-ascent
owing to the fact that the learning rule is computationally efficient and a natural analogue to gradient descent
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from function optimization. Formally, the learning dynamics are given by each player myopically updating
a strategy with an individual gradient as follows:
x+1 = x1 − γ1D1f(x1, x2)
x+2 = x2 + γ2D2f(x1, x2).
The analysis of gradient descent-ascent is complicated by the intricate optimization landscape in non-convex,
non-concave zero-sum games. To begin, there is the fundamental question of what type of solution concept
is desired. Given the class of games under consideration, local solution concepts have been proposed and
are often taken to be the goal of a learning algorithm. The primary notions of equilibrium that have been
adopted are the local Nash and local minmax/Stackelberg concepts with a focus on the set of strict local
equilibrium that can be characterized by gradient-based sufficient conditions. Following several past works,
from here on we refer to strict local Nash equilibrium and strict local minmax/Stackelberg equilibrium as
differential Nash equilibrium and differential Stackelberg equilibrium, respectively.
Regardless of the equilibrium notion under consideration, a number of past works highlight failures of
standard gradient descent-ascent in non-convex, non-concave zero-sum games. Indeed, it has been shown
gradient descent-ascent with a shared learning rate (γ1 = γ2) is prone to reaching critical points that are
neither differential Nash equilibrium nor differential Stackelberg equilibrium (Daskalakis and Panageas, 2018;
Jin et al., 2020; Mazumdar et al., 2020). While an important negative result, it does not rule out the prospect
that gradient descent-ascent may be able to guarantee equilibrium convergence as it fails to account for a
key structural parameter of the learning dynamics, namely the ratio of learning rates between the players.
Motivated by the observation that the order of play between players is fundamental to the definition
of the game, the role of timescale separation in gradient descent-ascent has been explored theoretically in
recent years (Chasnov et al., 2019; Heusel et al., 2017; Jin et al., 2020). On the empirical side of past
work, it has been widely demonstrated and prescribed that timescale separation in gradient descent-ascent
between the generator and discriminator, either by heterogeneous learning rates or unrolled updates, is
crucial to improving the solution quality when training generative adversarial networks (Arjovsky et al.,
2017; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Heusel et al., 2017). Denoting γ1 as the learning rate of the player 1, the
learning rate of player 2 can be redefined as γ2 = τγ1 where τ = γ2/γ1 > 0 is the ratio of learning
rates or timescale separation parameter. The work of Jin et al. (2020) took a meaningful step toward
understanding the effect of timescale separation in gradient descent-ascent by showing that as τ → ∞ the
stable critical points of the learning dynamics coincide with the set of differential Stackelberg equilibrium. In
simple terms, the aforementioned result implies that all ‘bad critical points’ (that is, critical points lacking
game-theoretic meaning) become unstable as the timescale separation approaches infinity and that all ‘good
critical points’ (that is, game-theoretically meaningful equilibria) remain or become stable as the timescale
separation approaches infinity. While a promising theoretical development on the local stability of the
underlying dynamics, it does not lead to a practical, implementable learning rule or necessarily provide an
explanation for the satisfying performance in applications of gradient descent-ascent with a finite timescale
separation. It remains an open question to fully understand gradient descent-ascent as a function of the
timescale separation and to determine whether the desirable behavior with an infinite timescale separation
is achievable for a range of finite learning rate ratios.
This paper continues the theoretical study of gradient descent-ascent with timescale separation in non-
convex, non-concave zero-sum games. We focus our attention on answering the remaining open questions
regarding the behavior of the learning dynamics with finite learning rate ratios and provide a number of
conclusive results. Notably, we develop necessary and sufficient conditions for a critical point to be stable for
a range of finite learning rate ratios. The results imply that differential Stackelberg equilibria are stable for
a range of finite learning rate ratios and that non-equilibria critical points are unstable for a range of finite
learning rate ratios. Together, this means gradient descent-ascent only converges to differential Stackelberg
equilibrium for a range of finite learning rate ratios. To our knowledge, this is the first provable guarantee of
its kind for an implementable first-order method. Moreover, the technical results in this work rely on tools
that have not appeared in the machine learning and optimization communities analyzing games and expose
a number interesting directions of future research. Explicitly, the notion of a guard map, which is arguably
even an obscure tool in modern control and dynamical systems theory, is ‘rediscovered’ in this work as a
technique for analyzing the stability of game dynamics.
2
1.1 Contributions
To motivate our primary theoretical results, we present a self-contained description of what is known about
the local stability of gradient descent-ascent around critical points in Section 3.1. The existing results
primarily concern gradient descent-ascent without timescale separation and with a ratio of learning rates
approaching infinity (see Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of known results in each regime). In contrast, this
paper is focused on characterizing the stability and convergence of gradient descent-ascent across a range of
finite learning rate ratios. To hint at what is achievable in this realm, we present simple examples for which
gradient descent-ascent converges to non-equilibrium critical points and games with differential Stackelberg
equilibrium that are unstable with respect to gradient descent-ascent without timescale separation (see
Examples 1 and 2, Section 3). While the existence of such examples is known (Daskalakis and Panageas, 2018;
Jin et al., 2020; Mazumdar et al., 2020), we demonstrate in them that a finite timescale separation is sufficient
to remedy the undesirable stability properties of gradient descent-ascent without timescale separation.
Toward characterizing this phenomenon in its full generality, we provide intermediate results which are
known, but we prove using technical tools not yet broadly seen and exploited by this community. To
begin, it is known that the set of differential Nash equilibrium are stable with respect to gradient descent-
ascent (Daskalakis and Panageas, 2018; Mazumdar and Ratliff, 2019), and that they remain stable for any
timescale separation parameter τ ∈ (0,∞) (Jin et al., 2020). We provide a proof for this result (Proposition 3)
using the concept of quadratic numerical range (Tretter, 2008). Furthermore, Jin et al. (2020) recently showed
that as the timescale separation τ → ∞, the stable critical points of gradient descent-ascent coincide with
the set of differential Stackelberg equilibrium. We reveal that this result has long existed in the literature
on singularly perturbed systems (Kokotovic et al., 1986, Chapter 2 and the citations within) and provide a
proof (see Proposition 4) using analysis methods from the aforementioned line of work that are novel to the
literature on learning in games from the machine learning and optimization communities in recent years.
A relevant line of study on singularly perturbed systems is that of characterizing the range of perturbation
parameters for which a system is stable (Kokotovic et al., 1986; Saydy, 1996; Saydy et al., 1990). Debatably
introduced by Saydy et al. (1990), guardian or guard maps act as a certificate that the roots of a polynomial
lie in a particular guarded domain for a range of parameter values. Historically, guard maps serve as a tool
for studying the stability of parameterized families of dynamical systems. We bring this tool to learning in
games and construct a map that guards a class of Hurwitz stable matrices parameterized by the timescale
separation parameter τ in order to analyze the range of learning rate ratios for which a critical point is stable
with respect to gradient descent-ascent. This technique leads to the following result.
Informal Statement of Theorem 3. Consider a sufficiently regular critical point x∗ of gradient descent-
ascent. There exists a τ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that x∗ is stable for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) if and only if x∗ is a differential
Stackelberg equilibrium.
Theorem 3 confirms that there does indeed exist a range of finite learning ratios such that a differential
Stackelberg equilibrium is stable with respect to gradient descent-ascent. Moreover, such a range of learning
rate ratios only exists if a critical point is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. As we show in Corollary 2,
the former implication of Theorem 3 nearly immediately implies there exists a τ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that gradient
descent-ascent converges locally asymptotically for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) if and only if x∗ is a differential Stackelberg
equilibrium given a suitably chosen learning rate and deterministic gradient feedback. We give an explicit
asymptotic rate of convergence in Theorem 5 and characterize the iteration complexity in Corollary 3.
Moreover, we extend the convergence guarantees to stochastic gradient feedback in Theorem 6.
The latter implication of Theorem 3 says that there exists a finite learning rate ratio such that a non-
equilibrium critical point of gradient descent-ascent is unstable. Building off of this, we complement the
stability result of Theorem 3 with the following analagous instability result.
Informal Statement of Theorem 4. Consider any stable critical point x∗ of gradient descent-ascent which
is not a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. There exists a finite learning rate ratio τ0 ∈ (0,∞) such that x∗
is unstable for all τ ∈ (τ0,∞).
Theorem 4 establishes that there exists a range of finite learning ratios non-equilibrium critical points are
unstable with respect to gradient descent-ascent. This implies that for a suitably chosen finite timescale sep-
aration, gradient descent-ascent avoids critical points lacking game-theoretic meaning. Together, Theorem 3
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and Theorem 4 answer affirmatively that gradient descent-ascent with timescale separation can guarantee
equilibrium convergence, which answers a standing open question. Moreover, we provide explicit construc-
tions for computing τ∗ and τ0 given a critical point. In fact our construction of τ∗ in Theorem 3 is tight,
and this is confirmed by our numerical experiments.
We finish the theoretical analysis of gradient descent-ascent in this paper by connecting to the litera-
ture on generative adversarial networks. We show under common assumptions on generative adversarial
networks (Mescheder et al., 2018; Nagarajan and Kolter, 2017) that the introduction of gradient penalty
based regularization to the discriminator does not change the set of critical points for the dynamics and,
further, there exists a finite learning rate ratio τ∗ such that for any learning rate ratio τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) and any
non-negative, finite regularization parameter µ, the continuous time limiting regularized learning dynamics
remain stable, and hence, there is a range of learning rates γ1 for which the discrete time update locally
converges asymptotically.
Informal Statement of Theorem 7. Consider training a generative adversarial network with a gradient
penalty (for any fixed regularization parameter µ ∈ (0,∞)) via a zero-sum game with generator network
Gθ, discriminator network Dω, and loss f(θ, ω) such that relaxed realizable assumptions are satisfied for
a critical point (θ∗, ω∗). Then, (θ∗, ω∗) is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium, and for any τ ∈ (0,∞),
gradient descent-ascent converges locally asymptotically. Moreover, an asymptotic rate of convergence is
given in Corollary 5.
The theoretical results we provide are complemented by extensive experiments. In simulation, we explore
a number of interesting behaviors of gradient descent-ascent with timescale separation analyzed theoretically
including differential Stackelberg equilibria shifting from being unstable to stable and non-equilibrium critical
points moving from being stable to unstable. Furthermore, we examine how the vector field and the spectrum
of the game Jacobian evolve as a function of the timescale separation and explore the relationship with the
rate of convergence. We experiment with gradient descent-ascent on the Dirac-GAN proposed by Mescheder
et al. (2018) and illustrate the interplay between timescale separation, regularization, and rate of convergence.
Building on this, we train generative adversarial networks on the CIFAR-10 and CelebA datasets with
regularization and demonstrate that timescale separation can benefit performance and stability. In the
experiments we observe that regularization and timescale separation are intimately connected and there
is an inherent tradeoff between them. This indicates that insights made on simple generative adversarial
network formulations may carry over to the complex problems where players are parameterized by neural
networks.
Collectively, the primary contribution of this paper is the near-complete characterization of the behavior
of gradient descent-ascent with finite timescale separation. Moreover, by introducing a novel set of analysis
tools to this literature, our work opens a number of future research questions. As an aside, we believe these
technical tools open up novel avenues for not only proving results about learning dynamics in games, but
also for synthesizing algorithms.
1.2 Organization
The organization of this paper is as follows. Preliminaries on game theoretic notions of equilibria, gradient-
based learning algorithms, and dynamical systems theory are reviewed in Section 2.
Convergence analysis proceeds in two phases. In Section 3, we study the stability properties of the contin-
uous time limiting dynamical system given a timescale separation between the minimizing and maximizing
players. Specifically, we show the first result on necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence of the
continuous time limiting system corresponding to gradient descent-ascent with time scale separation to game
theoretically meaningful equilibria (i.e., local minmax equilibria in zero-sum games). Following this, in Sec-
tion 4, we provide convergence guarantees for the original discrete time dynamical system of interest (namely,
gradient descent ascent). Using the results in the proceeding section, we show that gradient descent-ascent
converges to a critical point if and only if it is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium (i.e., a sufficiently regular
local minmax). In addition, we characterize the iteration complexity of gradient descent-ascent dynamics
and provide finite-time bounds on local convergence to approximate local Stackelberg equilibria.
We apply the main results in the preceding sections to generative adversarial networks in Section 5,
and in Section 6 we present several illustrative examples including generative adversarial networks where
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we show that tuning the learning rate ratio along with regularization and the exponential moving average
hyperparameter significantly improves the Fre´chet Inception Distance (FID) metric for generative adversarial
networks.
Given its length, prior to concluding in Section 7, we review related work drawing connections to solution
concepts, gradient descent-ascent learning dynamics, applications to adversarial learning where the success
of heuristics provide strong motivation for the theoretical work in this paper, and historical connections to
dynamical systems theory. Throughout the sections proceeding Section 7, we draw connections to related
works and results in an effort to place our results in the context of the literature. We conclude in Section 8
with a discussion on the significance of the results and open questions. The appendix includes the majority
of the detailed proofs as well as additional experiments and commentary.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we review game theoretic and dynamical systems preliminaries. Additionally, we formulate
the class of learning rules analyzed in this paper.
2.1 Game Theoretic Preliminaries
A two–player zero-sum continuous game is defined by a collection of costs (f1, f2) where f1 ≡ f and f2 ≡ −f
with f ∈ Cr(X,R) for some r ≥ 2 and where X = X1 × X2 with each Xi a precompact subset of Rni for
i = 1, 2. Let n = n1 + n2 be the dimension of the joint strategy space X = X1 ×X2. Player i ∈ I seeks to
minimize their cost function fi(xi, x−i) with respect to their choice variable xi where x−i is the vector of all
other actions xj with j 6= i.
There are two natural equilibrium concepts for such games depending on the order of play—i.e., the Nash
equilibrium concept in the case of simultaneous play and the Stackelberg equilibrium concept in the case of
hierarchical play. Each notion of equilibria can be characterized as the intersection points of the reaction
curves of the players (Bas¸ar and Olsder, 1998).
Definition 1 (Local Nash Equilibrium). The joint strategy x ∈ X is a local Nash equilibrium on ∏i∈I Ui ⊂
X, where Ui ⊆ Xi, if f(x1, x2) ≤ f(x′1, x2), for all x′1 ∈ U1 ⊂ X1 and f(x1, x2) ≥ f(x1, x′2) for all
x′2 ∈ U2 ⊂ X2. Furthermore, if the inequalities are strict, we say x is a strict local Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Local Stackelberg Equilibrium). Consider Ui ⊂ Xi for i = 1, 2 where, without loss of general-
ity, player 1 is the leader (minimizing player) and player 2 is the follower (maximizing player). The strategy
x∗1 ∈ U1 is a local Stackelberg solution for the leader if, ∀x1 ∈ U1,
supx2∈rU2 (x∗1) f(x
∗
1, x2) ≤ supx2∈rU2 (x1) f(x1, x2),
where rU2(x1) = {y ∈ U2|f(x1, y) ≥ f(x1, x2),∀x2 ∈ U2} is the reaction curve. Moreover, for any x∗2 ∈
rU2(x
∗
1), the joint strategy profile (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) ∈ U1 × U2 is a local Stackelberg equilibrium on U1 × U2.
Predicated on existence,1 equilibria can be characterized in terms of sufficient conditions on player costs.
Indeed, in continuous games, first and second order conditions on player cost functions leads to a differential
characterization (i.e., necessary and sufficient conditions) of local Nash equilibria reminiscent of optimality
conditions in nonlinear programming (Ratliff et al., 2016).2
We denote Difi as the derivative of fi with respect to xi, Dijfi as the partial derivative of Difi with
respect to xj , D
2
i fi as the partial derivative of Difi with respect to xi, and D(·) as the total derivative.3
1Characterizing existence of equilibria is outside the scope of this work. However, we remark that Nash equilibria exist for
convex costs on compact and convex strategy spaces and Stackelberg equilibria exist on compact strategy spaces (Bas¸ar and
Olsder, 1998, Thm. 4.3, Thm. 4.8, & Sec. 4.9).
2The differential characterization of local Nash equilibria in continuous games was first reported in (Ratliff et al., 2013).
Genericity and structural stability we studied in general-sum settings in (Ratliff et al., 2014) and in zero-sum settings in
(Mazumdar and Ratliff, 2019).
3Example: given f(x, h(x)), Df = D1f +D2f ◦Dh.
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Proposition 1 (Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Local Nash (Ratliff et al., 2016, Thm. 1 & 2)). If
x is a local Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game ((f,−f), then D1f(x) = 0, −D2f(x) = 0, D21f(x) ≥ 0
and D22f(x) ≤ 0. On the other hand, if D1f(x) = 0, D2f(x) = 0, and D21f(x) > 0 and D22f(x) < 0, then
x ∈ X is a local Nash equilibrium.
The following definition, characterized by sufficient conditions for a local Nash equilibrium as defined in
Definition 1, was first introduced in (Ratliff et al., 2013).
Definition 3 (Differential Nash Equilibrium (Ratliff et al., 2013)). The joint strategy x ∈ X is a differential
Nash equilibrium if D1f(x) = 0, −D2f(x) = 0, D21f(x) > 0 and D22f(x) < 0.
Analogous sufficient conditions can be stated to characterize a local Stackelberg equilibrium as defined
in Definition 2.4 Suppose that f ∈ Cr+1(X,R) for some r ≥ 1. Given a point x∗ at which det(D22f(x∗)) 6= 0,
the implicit function theorem (Abraham et al., 2012, Thm. 2.5.7) implies there is a neighborhood U1 of x
∗
1
and a unique Cr map h : U1 → Rn2 such that for all x1 ∈ U1, D2f(x1, h(x1)) = 0. The map h : x1 7→ x2 is
referred to as the implicit map. Further, Dh ≡ −(D22f)−1 ◦D21f . Note that det(D22f(x)) 6= 0 is a generic
condition (cf. (Fiez et al., 2020, Lem. C.1)). Let Df(x1, h(x1)) be the total derivative of f and analogously,
let D2f be the second-order total derivative.
Definition 4 (Differential Stackelberg Equilibrium (Fiez et al., 2020)). The joint strategy x = (x1, x2) ∈
X is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium if D1f(x1, x2) = 0, −D2f(x1, x2) = 0, D2f(x1, x2) > 0, and
D22f(x1, x2) < 0.
Observe that in a general sum setting the first order conditions for player 1 are equivalent the total
derivative of f being zero at the candidate critical point where x2 is implicitly defined as a function of x1 via
the implicit mapping theorem applied to D2f(x1, x2) = 0. Since in this paper and in Definition 4, the class of
games is zero sum, D1f(x1, x2) = 0 and D2f(x1, x2) = 0 (along with the condition that det(D
2
2f(x1, x2)) 6= 0
which is implied by the second order conditions) are sufficient to imply that the total derivative Df(x1, x1)
is zero.
The Jacobian of the first order necessary and sufficient condition—i.e., conditions that define potential
candidate differential Nash and/or Stackelberg equilibria—is a useful mathematical object for understanding
convergence properties of gradient based learning rules as we will see in subsequent sections. Consider the
vector of individual gradients g(x) = (D1f(x),−D2f(x)) which define first order conditions for a differential
Nash equilibrium. Let J(x) denote the Jacobian of g(x) which is defined by
J(x) =
[
D21f1(x) D12f1(x)
D21f2(x) D
2
2f2(x)
]
. (1)
We recall from Fiez et al. (2020) an alternative (to Definition 4, but equivalent set of sufficient conditions
for a differential Stackelberg in terms of J(x). Let S1(·) denote the Schur complement of (·) with respect to
the n2 × n block-row matrix in (·).
Proposition 2 (Proposition 1 Fiez et al. (2020)). Consider a zero-sum game (f,−f) defined by f ∈
Cr(X,R) with r ≥ 2 and player 1 (without loss of generality) taken to be the leader (minimizing player).
Let x∗ satisfy −D2f(x∗) = 0 and −D22f(x∗) > 0. Then Df(x∗) = 0 and S1(J(x∗)) > 0 if and only if x∗ is
a differential Stackelberg equilibria.
Remark 1 (A comment on the genericity of differential Stackelberg/Nash equilibria.). Due to Fiez et al.
(2020, Theorem 1), differential Stackelberg are generic amongst local Stackelberg equilibria and, similarly,
due to Mazumdar and Ratliff (2019, Theorem 2), differential Nash equilibria are generic amongst local Nash
equilibria. This means that the property of being a differential Stackelberg (respectively, differential Nash)
equilibrium in a zero-sum game is generic in the class of zero-sum games defined by C2(X,R) functions—
that is, for almost all (in some formall sense) zero-sum games, all the local Stackelberg/Nash are differential
Stackelberg/Nash.
4The differential characterization of Stackelberg equilibria was first introduced in (Fiez et al., 2019). The genericity and
structural structural stability were shown in (Fiez et al., 2020).
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2.2 Gradient-based learning algorithms
As noted above, in this paper we focus on settings in which agents or players in this game are seeking
equilibria of the game via a learning algorithm. We study arguably the most natural learning rule in zero-
sum continuous games: gradient descent-ascent (GDA). This gradient-based learning rule is a simultaneous
gradient play algorithm in that agents update their actions at each iteration simultaneously.
Gradient descent-ascent is defined as follows. At iteration k, each agent i ∈ I updates their choice
variable xi,k ∈ Xi by the process
xi,k+1 = xi,k − γigi(xi,k, x−i,k) (2)
where γi is agent i’s learning rate, and gi(x) is agent i’s gradient-based update mechanism. For simultaneous
gradient play,
g(x) = (D1f1(x), D2f2(x)) (3)
is the vector of individual gradients and in a zero-sum setting, GDA is defined using g(x) = (D1f(x),−D2f(x))
where the first player is the minimizing player and the second player is the maximizing player.
One of the key contributions of this paper is that we provide convergence rates for settings in which
there is a timescale separation between the learning processes of the minimizing and maximizing players—
i.e., settings in which the agents learning rates γi are not homogeneous. Define Γ = blkdiag(γ1In1 , γ2In2)
where Ini denotes the ni × ni identity matrix. Let τ = γ2/γ1 be the learning rate ratio and define Λτ =
blockdiag(In1 , τIn2). The τ -GDA dynamics are given by
xk+1 = xk − γ1Λτg(xk). (4)
Tools for Convergence Analysis. We analyze the iteration complexity or local asymptotic rate of con-
vergence of learning rules of the form (2) in the neighborhood of an equilibrium. Given two real valued
functions F (k) and G(k), we write F (k) = O(G(k)) if there exists a positive constant c > 0 such that
|F (k)| ≤ c|G(k)|. For example, consider iterates generated by (2) with initial condition x0 and critical point
x∗. Suppose that we show ‖xk+1−x∗‖ ≤Mk‖x0−x∗‖. Then, we write F (k) = O(Mk) where c = ‖x0−x∗‖.
2.3 Dynamical Systems Primer
In this paper, we study learning rules employed by agents seeking game-theoretically meaningful equilibria
in continuous games. Dynamical systems tools for both continuous and discrete time play a crucial role in
this analysis.
Stability. Before we proceed, we recall and remark on some facts from dynamical systems theory concern-
ing stability of equilibria in the continuous-time dynamics
x˙ = −g(x) (5)
relevant to convergence analysis for the discrete-time learning dynamics in (2). Observe that equilibria are
shared between (2) and (5). Our focus is on the subset of equilibria that satisfy Definition 4, and the
subset thereof defined in Definition 3. Recall the following equivalent characterizations of stability for an
equilibrium of (5) in terms of the Jacobian matrix J(x) = Dg(x).
Theorem 1 ((Khalil, 2002, Thm. 4.15)). Consider a critical point x∗ of g(x). The following are equivalent:
(a) x∗ is a locally exponentially stable equilibrium of x˙ = −g(x); (b) spec(−J(x∗)) ⊂ C◦−; (c) there exists a
symmetric positive-definite matrix P = P> > 0 such that P J(x∗) + J(x∗)>P > 0.
It was shown in (Ratliff et al., 2016, Prop. 2) that if the spectrum of −J(x) at a differential Nash equi-
librium x is in the open left-half complex plane—i.e., spec(−J(x)) ⊂ C◦−—then x is a locally exponentially
stable equilibrium of (5). Indeed, if all agents learn at the same rate so Γ = γIn in (2), then a straightfor-
ward application of the Spectral Mapping Theorem (Callier and Desoer, 2012, Thm. 4.7) ensures that an
exponentially stable equilibrium x∗ for (5) is locally exponentially stable in (2) so long as γ > 0 is chosen
sufficiently small (Chasnov et al., 2019). However, this observation does not directly tell us how to select γ
or the resulting iteration complexity in an asymptotic or finite-time sense; furthermore, this line of reasoning
does not apply when agents learn at different rates (Γ 6= γI in (2)).
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Limiting dynamical systems. The continuous time dynamical system takes the form x˙ = −Λτg(x) due
to the timescale separation τ . Such a system is known as a singularly perturbed system or a multi-timescale
system in the dynamical systems theory literature (Kokotovic et al., 1986), particularly where τ−1 is small.
Singularly perturbed systems are classically expressed as
x˙ = −D1f1(x, z)
z˙ = −D2f2(x, z) (6)
where  = τ−1 is most often a physically meaningful quantity inherent to some dynamical system that
describes the evolution of some physical phenomena; e.g., in circuits it may be a constant related to device
material properties, and in communication networks, it is often the speed at which data flows through a
physical medium such as cable.
In the classical asymptotic analysis of a system of the form (6)—which we write more generally as
x˙ = F (t, x, ) for the purpose of the following observations—the goal is to obtain an approximate solution,
say x˜(t, ), such that the approximation error x(t, )− x˜(t, ) is small in some norm for small || and, further,
the approximate solution is expressed in terms of a reduced order system. Such results have significance in
terms of revealing underlying structural properties of the original system x˙ = F (t, x, ) and its corresponding
state x(t, ) for small ||. One of the contributions of this work is that we take a similar analysis approach in
order to reveal underlying structural properties of the optimization landscape of zero-sum games/minimax
optimization problems. Indeed, asymptotic methods can reveal multiple timescale structures that are in-
herent in many machine learning problems, as we observe in this paper for zero-sum games. One key
point of separation in applying dynamical systems theory to the study of algorithms versus physical system
dynamics—in particular, learning in games—this parameter no longer necessarily is a physical quantity but is
most often a hyper-parameter subject to design. In this paper, treating the inverse of the learning rate ratio
as a timescale separation parameter, we combine the asymptotic analysis tools from singular perturbation
theory with tools from algebra to obtain convergence guarantees.
Leveraging Linearization to Infer Qualitative Properties. The Hartman-Grobman theorem asserts
that it is possible to continuously deform all trajectories of a nonlinear system onto trajectories of the
linearization at a fixed point of the nonlinear system. Informally, the theorem states that if the linearization
of the nonlinear dynamical system x˙ = F (x) around a fixed point x¯—i.e., F (x¯) = 0—has no zero or purely
imaginary eigenvalues, then there exists a neighborhood U of x¯ and a homeomorphism h : U → Rn—i.e.,
h, h−1 ∈ C(U,Rn)—taking trajectories of x˙ = F (x) and mapping them onto those of z˙ = DF (x¯)z. In
particular, h(x¯) = 0.
Given a dynamical system x˙ = F (x), the state or solution of the system at time t starting from x at time
t0 is called the flow and is denoted φ
t(x).
Theorem 2 (Hartman-Grobman (Sastry, 1999, Thm. 7.3); (Teschl, 2000, Thm. 9.9)). Consider the n-
dimensional dynamical system x˙ = F (x) with equilibrium point x¯. If DF (x¯) has no zero or purely imaginary
eigenvalues, there is a homeomorphism h defined on a neighborhood U of x¯ taking orbits of the flow φt to those
of the linear flow etDF (x¯) of x˙ = F (x)—that is, the flows are topologically conjugate. The homeomorphism
preserves the sense of the orbits and is chosen to preserve parameterization by time.
The above theorem says that the qualitative properties of the nonlinear system x˙ = F (x) in the vicinity
(which is determined by the neighborhood U) of an isolated equilibrium x¯ are determined by its linearization
if the linearization has no eigenvalues on the imaginary axes in the complex plane. We also remark that
Hartman-Grobman can also be applied to discrete time maps (cf. Sastry (1999, Thm. 2.18)) with the same
qualitative outcome.
Internally Chain Transitivity. In proving results for stochastic gradient descent-ascent, we leverage
what is known as the ordinary differential equation method in which the flow of the limiting continuous
time system starting at sample points from the stochastic updates of the players actions is compared to
asymptotic psuedo-trajectories—i.e., linear interpolations between sample points. To understand stability
in the stochastic case, we need the notion of internally chain transitive sets. For more detail, the reader is
referred to (Alongi and Nelson, 2007, Chap. 2–3).
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A closed set U ⊂ Rm is an invariant set for a differential equation x˙ = F (x) if any trajectory x(t)
with x(0) ∈ U satisfies x(t) ∈ U for all t ∈ R. Let φt be a flow on a metric space (X, d). Given ε > 0,
T > 0 and x, y ∈ X, an (ε, T )-chain from x to y with respect to φt and d is a pair of finite sequences x =
x0, x1, . . . , xk−1, xk = y inX and t0, . . . , tk−1 in [T,∞), denoted together by (x0, x1, . . . , xk−1, xk; t0, . . . , tk−1),
such that d(φti(xi), xi+1) < ε for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , k − 1. A set U ⊆ X is (internally) chain transitive with
respect to φt if U is a non-empty closed invariant set with respect to φt such that for each x, y ∈ U ,  > 0
and T > 0 there exists an (ε, T )-chain from x to y. A compact invariant set U is invariantly connected if it
cannot be decomposed into two disjoint closed nonempty invariant sets. It is easy to see that every internally
chain transitive set is invariantly connected.
3 Stability of Continuous Time GDA with Timescale Separation
To characterize the convergence of τ -GDA, we begin by studying its continuous time limiting system
x˙ = −Λτg(x), (7)
where we recall that Λτ = blockdiag(In1 , τIn2). Throughout this section, the class of zero-sum games we
consider are sufficiently smooth, meaning that f ∈ Cr(X,R) for some r ≥ 2. The Jacobian of the system
from (7) in zero-sum games of the form (f1, f2) = (f,−f) is given as
Jτ (x) =
[
D21f(x) D12f(x)
−τD>12f(x) −τD22f(x)
]
. (8)
By analyzing the stability of the continuous time system as a function of the timescale separation τ using
the Jacobian from (8) in this section, we can then draw conclusions about the stability and convergence of
the discrete time system τ -GDA in Section 4.
The organization of this section is as follows. To begin, we present a collection of preliminary observations
in Section 3.1 regarding the stability of continuous time gradient descent-ascent with timescale separation to
motivate the results in the subsequent subsections by establishing known results and introducing alternative
analysis methods that the technical results in this paper build on. Then, in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively,
we present necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of the continuous time system around critical
points in terms of the learning rate ratio along with sufficient conditions to guarantee the instability of the
continuous time system around non-equilibrium critical points in terms of the timescale separation.
3.1 Preliminary Observations
In Figure 1 we present a graphical representation of known results on the stability of gradient descent-
ascent with timescale separation in continuous time, where we remark that such results nearly directly imply
equivalent conclusions regarding the discrete time system τ -GDA with a suitable choice of learning rate γ1.
The primary focus of past work has been on the edge cases of τ = 1 and τ → ∞. For τ = 1, the set of
differential Nash equilibrium are stable, but differential Stackelberg equilibrium may be stable or unstable,
and non-equilibrium critical points can be stable. As τ →∞, the set of differential Nash equilibrium remain
stable, each differential Stackelberg equilibrium is guaranteed to become stable, and each non-equilibrium
critical point must be unstable. We fill the gap between the known results by providing results as a function
of finite τ . With an eye toward this goal, we now provide examples and preliminary results that illustrate
the type of guarantees that may be achievable for a range of finite learning rate ratios.
To start off, we consider the set of differential Nash equilibrium. It is nearly immediate from the structure
of the Jacobian that each differential Nash equilibrium is stable for τ = 1 (Daskalakis and Panageas, 2018;
Mazumdar et al., 2020). Moreover, Jin et al. (2020) showed that regardless of the value of τ ∈ (0,∞), the
set of differential Nash equilibrium remain stable. In other words, the desirable stability characteristics of
differential Nash equilibrium are retained for any choice of timescale separation. We state this result as a
proposition for later reference and since our proof technique relies on the concept of quadratic numerical
range (Tretter, 2008), which has not appeared previously in this context. The proof of Proposition 3 is
provided in Appendix B.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the known stability results on τ -GDA in relationship to local equilibrium
concepts with τ = 1 and τ → ∞. The acronyms in the figure are differential Nash equilibria (DNE),
differential Stackelberg equilibria (DSE), and locally asymptotically stable equilibria (LASE). Note that
the terminology of locally asymptotically stable equilibria refers to the set of stable critical points with
respect to the system x˙ = −Λτg(x) for the given τ . Fiez et al. (2020) reported the subset relationship
between differential Nash equilibria and differential Stackelberg equilibria and Jin et al. (2020) gave a similar
characterization in terms of local Nash and local minmax. For the regime of τ = 1, Daskalakis and Panageas
(2018); Mazumdar et al. (2020) presented the relationship between the set of differential Nash equilibrium and
the set of locally asymptotically stable equilibrium, and Jin et al. (2020) provided the relationship between
the set of differential Stackelberg equilibrium and the set of locally asymptotically stable equilibrium. Finally,
Jin et al. (2020) reported the characterization of the locally asymptotically stable equilibrium as τ →∞. The
missing pieces in the literature are results as a function of finite τ , which we answer in this work definitively.
Proposition 3. Consider a zero-sum game (f1, f2) = (f,−f) defined by f ∈ Cr(X,R) for some r ≥ 2.
Suppose that x∗ is a differential Nash equilibrium. Then, spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦− for all τ ∈ (0,∞).
Fiez et al. (2020) show that the set of differential Nash equilibrium is a subset of the set of differential
Stackelberg equilibrium. In other words, any differential Nash equilibrium is a differential Stackelberg equi-
librium, but a differential Stackelberg equilibrium need not be a differential Nash equilibrium. Moreover, Jin
et al. (2020) show that the result of Proposition 3 fails to extend from differential Nash equilibria to the
broader class of differential Stackelberg equilibrium. Indeed, not all differential Stackelberg equilibrium are
stable with respect to the continuous time limiting dynamics of gradient descent-ascent without timescale
separation. However, as the following example demonstrates, differential Stackelberg equilibrium that are
unstable without timescale separation can become stable for a range of finite timescale learning rate ratios.
Example 1. Within the class of zero-sum games, there exists differential Stackelberg equilibrium that are
unstable with respect to x˙ = −g(x) and stable with respect to x˙ = −Λτg(x) for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) where τ∗ is
finite. Indeed, consider the quadratic zero-sum game defined by the cost
f(x1, x2) =
1
2
[
x1
x2
]> 
−v 0 −v 0
0 12v 0
1
2v−v 0 − 12v 0
0 12v 0 −v
[x1x2
]
where x1, x2 ∈ R2 and v > 0. The unique critical point of the game given by x∗ = (0, 0) is a differential
Stackelberg equilibrium since g(x∗) = 0, S1(J(x∗)) = diag(v, v/4) > 0 and −D22f(x∗) = diag(v/2, v) > 0.
The spectrum of the Jacobian of Λτg(x) is given by
spec(Jτ (x
∗)) =
{v(2τ + 1±√4τ2 − 8τ + 1)
4
,
v(τ − 2±√τ2 − 12τ + 4)
4
}
.
Observe that for τ = 1, spec(Jτ (x
∗)) = { 14 (3±i
√
3)v, 14 (−1±i
√
7)v} 6⊂ C◦+ for any v > 0 so that the differen-
tial Stackelberg equilibrium x∗ is never stable for the choice of τ . However, for any v > 0, spec(Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦+
for all τ ∈ (2,∞), meaning that the differential Stackelberg equilibrium x∗ is indeed stable with respect to the
dynamics x˙ = −Λτg(x) for a range of finite learning rate ratios.
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We explore Example 1 further via simulations in Section 6.1. The key takeaway from Example 1 is that
it is clearly not always necessary for the timescale separation τ to approach infinity in order to guarantee the
stability of a differential Stackelberg equilibrium and instead there exists a sufficient finite learning rate ratio.
Put simply, the undesirable property of differential Stackelberg equilibria not being stable with respect to
gradient descent-ascent without timescale separation can potentially be remedied with only a finite timescale
separation.
It is well-documented that some stable critical points of the continuous time gradient descent-ascent
limiting dynamics without timescale separation can lack game-theoretic meaning, as they may be neither a
differential Nash equilibria nor differential Stackelberg equilibria (Daskalakis and Panageas, 2018; Jin et al.,
2020; Mazumdar et al., 2020). The following example demonstrates that such undesirable critical points
that are stable without timescale separation can become unstable for a range of finite learning ratios.
Example 2. Within the class of zero-sum games, there exists non-equilibrium critical points that are stable
with respect to x˙ = −g(x) and unstable with respect to x˙ = −Λτg(x) for all τ ∈ (τ0,∞) where τ0 is finite.
Indeed, consider a zero sum game defined by the cost
f(x1, x2) =
1
2
[
x1
x2
]> 
1
2v 0
1
2v 0
0 − 14v 0 12v
1
2v 0
1
4v 0
0 12v 0 − 12v
[x1x2
]
(9)
where x1, x2 ∈ R2 and v > 0. The unique critical point of the game given by x∗ = (0, 0) is neither a
differential Nash equilibrium nor a differential Stackelberg equilibrium since D21f(x
∗) = diag(v/2,−v/4) ≯ 0
and −D22f(x∗) = diag(−v/4, v/2) ≯ 0. The spectrum of the Jacobian of Λτg(x) is given by
spec(Jτ (x
∗)) =
{v(2τ − 1±√4τ2 − 12τ + 1)
8
,
v(2− τ ±√τ2 − 12τ + 4)
8
}
.
Given τ = 1, spec(Jτ (x
∗)) = { 18 (1 ± i
√
7)v, 18 (1 ± i
√
7)v} ⊂ C◦+ for any v > 0 so that the non-equilibrium
critical point x∗ is in fact stable for the choice of timescale separation τ . However, for any v > 0,
spec(Jτ (x
∗)) 6⊂ C◦+ for all τ ∈ (2,∞), meaning that the non-equilibrium critical point x∗ is unstable with
respect to the dynamics x˙ = −Λτg(x) for a range of finite learning rate ratios.
The game construction from (9) is quadratic and as a result has a unique critical point. Games can be
constructed in which critical points lacking game-theoretic meaning that are stable without timescale separa-
tion become unstable for all τ > τ0 even in the presence of multiple equilibria. Indeed, consider a zero-sum
game defined by the cost
f(x1, x2) =
5
4
(
x211 + 2x11x21 +
1
2x
2
21 − 12x212 + 2x12x22 − x222
)
(x11 − 1)2
+ x211
(∑2
i=1(x1i − 1)2 − (x2i − 1)2
)
.
(10)
This game has critical points at (0, 0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1, 1), and (−4.73, 0.28,−92.47, 0.53). The critical points
(1, 1, 1, 1) and (−4.73, 0.28,−92.47, 0.53) are differential Nash equilibria and are consequently stable for any
choice of τ > 0. The critical point x∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0) is neither a differential Nash equilibrium nor a differential
Stackelberg equilibrium. Moreover, the Jacobian of Λτg(x
∗) for the game defined by (9) with v = 5 is identical
to that for the game defined by (10). As a result, we know that x∗ is stable without timescale separation,
but spec(Jτ (x
∗)) 6⊂ C◦+ for all τ ∈ (2,∞) so that the non-equilibrium critical point x∗ is again unstable with
respect to the dynamics x˙ = −Λτg(x) for a range of finite learning rate ratios.
We investigate the game defined in (10) from Example 2 with simulations in Section 6.2. In an analogous
manner to Example 1, Example 2 demonstrates that it is not always necessary for the timescale separation
τ to approach infinity in order to guarantee non-equilibrium critical points become unstable as there can
exist a sufficient finite learning rate ratio. This is to say that the unwanted property of non-equilibrium
critical points being stable without timescale separation can also potentially be remedied with only a finite
timescale separation.
The examples of this section have provided evidence that there exists a range of finite learning rate
ratios for which differential Stackelberg equilibrium are stable and a range of learning rate ratios for which
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non-equilibrium critical points are unstable. Yet, no result has appeared in the literature on gradient
descent-ascent with timescale separation confirming this behavior in general. We focus on doing precisely
that in the subsection that follows. Before doing so, we remark on the closest existing result. As mentioned
previously Jin et al. (2020) show that as τ →∞, the set of stable critical points with respect to the dynamics
x˙ = −Λτg(x) coincide with the set of differential Stackelberg equilibrium. However, an equivalent result in
the context of general singularly perturbed systems has been known in the literature (cf. Kokotovic et al.
1986, Chap. 2). We give a proof based on this type of analysis because it reveals a new set of analysis tools
to the study of game-theoretic formulations of machine learning and optimization problems; a proof sketch
is given below while the full proof is given in Appendix F.
Proposition 4. Consider a zero-sum game (f1, f2) = (f,−f) defined by f ∈ Cr(X,R) for some r ≥ 2.
Suppose that x∗ is such that g(x∗) = 0 and det(D22f2(x
∗)) 6= 0. Then, as τ →∞, spec(Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦+ if and
only if x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof Sketch. The basic idea in showing this result is that there is a (local) transformation of coordinates
from the linearized dynamics of x˙ = −Λτg(x), which we write as
x˙ =
[
A11 A12
−τA>12 τA22
]
x,
in a neighborhood of a critical point to an upper triangular system that depends parametrically on τ and
hence, the asymptotic behavior is readily obtainable from the block diagonal components of the system in
the new coordinates. Indeed, consider the change of variables z = x2 + L(τ
−1)x1 for the second player so
that [
x˙1
z˙
]
=
[
A11 −A12L(τ−1) A12
R(L, τ) A22 + τ
−1L(τ−1)A12
] [
x1
z
]
(11)
where
R(L, τ) = −A>12 −A22L(τ−1) + τ−1L(τ−1)A11 − τ−1L(τ−1)A12L(τ−1) = 0
A transformation of coordinates L(τ) such that R(L, τ) = 0 always exists (cf. Lemma 7, Appendix F). Hence,
the characteristic equation of (11) can be expressed as
χ(s, τ) = τnχs(s, τ)χf (p, τ) = 0
where χs(s, τ) = det(sI−(A11−A12L(τ−1))) and χf (p, τ) = det(pI−(A22 +τ−1A12L(τ−1))) with p = sτ−1.
As τ → ∞, L(τ−1) → L(0) = −A−122 A>12. Consequently, n of the eigenvalues of x˙ = −Λτg(x), denoted by
{λ1, . . . , λn1}, are the roots of the slow characteristic equation χs(s, τ) = 0 and the rest of the eigenvalues
{λn1+1, . . . , λn1+n2} are denoted by λi = νj/ε for i = n1 + j and j ∈ {1, . . . , n2} where {ν1, . . . , νn2} are the
roots of the fast characteristic equation χf (p, τ) = 0. The roots of χs(s, τ) are precisely those of the (first)
Schur complement of −Jτ (x∗) while the roots of χf (p, τ) are precisely those of D22f(x∗).
This simple transformation of coordinates to an upper triangular dynamical system shown in (11) leads
immediately to the asymptotic result in Proposition 4. It also shows that if the eigenavlues of S1(Jτ (x
∗))
are distinct5 and similarly, so are those of D22f(x
∗) (although, S1(Jτ (x∗)) and D22f(x
∗) are allowed to have
eigenvalues in common), then the asymptotic results from Proposition 4 imply the following approximations
for the elements of spec(Jτ (x
∗)):
λi = λi(S1(Jτ (x
∗)) +O(τ−1), i = 1, . . . , n1,
λj+n1 = τ(λj(−D22f(x∗)) +O(τ−1)), j = 1, . . . , n2.
This follows simply by observing that when the eigenvalues are distinct, the derivatives ds/dτ and dp/dτ are
well-defined by the implicit mapping theorem and the total derivative of χs(s, τ) and χf (p, τ), respectively.
5Distinct eigenvalues is a generic property in the space of n× n real matrices.
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3.2 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Stability
The proof of Proposition 4 provides some intuition for the next result, which is one of our main contri-
butions. Indeed, as shown in Kokotovic et al. (1986, Chap. 2), as τ → ∞ the first n1 eigenvalues of
x˙ = −Λτg(x) tend to fixed positions in the complex plane defined by the eigenvalues of −S1 = −(D21f(x∗)−
D12f(x
∗)(D22f(x
∗))−1D>12f(x
∗)), while the remaining n2 eigenvalues tend to infinity, with the linear rate
τ , along as asymptotes defined by the eigenvalues of D22f(x
∗). The asymptotic splitting of the spectrum
provides some intuition for the following result.
Theorem 3. Consider a zero-sum game (f1, f2) = (f,−f) defined by f ∈ Cr(X,R) for some r ≥ 2. Suppose
that x∗ is such that g(x∗) = 0 and S1(J(x∗)) and D22f2(x
∗) are non-singular. There exists a τ∗ ∈ (0,∞)
such that spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦− for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) if and only if x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium.
Before getting into the proof sketch, we provide some intuition for the construction of τ∗ and along the
way revive an old analysis tool from dynamical systems theory which turns out to be quite powerful in
analyzing stability properties of parameterized systems.
Construction of τ∗. There is still the question of how to construct such a τ∗ and do so in a way that
is as tight as possible. Recall Theorem 1 which states that a matrix is exponentially stable if and only if
there exists a symmetric positive definite P = P> > 0 such that PJτ (x∗) + J>τ (x
∗)P > 0. The operator
L(P ) = J>τ (x∗)P + PJτ (x∗) is known as the Lyapunov operator. Given a positive definite Q = Q> > 0,
−Jτ (x∗) is stable if and only if there exists a unique solution P = P> to
((J>τ (x
∗)⊗ I) + (I ⊗ J>τ (x∗)))vec(P ) = (J>τ (x∗)⊕ J>τ (x∗))vec(P ) = vec(Q) (12)
where ⊗ and ⊕ denote the Kronecker product and Kronecker sum, respectively.6 The existence of a unique
solution P occurs if and only if J>τ and −J>τ have no eigenvalues in common. Hence, using the fact
that eigenvalues vary continuously, if we imagine varying τ and examining the eigenvalues of the map
(J>τ (x
∗)⊕ J>τ (x∗)), this will tell us the range of τ for which spec(−Jτ (x∗)) remains in C◦−.
This method of varying parameters and determining when the roots of a polynomial (or correspondingly,
the eigenvalues of a map) cross the boundary of a domain uses what is known as a guardian or guard map
(cf. Saydy et al. (1990)). In particular, the guard map provides a certificate that the roots of a polynomial
lie in a particular guarded domain for a range of parameter values. Formally, let X be the set of all n × n
real matrices or the set of all polynomials of degree n with real coefficients. Consider S an open subset of X
with closure S¯ and boundary ∂S. The map ν : X → C is said to be a guardian map for S if for all x ∈ S¯,
ν(x) = 0 ⇐⇒ x ∈ ∂S.
Consider an open subset Ω of the complex plane that is symmetric with respect to the real axis (e.g., the
open left-half complex plane C◦−). Then, elements of S(Ω) = {A ∈ Rn×n : spec(A) ⊂ Ω} are said to be
stable relative to Ω. Given a pathwise connected subset U of R, a domain S(Ω) and a guard map ν, it is
known that the family {A(τ) : τ ∈ U} is stable relative to Ω if and only if (i) it is nominally stable—i.e.,
A(τ0) ∈ S(Ω) for some τ0 ∈ U—and (ii) ν(A(τ)) 6= 0 for all τ ∈ U (Saydy et al., 1990, Prop. 1). To build
intuition for the guard map, consider the scalar game on R2 so that the Jacobian at a critical point has the
structure
Jτ (x) =
[
a b
−τb τd
]
. (13)
It is known that a critical point x is stable if det(Jτ (x)) > 0 and tr(Jτ (x)) > 0. Thus, it is fairly easy to
see that ν : A 7→ det(A) tr(A) is a guard map for the 2× 2 Hurwitz stable matrices S(C◦−). Now, the trace
operator can be generalized using a bialternate product, which is denoted A B for matrices A and B and
defined by A  B = 12 (A ⊗ B + B ⊗ A) so that 2(A  I) = A ⊕ A (cf. Govaerts (2000, Sec. 4.4.4)). For
2 × 2 matrices such as Jτ (x) in (13), 2(A  I)) = a + τd = tr(A). Hence, ν : A 7→ det(A) det(2(A  I))
generalizes the map ν : A 7→ det(A) tr(A) to an n × n matrix. Replacing A with the parameterized family
6See Lancaster and Tismenetsky (1985); Magnus (1988) for more detail on the definition and properties of these mathematical
operators, and Appendix E for more detail directly related to their use in this paper.
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Figure 2: Guard map ν(τ) and real parts of the eigenvalues of the vectorized Lyapunov operator −(Jτ (x∗)
Jτ (x
∗)) using the reduction via the duplication matrix for the quadratic example given in Example 1. The
largest real positive root of ν(τ) is τ∗ = 2 and in the right plot, we see that all the real parts of the eigenvalues
of the Lyapunov operator are negative indicating stability. The right most graphic is a cartoon visualization
of the guard map method: the outer grey region represents Cn×n, the blue region represents the Hurwitz
stable n×n matrices S(C◦−), the green region represents the parameterized class of matrices {Jτ (x∗)}τ , and
the curve cutting through the regions is the guard map ν(τ). The goal is to fine the subset of {Jτ (x∗)}τ
that lie within S(C◦−), which can be done by reducing the problem to finding the roots of ν(τ).
of matrices −Jτ (x∗), we have the guard map ν(τ) = det(−Jτ (x∗)) det(2(−Jτ (x∗)  I)). It is fairly easy to
see that this polynomial in τ also guards the open left-half complex plane C◦−; details are given in the full
proof in Appendix E. In fact, using the Schur complement formula,
det(−Jτ (x∗)) = τn2 det(D22f(x∗)) det(−S1)
so that if x∗ is a non-degenerate (a condition implied by the hyperbolicity of x∗ for S1 and D22f(x
∗)),
det(−Jτ (x∗)) does not change the properties of the guard map. In particular, the values of τ ∈ (0,∞) where
ν(τ) = 0 does not depend on det(−Jτ (x∗)). Hence, we can use the reduced guard map
ν(τ) = det(2(−Jτ (x∗) I)) = det(−Jτ (x∗)⊕ (−Jτ (x∗)).
Reflecting back to (12), we see that this guard map in τ is closely related to the vectorization of the Lyapunov
operator and of course, this is not a coincidence. For any symmetric positive definite Q = Q> > 0, there
will be a symmetric positive definite solution P = P> > 0 of the Lyapunov equation
[−(J>τ (x∗)⊕ J>τ (x∗))]vec(P ) = vec(−Q)
if and only if the operator −(Jτ (x∗)⊕ Jτ (x∗)) is non-singular. In turn, this is equivalent to det(−(Jτ (x∗)⊕
Jτ (x
∗))) 6= 0. Hence, to find the range of τ for which, given any Q = Q> > 0, the solution switches from a
positive definite P = P> > 0 to a negative definite P = P> < 0 we need to find the value of τ such that
ν(τ) = det(−(Jτ (x∗)⊕ Jτ (x∗))) = 0—i.e., where it hits the boundary ∂S(C◦−).
Proof Sketch for Theorem 3. The ‘necessary’ direction follows directly from the above observation, while the
‘sufficiency’ direction follows by construction.
We leverage the guard map as described above to construct τ∗. Define  as an operator that generates
an 12n(n+ 1)× 12n(n+ 1) matrix from a matrix A ∈ Rn×n such that
AA = H+n (A⊕A)Hn
where H+n = (H
>
n Hn)
−1H>n is the (left) pseudo-inverse of Hn, a full column rank duplication matrix (cf. Ap-
pendix C) which maps a n2 (n+ 1) vector to a n
2 vector generated by applying vec(·) to a symmetric matrix
and it is designed to respect the vectorization map vec(·).7 It is fairly straightforward to see that the Kro-
necker sum A ⊕ A = A ⊗ I + I ⊗ A has spectrum {λj + λi} where λi, λj ∈ spec(A). The operator A  A
is simply a more computationally efficient expression of A ⊕ A, and as such the eigenvalues of A  A are
7The intuition can be gained simply by examining the map ν(τ) = det(−(Jτ (x∗)⊗Jτ (x∗))), however, this does not produce a
tight estimate of τ∗ and requires more computation due to the redundancies from symmetries in the subcomponents of −Jτ (x∗).
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those of A⊕ A removing redundancies. We use A A specifically because of its computational advantages
in computing τ∗.
We show in Lemma 6 (Appendix C) that ν : A 7→ det(AA) guards the set of n×nHurwitz stable matrices
S(C◦−). We then extend this guard map to the parametric guard map ν(τ) = det(−(Jτ (x∗)Jτ (x∗))). Indeed,
if we consider the subset of the family of matrices parameterized by τ that lies in S(C◦−), then for any τ such
that −Jτ (x∗) is in this subset, we have that ν(τ) = 0 if and only if −(Jτ (x∗)Jτ (x∗)) is singular if and only
if −Jτ (x∗) ∈ ∂S(C◦−). This shows that ν(τ) guards the space of n× n Hurwitz stable matrices S(C◦−). The
map ν(τ) defines a polynomial in τ and to determine the range of τ such that spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦−, we need
to find the value of τ such that ν(τ) = 0. Towards this end, the guard map ν(τ) can be further decomposed
by applying the Schur determinant formula to −(Jτ (x∗)  Jτ (x∗)). This gives rise to a polynomial of the
form
ν(τ) = τn2(n2+1)/2 det(D22f(x
∗)D22f(x∗)) det(S1  S1) det(τIn1n2 −B)
for some n1n2 × n1n2 matrix B. Hence, the problem of determining the value of τ such that ν(τ) = 0 (i.e.,
where the polynomial meets the boundary of S(C◦−)) is reduced to an eigenvalue problem in τ for the matrix
B. This value of τ is precisely the value τ∗ and since its derived from an eigenvalue problem it is precisely
τ∗ = λ+max(B) where λ
+
max(·) is the largest positive real eigenvalue of its argument if one exists and otherwise
its zero (meaning that the matrix −Jτ (x∗) is stable for all τ ∈ (0,∞)). The expression for the matrix B is
given in the fill proof contained in Appendix E.
Corollary 1. Consider a zero-sum game G = (f,−f) with f ∈ Cr(X,R) for some r ≥ 2. Suppose that
the assumptions of Theorem 3 hold and that the set of differential Stackelberg equilibria, denoted DSE(G), is
finite. Let τ∗ = maxx∗∈DSE(G) τ(x∗) where τ(x∗) is the value of τ obtained via Theorem 3 for each individual
critical point x∗ ∈ DSE(G). Then, for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) and x∗ ∈ DSE(G), spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦−.
In short, selecting the maximum value of τ∗ over the finite set of equilibria guarantees that the local
linearization of x˙ = −Λτg(x) around any differential Stackelberg equilibria is stable, and hence, the nonlinear
system is locally stable around each of these critical points.
New algebraic tools for analysis at the intersection of game theory and machine learning.
Before moving on, we remark on the utility of the algebraic tools we use in the proof for Theorem 3.
Indeed, the guard map concept is extremely powerful for understanding stability of parameterized families
of dynamical systems, and it is not limited to single parameter families. Hence, there is potential to extend
the above results to games with more than two players or additional parameters. In fact, we do exactly
this in Section 5 where we present results for GANs trained with gradient-penalty type regularizers for the
discriminator. Moreover, it is fairly easy to construct analogous guard maps for non-zero sum games. Many
of the tools and constructions readily extend. We leave these results to a different paper so as to not create
too much clutter in the present work.
3.3 Sufficient Conditions for Instability
Note that Theorem 3 also implies that for any stable spurious critical points, meaning non-Nash/non-
Stackelberg equilibria, there is no finite τ∗ such that spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦− for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞). In particular,
there exists at least one finite, positive value of τ such that spec(−Jτ (x∗)) 6⊂ C◦− since the only critical
point attractors are differential Stackelberg equilibria for large enough finite τ . We can extend this result to
address the question of whether or not there exists a finite learning rate ratio such that for all larger learning
rate ratios −Jτ (x∗) has at least one eigenvalue with strictly positive real part, thereby implying that x∗ is
unstable.
Theorem 4 (Instability of spurious critical points). Consider a zero sum game (f1, f2) = (f,−f) defined
by f ∈ Cr(X,R) for some r ≥ 2. Suppose that x∗ is any stable critical point of x˙ = −g(x) which is
not a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. There exists a finite learning rate ratio τ0 ∈ (0,∞) such that
spec(−Jτ (x∗)) 6⊂ C◦− for all τ ∈ (τ0,∞).
Proof Sketch. The full proof is provided in Appendix G. The proof leverages the fact that a nonlinear system
is unstable if its linearization is unstable, meaning that the linearization has at least one eigenvalue with
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strictly positive real part. In our setting, this can be shown by leveraging the Lyapunov equation and
Lemma 5 which states that if S1(−J(x∗)) has no eigenvalues with zero real part, then there exists matrices
P1 = P
>
1 and Q1 = Q
>
1 > 0 such that P1S1(−J(x∗))+S1(−J(x∗))P1 = Q1 where P1 and S1(−J(x∗)) have the
same inertia—i.e., the number of eigenvalues with positive, negative and zero real parts, respectively, are the
same. An analogous statement applies to −D22f(x∗). From here, we construct a matrix P that is congruent
to blockdiag(P1, P2) and a matrix Qτ such that −PJτ (x∗)− J>τ (x∗)P = Qτ . Since P and blockdiag(P1, P2)
are congruent, Sylvester’s law of inertia implies that they have the same number of eigenvalues with positive,
negative, and zero real parts, respectively, so that in turn P has at least one eigenvalue with strictly negative
real part. We then construct τ0 via an eigenvalue problem such that for all τ > τ0, Qτ > 0. Applying
Lemma 5 again, we get that Jτ (x
∗) has at least one eigenvalue with strictly negative real part so that
spec(−Jτ (x∗)) 6⊂ C◦− for all τ > τ0.
Unlike τ∗ Theorem 3, τ0 in Theorem 4 is not tight in the sense that −Jτ (x∗) may become unstable for
τ < τ0. The reason for this is that there are potentially many matrices P1 and Q1 that satisfy S1(J(x
∗))P1 +
P1S1(J(x
∗)) = Q1 such that S1(J(x∗)) and P1 have the same inertia; an analogous statement holds for P2,
Q2 and −D22f(x∗). The choice of these matrices impact the value of τ0. Hence, the question of finding the
exact value of τ beyond which a spurious stable critical point for 1-GDA is unstable remains open.
4 Provable Convergence of GDA with Timescale Separation
In this section, derive convergence guarantees for τ -GDA to differential Stackelberg equilibria in both the
deterministic (i.e., where agents have oracle access to their individual gradients) and the stochastic (i.e.,
where agents have an unbiased estimator of their individual gradient) settings.
4.1 Convergence Rate of Deterministic GDA with Timescale Separation
As a corollary to Theorem 3, we first show that the discrete time τ -GDA update is locally asymptotically
stable for a range of learning rates γ1.
We need the following lemma to prove asymptotic convergence as well as the subsequent results on
convergence rates.
Lemma 1. Consider a zero-sum game (f1, f2) = (f,−f) defined by f ∈ Cr(X,R) for some r ≥ 2. Suppose
that x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium and that given τ > 0, spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦−. Let γ =
minλ∈spec(Jτ (x∗)) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2. For any γ1 ∈ (0, γ), τ -GDA converges locally asymptotically.
Corollary 2 (Asymptotic convergence of τ -GDA). Suppose the assumptions of Theorem 3 hold so that x∗ is
a critical points of g and S1(J(x
∗)) and D22f2(x
∗) are non-singular. There exists a τ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that
τ -GDA with γ1 ∈ (0, γ(τ)) where γ(τ) = arg minλ∈spec(Jτ (x∗)) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2 converges locally asymptotically for
all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) if and only if x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium.
In addition to showing asymptotic convergence, we also provide an asymptotic convergence rate. To prove
the main theorems on convergence rates for both differential Stackelberg and differential Nash equilibria, we
use a common argument which is summarized in the lemma below.
Lemma 2. Consider a zero-sum game (f1, f2) = (f,−f) defined by f ∈ Cr(X,R) for some r ≥ 2.
Suppose that x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium and that given τ , spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦−. Let
γ = minλ∈spec(Jτ (x∗)) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2, and λm = arg minλ∈spec(Jτ (x∗)) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2. For any α ∈ (0, γ), τ -
GDA with learning rate γ1 = γ − α converges locally asymptotically at a rate of O((1 − α4β )k/2) where
β = (2Re(λm)− α|λm|2)−1.
The full proof of the above lemma is provided in Appendix C, and a short proof sketch with the main
ideas is summarized below.
Proof Sketch. Consider a zero-sum game (f,−f) as articulated in the lemma statement where x∗ is either a
differential Stackelberg or differential Nash equilibrium and fix any τ such that spec(Jτ (x
∗)).
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Figure 3: The inner maximization problem in (14) is over a finite set spec(Jτ (x
∗)) = {λ1, . . . , λn} where
Jτ (x
∗) ∈ Rn×n. As γ →∞, |1− γλi| → 0. The last λi such that 1− γλi hits the boundary of the unit circle
in the complex plane—i.e., |1 − γλi| = 1—gives us the optimal value of γ = 2Re(λm)/|λm|2 = 2 cos(θ)/|λm|
and the element of spec(Jτ (x
∗)) that achieves it (see blue arrows).
For the discrete time dynamical system xk+1 = xk− γ1Λτg(xk), it is well known that if γ1 is chosen such
that ρ(I − γ1Jτ (x∗)) < 1, then xk locally asymptotically converges to x∗ (cf. Proposition 6, Appendix A).
With this in mind, we formulate an optimization problem to find the upper bound γ on the learning rate
γ1 such that for all γ1 ∈ (0, γ), the spectral radius of the local linearization of the discrete time map is a
contraction which is precisely ρ(I − γ1Jτ (x∗)) < 1. The optimization problem is given by
γ = min
γ>0
{
γ : max
λ∈spec(Jτ (x∗))
|1− γλ| = 1
}
. (14)
The intuition is as follows. The inner maximization problem is over a finite set spec(Jτ (x
∗)) = {λ1, . . . , λn}
where Jτ (x
∗) ∈ Rn×n. As γ increases away from zero, each |1− γλi| shrinks in magnitude. The last λi such
that 1−γλi hits the boundary of the unit circle in the complex plane (i.e., |1−γλi| = 1) gives us the optimal
value of γ and the element of spec(Jτ (x
∗)) that achieves it. Examining the constraint, we have that for each
λi,
γ(γ|λi|2 − 2Re(λi)) ≤ 0
for any γ > 0. As noted this constraint will be tight for one of the λ, in which case γ = 2Re(λ)/|λ|2
since γ > 0. Hence, by selecting γ = minλ∈spec(Jτ (x∗)) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2, we have that |1 − γ1λ| < 1 for all
λ ∈ spec(Jτ (x∗)) and any γ1 ∈ (0, γ).
From here, we let λm = arg minλ∈spec(Jτ (x∗)) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2 so that by fixing any α ∈ (0, 1) and defining
β = (2Re(λm) − α|λm|2)−1 and γ1 = γ − α, we obtain the claimed convergence rate by standard arguments
in numerical analysis. In particular, we apply an argument along the lines of Proposition 6 in Appendix A.
Indeed, given the τ -GDA update, ρ(I − γ1Jτ (x∗)) = 1 − η < 1 for some η ∈ (0, 1) implies there exists a
neighborhood U of x∗ such that if τ -GDA is initialized in U , ‖xk−x∗‖ ≤ (1−η/4)k/2‖x0−x∗‖ thereby giving
the desired rate. The full details on this part of the argument can be found in Appendix C.
The above lemma provides a convergence rate given a differential Stackelberg equilibrium x∗ and a
learning rate ratio τ such that x∗ is stable with respect to the dynamics x˙ = −Λτg(x).
The following theorem—which uses Lemma 2 in its proof—characterizes the iteration complexity for
τ -GDA. Specifically, the result leverages Theorem 3 to construct a finite τ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that −Jτ (x∗) is
(Hurwitz) stable, and then for any τ ∈ (τ∗,∞), Lemma 2 implies a local asymptotic convergence rate.
Theorem 5. Consider a zero-sum game (f1, f2) = (f,−f) defined by f ∈ Cr(X,R) for r ≥ 2 and let
x∗ be a differential Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. There exists a τ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that for any
τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) and α ∈ (0, γ), τ -GDA with learning rate γ1 = γ − α converges locally asymptotically at a
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rate of O((1 − α4β )k/2) where γ = minλ∈spec(Jτ (x∗)) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2, λm = arg minλ∈spec(Jτ (x∗)) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2, and
β = (2Re(λm)−α|λm|2)−1. Moreover, if x∗ is a differential Nash equilibrium, τ∗ = 0 so that for any τ ∈ (0,∞)
and α ∈ (0, γ), τ -GDA with γ1 = γ − α converges with a rate O((1− α4β )k/2).
Proof. To prove this result, we apply Theorem 3 to construct τ∗ via the guard map ν(τ) = det(−Jτ (x∗) 
−Jτ (x∗)) such that for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞), spec(Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦+. This guarantees that spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦− for
any τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) and hence the nonlinear dynamical system
x˙ = −Λτg(x)
is locally asymptotically (in fact, exponentially) stable by the Hartman-Grobman theorem (cf. Theorem 2).
Therefore, for any τ ∈ (τ∗,∞), by Lemma 2, τ -GDA converges with a rate of O((1− α4β )k/2).
Remark 2. We note that as τ →∞, the eigenvalues of Jτ (x∗) become real. In fact there exists a finite value
of τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) after which spec(Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ R. Hence, there is an opportunity to take advantage of momentum-
based approaches when timescale separation via τ is introduced. This may provide some explanation for why
the heuristics of timescale separation or unrolled updates in combination with momentum work in practice
when training generative adversarial networks. We believe there may be potential to precisely characterize
when the eigenvalues of the Jacobian become purely real as a function of τ by constructing a suitable guard
map and this is a direction of future work.
Theorem 5 directly implies a finite time convergence guarantee for obtaining an ε-differential Stackelberg
equilibrium—i.e., an point with an ε-ball around a differential Stackelberg x∗.
Corollary 3. Given ε > 0, under the assumptions of Theorem 5, τ -GDA obtains an ε–differential Stackleberg
equilibrium in d 4βα log(‖x0 − x∗‖/ε)e iterations for any x0 ∈ Bδ(x∗) with δ = α/(4Lβ) where L is the local
Lipschitz constant of I − γJτ (x∗).
Comments on computing the neighborhood Bδ(x
∗). We note that we have essentially given a proof
that there exists a neighborhood on which τ -GDA converges. Of course, due to the non-convexity of the
problem in general, this neighborhood could be arbitrarily small. We provide an estimate of the neighborhood
size using the local Lipschitz constant of the local linearization I − γ1Jτ (x∗). One way to better understand
the size of this neighborhood is to use Lyapunov analysis, a tool which is well explored in the singular
perturbation theory (Kokotovic et al., 1986). In particular, Lyapunov methods can be applied directly to
the nonlinear system if one can construct Lyapunov functions for the fast and slow subsystems individually—
also known as the boundary layer model and reduced order model. With these Lyapunov functions in hand,
one can “stitch” the two together (via convex combination) and show under some reasonable assumptions
that this combined function is a Lyapunov function for the overall singularly perturbed system. The benefit
of this analysis is that the Lyapunov function gives one an estimate of the region of attraction (via, e.g., the
level sets); however, it is not easy to construct a Lyapunov function for a nonlinear system in general. We
leave expanding to such methods to future work.
Comments on avoiding saddle points. Before turning to the stochastic setting, we comment on saddle
point avoidance in the deterministic setting. It was shown by Mazumdar et al. (2020) that gradient-based
learning in continuous games with heterogeneous learning rates avoids saddles on all but a set of measure zero
initializations. Hence, τ -GDA avoids saddles for almost every initialization. We also know that all differential
Nash equilibria are locally asymptotically stable for zero-sum settings. Hence, there are no differential Nash
equilibria that are saddle points of the dynamics x˙ = −Λτg(x). On the other hand, as Example 1 shows,
there are differential Stackelberg equilibria which correspond to saddle points of the dynamics for some
choices of τ—in particular, τ = 1 in that example. Theorem 3 and Corollary 1, however, implies that for
a given zero-sum game (or minmax problem), there exists a finite τ∗ such that all locally asymptotically
stable equilibria are differential Stackelberg equilibria. Hence, an ‘almost sure’ saddle point avoidance result
together with the local convergence guarantee provided by Theorem 5 provides a strong characterization of
long-run learning behavior.
Avoidance of saddles nor the if and only if convergence guarantee of Theorem 3 are, however, enough to
ensure avoidance of limit cycles. In fact, it is known that limit cycles can exist in zero sum games (Daskalakis
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et al., 2018; Mazumdar et al., 2020). Understanding when such complex phenomena exist in games and de-
termining how to ascribe meaning the behavior is an active area of study (see, e.g., the work of Papadimitriou
and Piliouras (2019)).
4.2 Convergence of Stochastic GDA with Timescale Separation
In this section, we analyze convergence when players do not have oracle access to their gradients but instead
have an unbiased estimator in the presence of zero mean, finite variance noise. Specifically, we show that
the agents will converge locally asymptotically almost surely to a differential Stackelberg equilibrium.
The stochastic form of the update is given by
xk+1 = xk − γk(Λτg(xk) + wk+1) (15)
where wk+1 is a zero mean, finite variance random variable and {γk} is the learning rate sequence.
Assumption 1. The stochastic process {wk} is a martingale difference sequence with respect to the increasing
family of σ-fields defined by
Fk = σ(x`, w`, ` ≤ k), ∀k ≥ 0,
so that E[wk+1| Fk] = 0 almost surely (a.s.) for all k ≥ 0. Moreover, wk is square-integrable so that, for
some constant C > 0,
E[‖wk+1‖2| Fk] ≤ C(1 + ‖xk‖2) a.s., ∀k ≥ 0.
We note that this assumption has been relaxed in the literature (cf. Thoppe and Borkar (2019)), however
simplicity, we state the theorem with the most accessible criteria. We remark below in the paragraph on
extensions to concentration bounds on the nature of the relaxed assumptions.
Theorem 6. Consider a zero-sum game (f,−f) such that f ∈ Cr(X,R) for some r ≥ 2. Suppose that
Assumption 1 holds and that {γk} is square summable but not summable—i.e.,
∑
k γ
2
k <∞, yet
∑
k γk =∞.
For any τ ∈ (0,∞), the sequence {xk} generated by (15) converges to a, possibly sample path dependent,
internally chain transitive invariant set of x˙ = −Λτg(x). Moreover, if x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equi-
librium, then there exists a finite τ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that {xk} almost surely converges locally asymptotically
to x∗ for every τ ∈ (0,∞).
Proof. The convergence of {xk} to a, possibly sample path dependent, compact connected internally chain
transitive invariant set of x˙ = −Λτg(x) follows from classical results in stochastic approximation theory
(cf. Borkar (2008, Chap. 2); Benaim (1996)).
Suppose that x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. By Theorem 3, there exists a finite τ∗ ∈ (0,∞)
such that for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞), x∗ is a locally exponentially stable equilibrium of the continuous time dynamics
x˙ = −Λτg(x)—that is, spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦− for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞).
Fix arbitrary τ ∈ (τ∗,∞). Since spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦−, det(−Jτ (x∗)) 6= 0 so that x∗ is an isolated critical
point. Furthermore, exponentially stability of x∗ implies that there exists a (local) Lyapunov function defined
on a neighborhood of x∗ by the converse Lyapunov theorem (cf. Sastry (1999, Thm. 5.17) or Krasovskii (1963,
Thm. 4.3)). Let U be the neighborhood of x∗ on which the local Lyapunov function is defined, such that
U contains no other critical points (which is possible since x∗ is isolated). That is, let Φ : U → [0,∞) be
the local Lyapunov function defined on U where x∗ ∈ U , Φ is positive definite on U , and for all x ∈ U ,
d
dtΦ(x) ≤ 0 where equality holds for z ∈ U if and only if Φ(z) = 0. By Corollary 3 (Borkar, 2008, Chap. 2),{xk} converges to an internally chain transitive invariant set contained in U almost surely. The only internally
chain transitive invariant set in U is x∗.
Corollary 4. Consider a zero-sum game (f,−f) such that f ∈ C2(X,R). Suppose that Assumption 1 holds
and that {γk} is square summable but not summable—i.e.,
∑
k γ
2
k < ∞, yet
∑
k γk = ∞. If there exists a
finite τ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦− for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞), then x∗ is a differential Stackelberg
equilibrium and {xk} almost surely converges locally asymptotically to x∗.
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While (local) almost sure convergence in gradient descent-ascent (Chasnov et al., 2019) to a critical
point8 in the stochastic setting, the result requires time varying learning rates with a sufficient separation
in timescale. Specifically, the players need to be using learning rate sequences {γi,k} for each i ∈ {1, 2} such
that (without loss of generality) not only is it assumed that γ1,k = o(γ2,k), but also
∑
k γ
2
1,k + γ
2
2,k <∞ and∑
k γi,k =∞ for each i ∈ {1, 2}. The challenge with these assumptions on the learning rate sequences is that
empirically the sequences that satisfy them result in poor behavior along the learning path such as getting
stuck at saddle points or making no progress. This is, in essence, due to the fact that the faster player—i.e.,
player 2 if γ1,k = o(γ2,k)—equilibriates too quickly causing progress to stall. This can result in undesirable
behavior such as vanishing gradients (so that the discriminator does not provide enough information for the
generator to make progress), mode collapse, or failure to converge in practical applications such as generative
adversarial networks.
On the other hand, our convergence result gives a similar guarantee with less restrictive requirements on
the stepsize sequence. In particular, only a single stepsize sequence is required (so that the algorithm can
be viewed as a single timescale stochastic approximation update) as long as the fast player (who, without
loss of generality, is player 2 in this paper) scales their estimated gradient by τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) where τ∗ is as in
Theorem 3.
Extensions to concentration bounds and relaxed assumptions on stepsizes. It is possible to
obtain concentration bounds and even finite time, high probability guarantees on convergence leveraging
recent advances in stochastic approximation (Borkar, 2008; Kamal, 2010; Thoppe and Borkar, 2019). To
our knowledge, the concentration bounds in (Thoppe and Borkar, 2019) require the weakest assumptions
on learning rates—e.g., the stepsize sequence {γk} needs only to satisfy
∑
k γk = ∞, limk→∞ γk = 0, and∑
k γk ≤ 1. Specifically, since it is assumed, for the zero sum game (f,−f), that f ∈ C2(X,R) and x∗ is a
differential Stackelberg equilibrium, Theorem 3 implies that x∗ is a locally asymptotically stable attractor
of x˙ = −Λτg(x) for arbitrary fixed τ ∈ (τ∗,∞), and hence, the concentration bounds in Theorem 1.1 and
1.2 of (Thoppe and Borkar, 2019) directly apply.
Furthermore, we note that in applications such as generative adversarial networks, while it has been
observed that timescale separation heuristics such as unrolling or annealing the stepsize of the discriminator
work well, in the stochastic case, summmable/square-summable assumptions on stepsizes are generally too
restrictive in practice since they lead to a rapid decay in the stepsize which, in turn, can stall progress.
On the other hand, stepsize sequences such as γk = 1/(k + 1)
β for β ∈ (0, 1]—a sequence which satisfies
the assumptions posed in (Thoppe and Borkar, 2019)—tend not to have this issue of decaying too rapidly
for appropriately chosen β, while also maintaining the guarantees of the theoretical results. We state a
convergence guarantee under these relaxed assumptions in Proposition 8 which is contained in Appendix J.
5 Regularization with Applications to Adversarial Learning
In this section, we focus on generative adversarial networks with regularization. Specifically, using the theory
developed so far, we extend the results in Mescheder et al. (2018) to provide a convergence guarantee for a
range of regularization parameters and learning rate ratios.
As has been repeatedly observed in recent theoretical works on generative adversarial networks, the
training dynamics of generative adversarial networks are not well understood even though we have seen
impressive practical advances over the last few years. In an attempt to address this, recent works—e.g.,
(Berard et al., 2020; Fiez et al., 2020; Mescheder et al., 2017; Nagarajan and Kolter, 2017) amongst others—
study the optimization landscape of generative adversarial networks through the lens of dynamical systems
theory which provides analysis tools for convergence based on the eigen-structure of the local linearization of
the learning dynamics. Nagarajan and Kolter (2017) show, under suitable assumptions, that gradient-based
methods for training generative adversarial networks are locally convergent assuming the data distributions
are absolutely continuous. However, as observed by Mescheder et al. (2018), such assumptions not only may
not be satisfied by many practical generative adversarial network training scenarios such as natural images,
but it can often be the case that the data distribution is concentrated on a lower dimensional manifold. The
latter characteristic leads to nearly purely imaginary eigenvalues and highly ill-condition problems.
8To date it has not been shown that for a sufficient separation in timescale the only critical point attractors are local minmax.
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Mescheder et al. (2018) provide an explanation for observed instabilities consequent of the true data
distribution being concentrated on a lower dimensional manifold using discriminator gradients orthogonal to
the tangent space of the data manifold. Further, the authors introduce regularization via gradient penalties
that leads to convergence guarantees under less restrictive assumptions than were previously known. Here,
we further extend these results to show that convergence to differential Stackelberg equilibria is guaranteed
under a wide array of hyperparameter configurations.
Consider the training objective of the form
f(θ, ω) = Ep(z)[`(D(G(z; θ);ω))] + EpD(x)[`(−D(x;ω))]
where Dω(x) and Gθ(z) are discriminator and generator networks, respectively, and pD(x) is the data distri-
bution while p(z) is the latent distribution. The goal of the generator is to minimize the above loss and the
discriminator to maximize it. The mapping ` ∈ C2(R) is some real-value function; e.g., a common choice is
`(x) = − log(1 + exp(−x)) as in the original generative adversarial network paper (Goodfellow et al., 2014).
To motivate both regularization and time-scale separation, consider the following prototypical example of a
Dirac-GAN.
Example: Dirac-GAN. The Dirac-GAN is arguably as simple an example as one can construct that
posses interesting and non-trivial degeneracies. The parameter space for each the generator and discriminator
is just R—that is, the generator and discriminator have scalar “network”.
Definition 5. The Dirac-GAN consists of a univariate generator distribution pθ = δθ and a linear dis-
criminator D(x;ω) = ω>x. The true data distribution pD is given by a Dirac-distribution concentrated at
zero.
The objective of the Dirac-GAN is
f(θ, ω) = `(ωθ) + `(0).
Several choices exist for the mapping ` including `(t) = − log(1+exp(−t)) which leads to the Jensen-Shannon
divergence between pθ and pD. As described in (Mescheder et al., 2018), when training a Dirac-GAN with
vanilla GDA, the dynamics are oscillatory. This can immediately be verified by examining the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian at the (unique) equilibrium (θ∗, ω∗) = (0, 0) which are purely complex taking on values ±i`′(0)
since
J(0) =
[
0 `′(0)
−`′(0) 0
]
.
It is observed in Lemma 3.1 Mescheder et al. (2018) that GDA will not generally converge even with unrolling of
the discriminator, a proxy for timescale separation. We observe, however, that this is because the equilibrium
is not hyperbolic, and hence it is not structurally stable (Broer and Takens, 2010). In fact, introducing
regularization remedies these issues. Under reasonable generative adversarial network assumptions, we show
that the introduction of a gradient penalty based regularization to the discriminator does not change the set
of critical points for the dynamics and, further, for any learning rate ratio τ ∈ (0,∞) and any positive, finite
regularization parameter µ, the continuous time limiting regularized learning dynamics remain stable, and
hence, there is a range of learning rates γ1 for which the discrete time update locally converges asymptotically.
Introducing Regularization. Gradient penalties ensure that the discriminator cannot create a non-zero
gradient which is orthogonal to the data manifold without suffering a loss. Introduced by Roth et al. (2017)
and refined in Mescheder et al. (2018), we consider training generative adversarial networks with one of two
fairly natural gradient-penalties used to regularize the discriminator:
R1(θ, ω) =
µ
2
EpD(x)[‖∇xD(x;ω)‖2], (16)
R2(θ, ω) =
µ
2
Epθ(x)[‖∇xD(x;ω)‖2], (17)
where, by a slight abuse of notation, ∇x(·) denotes the partial gradient with respect to x of the argument
(·) when the argument is the discriminator D(·;ω) in order prevent any confusion between the notation D(·)
which we use elsewhere for derivatives.
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Also following Mescheder et al. (2018), we use relaxed assumptions—as compared to the work by Nagara-
jan and Kolter (2017)—which allow us to consider generative adversarial networks with data distributions
that do not (locally) have the same support and hence, are concentrated on lower dimensional manifolds, a
commonly observed phenomena in practice (Arjovsky et al., 2017).
To state these assumptions, we need some additional notation. Let h1(θ) = Epθ(x)[∇ωD(x;ω)|ω=ω∗ ] and
h2(ω) = EpD(x)[|D(x;ω)|2 + ‖∇xD(x;ω)‖2]. Define reparameterization manifolds MG = {θ : pθ = pD} and
MD = {ω : h2(ω) = 0} and let Tθ∗MG and Tω∗MD denote their respective tangent spaces at θ∗ and ω∗.
Assumption 2. Consider training a generative adversarial network via a zero-sum game defined by f ∈
C2(Rm1 ×Rm2 ,R) where G(·; θ) and D(·;ω) are the generator and discriminator networks, respectively, and
x = (θ, ω) ∈ Rm1 × Rm2 . Suppose that x∗ = (θ∗, ω∗) is an equilibrium.
a. At (θ∗, ω∗), pθ∗ = pD and D(x;ω∗) = 0 in some neighborhood of supp(pD).
b. The function ` ∈ C2(R) satisfies `′(0) 6= 0 and `′′(0) < 0.
c. There are –balls B(θ
∗) and B(ω∗) centered around θ∗ and ω∗, respectively, so that MG∩B(θ∗) and
MD ∩B(ω∗) define C1-manifolds. Moreover, (i) if w /∈ Tθ∗MG, then w>∇wh1(θ∗)w 6= 0, and (ii) if
v /∈ Tω∗MD, then v>∇2ωh2(ω∗)v 6= 0.
Recalling the observations in Mescheder et al. (2018) used for explaining the last of the three assump-
tions, Assumption 2.c(i) implies that the discriminator is capable of detecting deviations from the generator
distribution in equilibrium, and Assumption 2.c(ii) implies that the manifoldMD is sufficiently regular and,
in particular, its (local) geometry is captured by the second (directional) derivative of h2.
The Jacobian of the regularized dynamics, for either j = 1 or 2, is of the form
J(τ,µ)(θ, ω) =
[
D21f(θ, ω) D12f(θ, ω)
−τD>12f(θ, ω) τ(−D22f(θ, ω) + µD2Rj(θ, ω))
]
(18)
where we use the subscript (τ, µ) to denote the parameter dependence on the learning rate ratio τ and
regularization parameter µ. For shorthand, we often replace (θ, ω) simply with the variable x.
It is straightforward to compute the block components of the Jacobian. Observe that Assumption 2.a im-
plies that D21f(θ
∗, ω∗) is identically zero, and hence x∗ = (θ∗, ω∗) is never a differential Nash equilibrium.
However, we show that x∗ is not only a differential Stackelberg equilibrium, but also characterize the learning
rate ratio and regularization parameter range for which x∗ is (locally) stable with respect to τ -GDA and give
a convergence rate.
Theorem 7. Consider training a generative adversarial network via a zero-sum game with generator network
Gθ, discriminator network Dω, and loss f(θ, ω) with regularization Rj(θ, ω) (for either j = 1 or j = 2) and
any regularization parameter µ ∈ (0,∞) such that Assumption 2 is satisfied for an equilibrium x∗ = (θ∗, ω∗)
of the regularized dynamics. Then, x∗ = (θ∗, ω∗) is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, for
any τ ∈ (0,∞), spec(−J(τ,µ)(x∗)) ⊂ C◦−—i.e., −J(τ,µ)(x∗) is Hurwitz stable.
Proof Sketch. To proof that x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium follows analogous arguments to those
in the proof of Theorem 4.1 in Mescheder et al. (2018). Given any positive regularization parameter µ, to
prove the stability of x∗ for any fixed τ ∈ (0,∞), we leverage the concept of the quadratic numerical range
of a block operator which is a superset of the spectrum of the operator (cf. Appendix A). The key for both
arguments is that Assumption 2 implies that the Jacobian of the regularized game has a specific structure.
Indeed, observe that the structural form of J(τ,µ)(x
∗) is
J(τ,µ)(x
∗) =
[
0 B
−τB> τ(C + µR)
]
where B = D12f(x
∗), C = −D22f(x∗) and R = D22Rj(x∗). This follows from Assumption 2-a., which implies
that D(x;ω∗) = 0 in some neighborhood of supp(pD) and hence, ∇xD(x;ω∗) = 0 and ∇2xD(x;ω∗) = 0 for
x ∈ supp(pD). In turn, we have that D21f(x∗) = 0.
From here, it is straightforward to argue that B is full rank and C + µR > 0 away from Tθ∗MG (by
Assumption 2-c). Together these observations imply that x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. Then,
arguments analogous to those in the proof of Proposition 3 (via the quadratic numerical range) imply
stability.
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Corollary 5. Under the assumptions of Theorem 7, consider any fixed µ ∈ (0, µ1] and τ ∈ (0,∞), and
let γ = minλ∈spec(J(τ,µ)(x∗)) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2, and λm = arg minλ∈spec(J(τ,µ)(x∗)) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2. For any α ∈ (0, γ),
τ -GDA with learning rate γ1 = γ − α converges locally asymptotically at a rate of O((1 − α4β )k/2) where
β = (2Re(λm)− α|λm|2)−1.
The proof of the above corollary follows a similar line of reasoning as the proof of Corollary 2.
Theorem A.7 of Mescheder et al. (2018) shows that matrices of the form
− J =
[
0 −B
B> −C
]
(19)
are stable if B is full rank and C > 0. The following proposition provides necessary conditions on the sizes
of the network architectures for the discriminator and generator network for stability.
Proposition 5. Consider training a generative adversarial network via a zero-sum game with generator
network Gθ, discriminator network Dω, and loss f(θ, ω) with regularization Rj(θ, ω) (for some j ∈ {1, 2})
such that Assumption 2 is satisfied for an equilibrium x∗ = (θ∗, ω∗). Independent of the learning rate ratio
and the regularization parameter µ, for x∗ to be stable it is necessary that the dimension of the discriminator
network parameter vector is at least half as large as the corresponding generator network parameter vector—
i.e., n2 ≥ n1/2 where θ ∈ Rn1 and ω ∈ Rn2 .
The intuition for the why this proposition should hold follows immediately from observing the structure
of the Jacobian: for any matrix of the form (19), at least one eigenvalue will be purely imaginary if n2 < n1/2
where B ∈ Rn1×n2 and C ∈ Rn2×n2 . The full proof is contained in Appendix I.
6 Experiments
We now present extensive numerical experiments examining gradient descent-ascent with timescale sepa-
ration. As we explored theoretically so far, the stability of gradient descent-ascent critical points has an
intricate relationship with timescale separation. We begin to investigate this behavior empirically by simu-
lating the gradient descent-ascent dynamics for the games from Examples 1 and 2 and examining how the
spectrum of the game Jacobian evolves as a function of the timescale separation. Then, on a polynomial
game, we demonstrate how timescale separation warps the vector field of gradient descent-ascent and con-
sequently shapes the region of attraction around critical points in the optimization landscape. There are a
number of both qualitative and quantitative theoretical questions that remain open related to characterizing
the region of attraction and how it depends parameterically on τ .
After exploring the optimization landscape, we focus in on gradient descent-ascent in the Dirac-GAN
game and illustrate the interplay between timescale separation, regularization, and rate of convergence.
Finally, we train generative adversarial networks on the CIFAR-10 and CelebA datasets with regulariza-
tion and show timescale separation can significantly improve stability and performance. Moreover, we
find that several of the insights we draw from the Dirac-GAN game carry over to this complex setting.
Appendix L contains several more experimental results including a generative adversarial network for-
mulation to learn a covariance matrix and a torus game. The code for our experiments is available at
github.com/fiezt/Finite-Learning-Ratio.
6.1 Quadratic Game: Timescale Separation and Stackelberg Stability
We now revisit the game from Example 1 that demonstrated there exists differential Stackelberg equilibrium
that are unstable for choices of the timescale separation τ . To be clear, we repeat the game construction
and some characteristics of the game. Let us consider the quadratic zero-sum game defined by the cost
f(x1, x2) =
1
2
[
x1
x2
]> 
−v 0 −v 0
0 12v 0
1
2v−v 0 − 12v 0
0 12v 0 −v
[x1x2
]
(20)
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Figure 4: Experimental results for the quadratic game defined in (20) of Section 6.1 and presented in
Example 1. Figures 4a and 4b show trajectories of the players coordinate pairs (x11, x21) and (x21, x22)
for a range of learning rate ratios, respectively. Figures 4c shows the distance from the equilibrium along
the learning paths. Figures 4e, 4f, and 4g show the trajectories of the eigenvalues, the real parts of the
eigenvalues, and the imaginary parts of the eigenvalues for the Jτ (x
∗) as a function of the τ , respectively.
where x1, x2 ∈ R2 and v > 0. The unique critical point of the game given by x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2) = (0, 0) is a
differential Stackelberg equilibrium. The spectrum of the Jacobian evaluated at the equilibrium is given by
spec(Jτ (x
∗)) =
{v(2τ + 1±√4τ2 − 8τ + 1)
4
,
v(τ − 2±√τ2 − 12τ + 4)
4
}
.
As mentioned in Example 1, it turns out that spec(Jτ (x
∗) ⊂ C◦+ only when τ ∈ (2,∞). We remark that we
computed τ∗ using the theoretical construction from Theorem 3 and found that it recovered the precise value
of τ∗ = 2 such that the equilibrium is stable for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) with respect to the dynamics x˙ = −Λτg(x).
In the experiments that follow, we consistently observe that the construction of τ∗ from the theory is tight.
For this experiment, we select v = 4 and simulate τ -GDA from the initial condition (x01, x
0
2) = (5, 4, 3, 2)
with γ1 = 0.0005 and τ ∈ {2, 2.5, 3, 5, 10}. In Figures 4a and 4b, we show the trajectories of the players
coordinate pairs (x11, x21) and (x21, x22), respectively. We observe that τ -GDA cycles around the equilibrium
with τ = 2 since it is marginally stable with respect to the dynamics. For τ ∈ (2,∞), the equilibrium is
stable and τ -GDA ends up converging to it at a rate that depends on the choice of τ . We demonstrate how
the convergence rate depends on the choice of τ in Figure 4c by showing the distance from the equilibrium
along the learning path for each of the trajectories. The primary observation is that the cyclic behavior of
τ -GDA dissipates as τ grows and as a result the dynamics then rapidly converge to the equilibrium.
The behavior of the learning dynamics as a function of the timescale separation τ can be further explained
by evaluating the eigenvalues of the game Jacobian at the equilibrium. We show the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian at the equilibrium in several forms in Figures 4e, 4f, and 4g. Analyzing the spectrum, we are
able to verify that for all τ ∈ (2,∞) the equilibrium is indeed stable. Moreover, we see that the imaginary
parts of the conjugate pairs of eigenvalues decay after τ = 1 and τ = 6, and then the eigenvalues of the
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Figure 5: Experimental results for the polynomial game defined in (21) of Section 6.2 and presented in
Example 2. Figures 5a and 5b show trajectories of the players coordinate pairs (x11, x21) and (x21, x22) for
a range of learning rate ratios, respectively. Figures 5d, 5e, and 5f show the trajectories of the eigenvalues,
the real parts of the eigenvalues, and the imaginary parts of the eigenvalues for Jτ (x
∗) as a function of the
τ , respectively where x∗ is the non-equilibrium critical point.
conjugate pairs eventually become purely real at τ = 1.87 and τ = 11.66, respectively. After the eigenvalues
of a conjugate pair become purely real, they split so that one of the eigenvalues asymptotically converges
to an eigenvalue of S1(J(x
∗)) by moving back along the real line, while the other eigenvalue tends toward
an eigenvalue of −τD22f(x∗). This occurrence is exactly what was described in Section 3 as an immediate
implication of Proposition 4 when the eigenvalues of S1(J(x
∗)) and τD22f(x
∗) are distinct. The convergence
rate is in fact limited by the eigenvalues splitting since as τ grows, the spectrum of the Jacobian is limited
by the eigenvalues of the Schur complement which remain constant. A related open question centers on
finding the worst case convergence rate as a function of the spectral properties of S1(J(x
∗)) and D22f(x
∗).
Finally, the evolution of the eigenvalues as a function of the timescale separation τ demonstrates that the
rotational dynamics in τ -GDA vanish as the ratio between the magnitude of the real and imaginary parts of
the eigenvalues grows.
6.2 Polynomial Game: Timescale Separation and Non-Equilibrium Stability
We now return to the game from Example 2 that showed a non-equilibrium critical point which is stable
without timescale separation and becomes unstable for a range of finite learning ratios with multiple equilibria
in the vicinity. Again, we repeat the game construction along with some of the key characteristics that were
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previously presented in Example 2. Consider a zero-sum game defined by the cost
f(x1, x2) =
5
4
(
x211 + 2x11x21 +
1
2x
2
21 − 12x212 + 2x12x22 − x222
)
(x11 − 1)2
+ x211
(∑2
i=1(x1i − 1)2 − (x2i − 1)2
)
.
(21)
This game has critical points at (0, 0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1, 1), and (−4.73, 0.28,−92.47, 0.53). Among the critical
points, only (1, 1, 1, 1) and (−4.73, 0.28,−92.47, 0.53) are game-theoretically meaningful equilibrium. In fact,
they are each differential Nash equilibrium and are locally stable for any choice of τ ∈ (0,∞) as a result of
Proposition 3. On the other hand, the critical point x∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0) is neither a differential Nash equilibrium
nor a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. However, x∗ is stable for τ ∈ (0, 2) and it is marginally stable
for τ = 2. In general, convergence to the non-equilibrium critical point x∗ in the presence of multiple
game-theoretically meaningful equilibrium would be viewed as undesirable. In fact, this is precisely the
type of critical point that sophisticated schemes for converging to only differential Nash equilibria or only
differential Stackelberg equilibria seek to avoid (Adolphs et al., 2019; Fiez et al., 2020; Mazumdar et al.,
2019; Wang et al., 2020). We show in this example that the simple inclusion of timescale separation in
gradient descent-ascent is sufficient to avoid x∗ and instead converge to a differential Nash equilibrium.
Indeed, for all τ ∈ (2,∞) the non-equilibrium critical point x∗ is unstable with respect to x˙ = −Λτg(x).
We simulate τ -GDA from the initial condition (x01, x
0
2) = (−1.5, 2.5, 2.5, 3) with γ1 = 0.0005 and τ ∈
{0.75, 2, 5, 12}, where we use the superscript to denote the time index so as not to be confused with the
multiple indexes for player choice variables. In Figures 5a and 5b, we show the trajectories of the players co-
ordinate pairs (x11, x21) and (x21, x22), respectively. We observe that τ -GDA converges to the non-equilibrium
critical point x∗ with τ = 0.75 as expected and the dynamics move near it and then cycle around it with
τ = 2 since the critical point becomes marginally stable. However, for τ = 5 and τ = 12, τ -GDA avoids the
non-equilibrium critical point since it becomes unstable and instead the dynamics converge to the nearby
differential Nash equilibrium. We show the eigenvalues of the Jacobian at the non-equilibrium critical point
x∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0) in several forms in Figures 5d–5f. Again, we observe that the eigenvalues quickly become
purely real as τ grows and then they split, and asymptotically converge toward the eigenvalues of S1(J(x
∗))
and −τD22f(x∗). Together, this example demonstrates that often there is a reasonable finite learning rate
ratio such that non-meaningful critical points become unstable for τ -GDA.
6.3 Polynomial Game: Vector Field Warping and Region of Attraction
Consider a zero-sum game defined by the cost
f(x1, x2) = −e−(0.01x
2
1+0.01x
2
2)
(
(0.3x1 + x
2
2)
2 + (0.3x2 + x
2
1)
2
)
. (22)
The cost structure of this game is visualized in Figure 6a, where we present a three dimensional view of
−f(x1, x2) along with the cost contours and the locations of critical points. This game has eleven critical
points including one differential Nash equilibrium and two differential Stackelberg equilibria that are not
a differential Nash equilibrium. The critical points that are neither a differential Nash equilibrium nor a
differential Stackelberg equilibrium are unstable for any choice of timescale separation τ . The differential
Nash equilibrium is at (x1, x2) = (10.57,−8.95) and it is stable for all τ ∈ (0,∞) by Proposition 3. The
differential Stackelberg equilibria are at (x1, x2) = (−1.625,−1.625) and (x∗1, x∗2) = (−11.03,−11.03); each
is stable for all τ ∈ (1,∞). We computed τ∗ for the pair of differential Stackelberg equilibrium using the
theoretical construction from Theorem 3 and observed that it properly recovered τ∗ = 1 for each equilibrium
as the timescale separation such that the continuous time system is stable for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞). Finally, we
note that while the set of equilibrium follow a linear translation, this game is generic and the equilibria are
in fact isolated.
In Figure 6b, we show the trajectories of τ -GDA with γ1 = 0.0001 and τ ∈ {1, 2, 5, 20} given the ini-
tialization (x01, x
0
2) = (−9,−9) near the differential Stackelberg equilibrium at (x∗1, x∗2) = (−11.03,−11.03).
Moreover, in Figure 7a, we overlay the trajectories on the vector field generated by the respective timescale
separation parameters. As expected, the choice of τ = 1 results in a trajectory that cycles around the
equilibrium in a closed curve since it is marginally stable and Jτ (x
∗) has purely imaginary eigenvalues. No-
tably, as τ grows, the cyclic behavior dissipates as the timescale separation reshapes the vector field until
the trajectory moves near directly to the zero derivative line of the maximizing player and then follows a
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Figure 6: Experimental results for the polynomial game defined in (22) of Section 6.3. Figures 6a provides a
3d view of the cost function −f(x1, x2) along with the cost contours and critical point locations. Figure 6b
shows trajectories of τ -GDA for a range of learning rate ratios given an initialization around the differential
Stackelberg equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2) = (−11.03,−11.03). Figures 6c and 6d show the evolution of the eigenvalues
from Jτ (x
∗) as a function of τ where x∗ is the differential Stackelberg equilibrium (x∗1, x
∗
2) = (−11.03,−11.03).
path along that line toward the equilibrium and converges rapidly. The eigenvalues of Jτ (x
∗) as a function
of τ are presented in Figures 6c and 6d. As was the case for the previous experiments, we observe that
after the eigenvalues become purely real as τ grows, they then split and asymptotically converge toward the
eigenvalues of S1(J(x
∗)) and −τD22f(x∗). It is worth noting that much of the rotational behavior in the
dynamics and vector field disappears as a result of timescale separation well before the eigenvalues become
purely real; this seems to occur after the timescale separation is such that the magnitude of the real part of
the eigenvalues is greater than that of the imaginary part.
Finally, in Figure 7b, we demonstrate how the choice of timescale separation τ not only warps the vector
field but also shapes the regions of attraction around critical points. The vector field is again shown for
each τ ∈ {1, 2, 5, 20}, but now zoomed out to include each of the equilibria. The colors overlayed on the
vector field indicate the equilibria that the dynamics converge to given an initialization at that position.
Positions in the strategy space without color did not converge to an equilibrium in the fixed horizon of
75000 iterations with γ1 = 0.001. This is explained by the fact that the dynamics are not guaranteed to
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Figure 7: Experimental results for the polynomial game defined in (22) of Section 6.3. In Figure 7a, we
overlay the trajectories from Figure 6b produced by τ -GDA onto the vector field generated by the choice of
timescale separation selection τ . The shading of the vector field is dictated by its magnitude so that lighter
shading corresponds to a higher magnitude and darker shading corresponds to a lower magnitude. Figure 7b
demonstrates the effect of timescale separation on the region of attractions around critical points by coloring
points in the strategy space according to the equilibrium τ -GDA converges. We remark that areas without
coloring indicate where τ -GDA did not converge in the time horizon.
be globally convergent and may get stuck in limit cycles or may simply move slowly for a long time in
flat regions of the optimization landscape. We produced this experiment by running τ -GDA for a dense set
of initial conditions chosen uniformly over the space of interest. It is clear from the experiment that the
choice of timescale separation determines not only the stability of equilibria, but also has a fundamental
impact on the equilibria the dynamics converge to from a given initial condition as a result of the warping
of the vector field. As a concrete example, given an initialization of (x1, x2) = (−10,−2), the dynamics with
τ = 1 converge to the differential Nash equilibria at (x1, x2) = (10.57,−8.95). However, for any τ > 1, the
dynamics instead converge to the differential Stackelberg equilibrium at (x1, x2) = (−11.03,−11.03) that is
significantly closer to the initial condition. This example motivates future work on methods for obtaining
accurate estimates of the regions of attraction around critical points and techniques to design τ in order to
explicitly shape the region of attraction around an equilibrium of interest. We refer to the end of Section 4.1
for further discussion on potentially relevant analysis methods in this direction.
6.4 Dirac-GAN: Regularization, Timescale Separation, and Convergence Rate
In Section 5, we studied gradient descent-ascent with regularization in generative adversarial networks and
showed that the general theory we provide can be extended to such a formulation. Recall that the training
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Figure 8: Experimental results for the Dirac-GAN game defined in (24) of Section 6.4. Figure 8a shows
trajectories of τ -GDA for τ ∈ {1, 4, 8, 16} with regularization µ = 0.3 and τ = 1 with regularization µ = 1.
Figure 8b shows the distance from the equilibrium along the learning paths. Figure 8f shows the trajectories
of τ -GDA overlayed on the vector field generated by the respective timescale separation and regularization
parameters. The shading of the vector field is dictated by its magnitude so that lighter shading corresponds
to a higher magnitude and darker shading corresponds to a lower magnitude. Figures 8e and 8f show the
trajectories of the eigenvalues for Jτ (θ
∗, ω∗) as a function of τ with regularization set to µ = 0.3 and µ = 1,
respectively where (θ∗, ω∗) is the unique critical point of the game.
objective for generative adversarial networks is of the form
f(θ, ω) = Ep(z)[`(D(G(z; θ);ω))] + EpD(x)[`(−D(x;ω))] (23)
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where Dω(x) and Gθ(z) are the discriminator and generator networks respectively, pD(x) is the data distri-
bution while p(z) is the latent distribution, and ` ∈ C2(R) is some real-value function such that `′(0) 6= 0 and
`′′(0) < 0. The goal of the generator is to minimize (23) while the discriminator seeks to maximize (23). As
a motivating example, we mentioned the Dirac-GAN proposed by Mescheder et al. (2018), which constitutes
an extremely simple, yet compelling generative adversarial network. Formally described in Definition 5, the
Dirac-GAN consists of a univariate generator distribution pθ = δθ and a linear discriminator D(x;ω) = ωx,
where the real data distribution pD is given by a Dirac-distribution concentrated at zero. The resulting
zero-sum game is defined by the cost
f(θ, ω) = `(θω) + `(0).
The unique critical point of gradient descent-ascent is a local Nash equilibrium given by (θ∗, ω∗) = (0, 0).
However, the structure of the game is such that
Jτ (θ
∗, ω∗) =
[
0 `′(0)
−τ`′(0) 0
]
.
Consequently, spec(Jτ (θ
∗, ω∗)) = {±i√τ`′(0)} so that spec(Jτ (θ∗, ω∗)) 6⊂ C◦+ and regardless of the choice of
timescale separation, τ -GDA oscillates and fails to converge to the equilibrium. This behavior is expected since
the equilibrium is not hyperbolic and corresponds to neither a differential Nash equilibrium nor a differential
Stackelberg equilibrium since D21f(θ
∗, ω∗) = 0 and −D22f(θ∗, ω∗) = 0, but it is undesirable nonetheless since
(θ∗, ω∗) is the unique critical point and a local Nash equilibrium.
Mescheder et al. (2018) proposed to remedy the degeneracy issues of generative adversarial networks by
using the following gradient penalties to regularize the discriminator with µ > 0:
R1(θ, ω) =
µ
2
EpD(x)[‖∇xD(x;ω)‖2] and R2(θ, ω) =
µ
2
Epθ(x)[‖∇xD(x;ω)‖2].
For the Dirac-GAN,
R1(θ, ω) = R2(θ, ω) =
µ
2
ω2.
The zero-sum game corresponding to the Dirac-GAN with regularization can be defined by the cost
f(θ, ω) = `(θω) + `(0)− µ
2
ω2. (24)
The unique critical point of the game remains at (θ∗, ω∗) = (0, 0), but we now see that
Jτ (θ
∗, ω∗) =
[
0 `′(0)
−τ`′(0) τµ
]
(25)
and spec(Jτ (θ
∗, ω∗)) = {(τµ ±√τ2µ2 − 4τ(`′(0))2)/2}. Observe that for all τ ∈ (0,∞) and µ ∈ (0,∞),
we get that spec(Jτ (θ
∗, ω∗)) ⊂ C◦+. This implies that for all timescale separation parameters τ > 0 and
all regularization parameters µ > 0, the local Nash equilibrium of the unregularized game is stable with
respect to the dynamics x˙ = −Λτg(x). As a result, for a suitably chosen learning rate γ1, the discrete time
update τ -GDA converges to the equilibrium. It is worth pointing out that the critical point (θ∗, ω∗) = (0, 0)
corresponds to a differential Stackelberg equilibrium of the regularized game since −D22f(θ∗, ω∗) = µ > 0
and S1(J(θ
∗, ω∗)) = (`′(0))2/µ > 0.
We now present experiments with τ -GDA for the regularized Dirac-GAN game defined in (24) focused
on exploring the interplay between timescale separation, regularization, and convergence rate since the
equilibrium is always stable for a positive regularization parameter. We let `(t) = − log(1 + exp(−t)),
which corresponds to the choice made in the original generative adversarial network formulation proposed
by Goodfellow et al. (2014). Figure 8a shows trajectories of τ -GDA from the initial condition (θ0, ω0) = (1, 1)
with learning rate γ1 = 0.01 for τ ∈ {1, 4, 8, 16} with regularization µ = 0.3 and τ = 1 with µ = 1. Moreover,
Figure 8f shows the trajectories of τ -GDA overlayed on the vector field generated by the respective timescale
separation and regularization parameters and Figure 8b shows the distance from the equilibrium along the
learning paths. The choice of µ = 0.3 is arbitrary to a degree, but µ∗ = 1 is chosen since it corresponds to the
critical regularization parameter such that spec(J(θ∗, ω∗)) ⊂ R+ for all µ > µ∗, meaning that the Jacobian
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without timescale separation has purely real eigenvalues. Finally, Figures 8e and 8f show the trajectories of
the eigenvalues for Jτ (θ
∗, ω∗) as a function of τ with regularization set to µ = 0.3 and µ = 1, respectively
where (θ∗, ω∗) is the unique critical point of the game.
From Figures 8a and 8d, we observe that the impact of timescale separation with regularization µ = 0.3
is that the trajectory is not as oscillatory since it moves faster to the zero line of −D2f(θ, ω) and then
follows along that line until reaching the equilibrium. We further see from Figure 8b that with regularization
µ = 0.3, τ -GDA with τ = 8 converges faster to the equilibrium than τ -GDA with τ = 16, despite the fact
that the former exhibits some cyclic behavior in the dynamics while the latter does not. The eigenvalues of
the Jacobian with regularization µ = 0.3 presented in Figure 8e explains this behavior since the imaginary
parts are non-zero with τ = 8 and zero with τ = 16, but the eigenvalue with the minimum real part is
greater at τ = 8 than at τ = 16. This example highlights that a degree of oscillatory behavior in the
dynamics is not always harmful for convergence and it can even speed up the rate of convergence. Building
off of this, for regularization µ = 1 and timescale separation τ = 1, Figures 8a and 8b show that even
though τ -GDA follows a direct path toward the equilibrium and does not cycle since the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian are purely real, the trajectory converges slowly to the equilibrium. While not presented, we ran
experiments with τ ∈ {2, 4, 8, 16} with µ = 1 as well and timescale separation only made the convergence
rate worse. The eigenvalues of the Jacobian with each regularization parameter presented in Figures 8e
and 8f are able to explain this phenomenon. Indeed, for each regularization parameter, the eigenvalues split
after becoming purely real and then converge toward the eigenvalues of S1(J(θ
∗, ω∗)) and −τD22f(θ∗, ω∗).
Since S1(J(θ
∗, ω∗)) ∝ 1/µ and −τD22f(θ∗, ω∗) ∝ τµ, there is a trade-off between the choice of regularization
µ and the timescale separation τ on the conditioning of the Jacobian matrix. As shown in Figures 8e and 8f,
the minimum real part of the eigenvalues with µ = 0.3 is significantly larger than with µ = 1 after sufficient
timescale separation, which makes the convergence rate faster. Together, this example demonstrates that
there may often be a delicate relationship between timescale separation, regularization, and convergence
rate, where after a certain threshold each parameter choice may inhibit the rate of convergence.
In Appendix L.2, we provide simulation results on the Dirac-GAN game using the non-saturating gener-
ative adversarial network objective proposed by Goodfellow et al. (2014). In this formulation, the game is
defined by the costs (f1, f2) = (−`(−ωθ) + `(0),−(`(ωθ) + `(0))). While the non-saturating objective was
motivated by global considerations (avoiding vanishing gradients) rather than local considerations, it turns
out that it is locally equivalent in terms of the game Jacobian as the standard formulation for the Dirac-GAN.
As a result, the stability characteristics are identical and we draw equivalent conclusions from the experiment
regarding the behavior of gradient descent-ascent in the game. Finally, we note that in Appendix L.3 we
explore another simple generative adversarial network formulation using the Wasserstein cost function with
a linear generator and quadratic discriminator (each of arbitrary dimension) for the problem of learning a
covariance matrix. In that example, we draw analogous conclusions about the interplay between timescale
separation, regularization, and the rate of convergence.
6.5 Generative Adversarial Networks: Image Datasets
We now investigate the role timescale separation has on training generative adversarial networks parame-
terized by deep neural networks. The empirical benefits of training with a timescale separation have been
documented previously. For example, Heusel et al. (2017) showed on a number of image datasets that a
timescale separation between the generator and discriminator improves generation performance as measured
by the Frechet Inception Distance (FID). Since then a significant number of papers have presented results
training generative adversarial networks with timescale separation. Moreover, it is common in the literature
for the discriminator to be updated multiple times between each update of the generator (Arjovsky et al.,
2017). Indeed, it has been widely demonstrated that this heuristic improves the stability and convergence of
the training process and locally it has a similar effect as including a timescale separation between the gener-
ator and discriminator. The disadvantage of this approach is that the number of gradient calls per generator
update increases and consequently the convergence is then slower in terms of wall clock time when a similar
effect could potentially be achieved by a learning rate separation between the generator and discriminator.
We remark that it appears to be reasonably common for practitioners to fix a shared learning rate for the
generator and discriminator along with a pre-selected number of discriminator updates per generator update
and not thoroughly investigate the impact timescale separation has on the training process.
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(a) µ = 10
(b) µ = 1
Figure 9: CIFAR-10 FID scores with regularization parameter µ = 10 in Figure 9a and µ = 1 in Figure 9b.
The goal of our generative adversarial network experiments is to reinforce the importance of the timescale
separation between the generator and the discriminator as a hyperparameter in the training process, demon-
strate how it changes the behavior along the learning path, and show that it is compatible with a number
of common training heuristics. This is to say that our goal is not necessarily to show state-of-the art per-
formance, but rather to perform experiments that allow us to make insights relevant to the theory in this
paper. We remark that our empirical work on training generative adversarial networks is distinct from and
complimentary to that of Heusel et al. (2017) in several ways. The theory given by Heusel et al. (2017)
only applies to stochastic stepsizes, however in the experiments they implemented constant step sizes. We
train with mini-batches and decaying stepsizes, which does satisfy the theory we provide. Moreover, by and
large, the experiments by Heusel et al. (2017) compare a fixed learning rate ratio between the generator and
discriminator to multiple fixed shared learning rates for the generator and discriminator. In contrast, we fix
a learning rate for the generator and explore the behavior of the training process as the timescale parameter
τ is swept over a given range.
We build our experiments based on the methods and implementations of Mescheder et al. (2018) and
explore both the CIFAR-10 and CelebA image datasets. We train the generative adversarial networks with
the non-saturating objective function and the R1 gradient penalty proposed by Mescheder et al. (2018) with
regularization parameters µ ∈ {1, 10}. We note that the non-saturating objective results in a game that is
not zero-sum, however it is commonly used in practice and under the realizable assumptions is it locally
equivalent to the zero-sum objective as discussed at the end of Section 6.4. The network architectures for
the generator and discriminator are both based on the ResNet architecture. The initial learning rate for the
generator in all of our experiments is fixed to be γ = 0.0001 and we decay the stepsizes so that at update k
the learning rate of the generator is given by γ1,k = γ1/(1 + ν)
k where ν = 0.005 and the learning rate of
the discriminator is γ2,k = τγ1,k. For each experiment the batch size is 64, the latent data is drawn from
a standard normal distribution of dimension 256, and the resolution of the images is 32 × 32 × 3. Finally,
as an optimizer, we run RMSprop with parameter α = 0.99. Again, the theory we provide does not strictly
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(a) µ = 10
(b) µ = 1
Figure 10: CelebA FID scores with regularization parameter µ = 10 in Figure 9a and µ = 1 in Figure 9b.
apply to using RMSprop, but it is ubiquitous in practice for training generative adversarial networks and
if the timescale separation is sufficiently large so that the eigenvalues are purely real in the Jacobian then
the theory we provide is applicable as remarked previously. We provide further details on the network and
hyperparameters in Appendix L.4. A final heuristic and hyperparameter that we explore in conjunction
with the timescale separation τ is that of using an exponential moving average to produce the model that is
evaluated. This means that at each update k, given that the parameters of the generator are given by x1,k,
the moving average x¯k = x1,kβ+x¯1,k−1(1−β) is kept where β ∈ (0, 1). Experimental studies have shown that
this heuristic can yield a significant improvement in terms of both the inception score and the FID (Gidel
et al., 2019a; Yazici et al., 2019). The success of this method is thought to be a result of dampening both
rotational dynamics and the noise from the randomness in the mini-batches of data.
We run the training algorithm with the learning rate ratio τ belonging to the set {1, 2, 4, 8} and the
regularization parameter µ belonging to the set {1, 10}. For each choice of τ and µ, we retain exponential
moving averages of the generator parameters for β ∈ {0.99, 0.999, 0.9999}. The training process is repeated
3 times for each hyperparameter configuration to rule out noise from random seeds and the performance is
evaluated along the learning path at every 10,000 updates in terms of the FID score. We report the mean
scores and the standard error of the mean over the repeated experiments. We run the experiments with
µ = 1 for 150k mini-batch updates and the experiments with µ = 10 for 300k mini-batch updates.
The results for each dataset across the hyperparameter configurations are presented in numeric form in
Figure 12. Figure 11 shows some generated samples selected at random for each dataset with the hyper-
parameter configuration that performed best in terms of the FID score at the end of the training process.
Figure 17 in Appendix L.4 has several more generated samples for each dataset selected at random. We now
describe the key observations from the experiments for each dataset.
CIFAR-10. The FID scores along the learning path for CIFAR-10 with µ = 10 and µ = 1 are presented in
Figures 9a and 9b, respectively. The corresponding scores in numeric form are given in Figures 12a, 12c, and
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(a) CIFAR-10 (b) CelebA
Figure 11: CIFAR-10 and CelebA samples from generator at 300k iterations with β = 0.9999 and τ = 4.
τ\β 0.99 0.999 0.9999
1 29.39 ± 0.37 27.56 ± 0.34 26.29 ± 0.2
2 24.94 ± 0.25 23.4 ± 0.22 22.36 ± 0.23
4 24.14 ± 0.42 22.53 ± 0.23 21.62 ± 0.05
8 24.63 ± 0.28 23.35 ± 0.3 22.52 ± 0.27
(a) CIFAR-10 FID at 150k updates with µ = 10
τ\β 0.99 0.999 0.9999
1 7.42 ± 0.1 7.01 ± 0.09 7.07 ± 0.08
2 6.26 ± 0.06 6.04 ± 0.02 6.05 ± 0.01
4 6.34 ± 0.03 5.97 ± 0.03 5.93 ± 0.002
8 7.01 ± 0.09 6.69 ± 0.09 6.43 ± 0.04
(b) CelebA FID at 150k updates with µ = 10
τ\β 0.99 0.999 0.9999
1 28.1 ± 0.52 26.18 ± 0.54 24.6 ± 0.3
2 23.49 ± 0.49 22.0 ± 0.38 21.05 ± 0.38
4 22.35 ± 0.15 20.71 ± 0.06 19.49 ± 0.06
8 22.46 ± 0.37 21.36 ± 0.44 20.27 ± 0.4
(c) CIFAR-10 FID at 150k updates with µ = 1
τ\β 0.99 0.999 0.9999
1 7.22 ± 0.15 6.87 ± 0.17 7.01 ± 0.22
2 5.93 ± 0.12 5.69 ± 0.03 5.86 ± 0.04
4 5.8 ± 0.04 5.51 ± 0.04 5.59 ± 0.06
8 5.88 ± 0.05 5.68 ± 0.03 5.7 ± 0.05
(d) CelebA FID at 150k updates with µ = 1
τ\β 0.99 0.999 0.9999
1 26.1 ± 0.44 23.98 ± 0.39 22.4 ± 0.35
2 21.44 ± 0.5 20.15 ± 0.32 18.5 ± 0.31
4 20.67 ± 0.04 19.23 ± 0.11 17.72 ± 0.05
8 21.09 ± 0.33 19.81 ± 0.22 18.45 ± 0.25
(e) CIFAR-10 FID at 300k updates with µ = 1
τ\β 0.99 0.999 0.9999
1 5.93 ± 0.06 5.63 ± 0.01 5.72 ± 0.02
2 5.13 ± 0.06 4.88 ± 0.02 5.0 ± 0.01
4 5.03 ± 0.06 4.9 ± 0.03 4.95 ± 0.05
8 5.51 ± 0.11 5.27 ± 0.04 5.21 ± 0.05
(f) CelebA FID at 300k updates with µ = 1
Figure 12: FID Scores on CIFAR-10 and CelebA.
12e for µ = 10 at 150k iterations and µ = 1 at 150k and 300k iterations, respectively. To begin, we observe
that the exponential moving average significantly improves performance, and of the parameters considered,
β = 0.9999 performed best. Relevant to this work, we observe that the performance gain from using an
exponential moving average appears to be maximized when the ratio of learning rates is smallest. This
may indicate that some of the dynamics in τ -GDA are dampened by timescale separation in this generative
adversarial network experiment, similarly to as observed for the simpler experiments presented previously.
Moreover, we that timescale separation also has a significant impact on the FID score of the training process.
Indeed, even selecting τ = 2 versus τ = 1 can yield an impressive performance gain. In this experiment for
each regularization parameter, τ = 4 converges fastest, followed by τ = 8, then τ = 2, and finally τ = 1.
Finally, observe that the performance with regularization µ = 1 is far superior to that with regularization
µ = 10. Interestingly, the last pair of conclusions are in line with the insights drawn from the simple Dirac-
GAN experiment in Section 6.4. In particular, timescale separation only speeds up to convergence until
hitting a limiting value and there is a fundamental interplay between timescale separation, regularization,
and convergence rate. This indicates that it may be possible to transfer some of the insights made on
simple generative adversarial network formulations to the much more complex problem where players are
parameterized by neural networks.
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CelebA. The FID scores along the learning path for CIFAR-10 with µ = 10 and µ = 1 are presented
in Figures 10a and 10b, respectively. The corresponding scores in numeric form are given in Figures 12b,
12d, and 12f for µ = 10 at 150k iterations and µ = 1 at 150k and 300k iterations, respectively. In this
experiment we that while the exponential moving average helps performance, the gain is not as drastic as
it was for CIFAR-10. However, timescale separation in combination with the regularization does have a
major effect on the the FID score of the training process in this experiment. For regularization µ = 10, the
timescale parameters of τ = 2 and τ = 4 outperform τ = 1 and τ = 8 by a wide margin, again highlighting
that timescale separation can speed up convergence until a certain point where it can potentially slow it
down owing to the effect on the conditioning of the problem locally. A similar trend can be observed
with regularization µ = 1, but with τ = 8 performing closer to τ = 2 and τ = 4. We again observe in
this experiment that for all timescale separation parameters, the performance is significantly improved with
regularization µ = 1 as compared with µ = 10. This once again highlights the importance of considering how
this the hyperparameters of regularization and timescale interact and dictate the local convergence rates.
In summary, we took a well-performing method and implementation for training generative adversarial
networks and demonstrated that timescale separation is an extremely important, and easy to implement,
hyperparameter that is worth careful consideration since it can have a major impact on the convergence
speed and final performance of the training process.
7 Related Work
In this section, we provide a review of related work at the intersection machine learning and game theory,
as well as connections to dynamical systems theory and control.
7.1 Machine Learning and Learning in Games
Given the extensive work on the topic of learning in games in machine learning that has gone on over the
last several years, we cannot cover all of it and instead focus our attention on only the most relevant to this
paper. We begin by reviewing solution concepts developed for the class of games under consideration and
then discuss some learning dynamics studied in the literature beyond gradient descent-ascent. Following
this, we delineate the related work studying gradient descent-ascent in non-convex, non-concave zero-sum
games and finish by making note of the literature on non-convex, concave optimization.
Solution Concepts. Owing to the numerous applications in machine learning, a significant portion of
the modern work on learning in games has focused on the zero-sum formulation with non-convex, non-
concave cost functions. Most recently, Daskalakis et al. (2020) tout the importance and significance of
this class of games in a paper on the complexity of finding equilibria (in particular, in the constrained
setting) in such games. Consequently, local solution concepts have been broadly adopted. Compared to the
standard game-theoretic notions of equilibrium that characterize player’s incentive to deviate given the game
and information structure, local equilibrium concepts restrict the deviation search space to a suitable local
neighborhood. Following the standard game-theoretic viewpoint, a vast number of works in machine learning
study the local Nash equilibrium concept and critical points satisfying gradient-based sufficient conditions
for the equilibrium, which are often referred to as differential Nash equilibria (Ratliff et al., 2013, 2014;
Ratliff et al., 2016). Based on the observation that in non-convex, non-concave zero-sum games the order of
play is fundamental in the definition of the game, there has been a push toward considering local notions of
the Stackelberg equilibrium concept, which is the usual game-theoretic equilibrium when there is an explicit
order of play between players. In the zero-sum formulation, Stackelberg equilibrium are often referred to
as minmax equilibria. Similar to as for the Nash equilibrium, gradient-based sufficient conditions for local
minmax/Stackelberg equilibrium have been given (Daskalakis and Panageas, 2018; Fiez et al., 2020; Jin et al.,
2020) and such critical points have been referred to as differential Stackelberg equilibria (Fiez et al., 2020).
We remark that it has been shown that local/differential Nash equilibria are a subset of local/differential
Stackelberg equilibria (Fiez et al., 2020; Jin et al., 2020). Following past works, we adopt the terminology of
differential Nash equilibrium and differential Stackelberg equilibrium in this paper as the meaning of strict
local Nash equilibrium and strict local minmax/Stackelberg equilibrium, respectively. Finally we mention
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the proximal equilibria proposed by Farnia and Ozdaglar (2020), which we do not consider in this work,
that depending on a regularization parameter can interpolate between the local Nash and local Stackelberg
equilibrium notions.
Learning Dynamics. Given that the focus of this work is on gradient descent-ascent, we center our
coverage of related work on papers analyzing its behavior. Nonetheless, we mention that a significant
number of learning dynamics for zero-sum games have been developed in the past few years, in some cases
motivated by the shortcomings of gradient descent-ascent without timescale separation. The methods include
optimistic and extra-gradient algorithms (Daskalakis et al., 2018; Gidel et al., 2019a; Mertikopoulos et al.,
2019), negative momentum (Gidel et al., 2019b), gradient adjustments (Balduzzi et al., 2018; Letcher et al.,
2019a; Mescheder et al., 2017), and opponent modeling methods (Foerster et al., 2018; Letcher et al., 2019b;
Metz et al., 2017; Scha¨fer and Anandkumar, 2019; Zhang and Lesser, 2010), among others. While the
aforementioned learning dynamics possess some desirable characteristics, they cannot guarantee that the
set of stable critical points coincide with a set of local equilibria for the class of games under consideration.
However, there have been a select few learning dynamics proposed that can guarantee the stable critical points
coincide with either the set of differential Nash equilibria (Adolphs et al., 2019; Mazumdar et al., 2019) or the
set of differential Stackelberg equilibria (Fiez et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020)—effectively solving the problem
of guaranteeing local convergence to only a class of local equilibria. However, since each of the algorithms
achieving the equilibrium stability guarantee require solving a linear equation in each update step, they are
not efficient and can potentially suffer from degeneracies along the learning path in applications such as
generative adversarial networks. These practical shortcomings motivate either proving that existing learning
dynamics using only first-order gradient feedback achieve analogous theoretical guarantees or developing
novel computationally efficient learning dynamics that can match the theoretical guarantee of interest.
Gradient Descent-Ascent. Gradient descent-ascent has been studied extensively in non-convex, non-
concave zero-sum games since it is a natural analogue to gradient descent from optimization, is computa-
tionally efficient, and has been shown to be effective in practice for applications of interest when combined
with common heuristics. A prevailing approach toward gaining understanding of the convergence character-
istics of gradient descent-ascent has been to analyze the local stability around critical points of the continuous
time limiting dynamical system. The majority of this work has not considered the impact of timescale sepa-
ration. Numerous papers have pointed out that the stable critical points of gradient descent-ascent without
timescale separation may not be game-theoretically meaningful. In particular, it has been shown that there
can exist stable critical points that are not differential Nash equilibrium (Daskalakis and Panageas, 2018;
Mazumdar et al., 2020). Furthermore, it is known that there can exist stable critical points that are not
differential Stackelberg equilibria (Jin et al., 2020). The aforementioned results rule out the possibility that
gradient descent-ascent without timescale separation can guarantee equilibrium convergence. In terms of the
stability of equilibria, it is known that differential Nash equilibrium are stable for gradient descent-ascent
without timescale separation (Daskalakis and Panageas, 2018; Mazumdar et al., 2020), but that there can
exist differential Stackelberg equilibria which are not stable with respect to gradient descent-ascent without
timescale separation.
The work of Jin et al. (2020) is the most relevant exploring how the aforementioned stability properties of
gradient descent-ascent change with timescale separation. In particular, Jin et al. (2020) investigate whether
the desirable stability characteristics (stability of differential Nash equilibria) and undesirable stability char-
acteristics (stability of non-equilibrium critical points and instability of differential Stackelberg equilibria)
of gradient descent without timescale separation are maintained and remedied, respectively with timescale
separation. In terms of the former query, extending the examples shown in Mazumdar et al. (2020) and
Daskalakis and Panageas (2018), Jin et al. (2020) show that differential Nash equilibrium are stable for
gradient descent-ascent with any amount of timescale separation.
On the other hand, for the latter query, Jin et al. (2020) shows (in Proposition 27) two interesting
examples: (a) for an a priori fixed τ , there exists a game with a differential Stackelberg equilibrium that
is not stable and (b) for an a priori fixed τ , there exists a game with a stable critical point that is not
a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. However, (a) does not imply that for the constructed game, there
does not exist another (finite) τ—independent of the game parameters—such the differential Stackelebrg
equilibrium is stable for all larger τ . In simple language, the result summarized in (a) says the following:
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if a bad timescale separation is chosen, then convergence may not be guaranteed. Similarly, (b) does not
imply that there is no τ such that for all larger τ for the constructed game instance, the critical point
becomes unstable. Again, in simple language, the result summarized in (b) says the following: if a bad
timescale separation is chosen, then non-game theoretically meaningful equilibria may persist. While at first
glance this set of results may appear to indicate that the undesirable stability characteristics of gradient
descent without timescale separation cannot be averted by any finite timescale separation, it is important to
emphasize that these results do not answer the questions of whether there (a) exists a game with a critical
point that is not a differential Stackelberg equilibrium which is stable with respect to gradient descent-ascent
without timescale separation and remains stable for all finite timescale separation ratios or (b) exists a game
with a differential Stackelberg equilibrium that is not stable for all finite timescale separation ratios. The
preceding questions are left open from previous work and are exactly the focus of this paper. In Appendix K,
we go into greater detail on the comparison between Proposition 27 of Jin et al. (2020) as we believe this to
be an important point of distinction between Theorem 3 and 4 in this paper.
Finally, Jin et al. (2020) study the an infinite timescale separation ratio and show that the stable critical
points of gradient descent-ascent coincide with the set of differential Stackelberg equilibria in this regime.
This result effectively shows that gradient descent-ascent can guarantee only equilibrium convergence with
timescale separation, albeit infinite. We remark that an equivalent result in the context of general singularly
perturbed systems has been known in the literature (Kokotovic et al., 1986, Chap. 2) as we discuss further
in Section 3.1. Finally, we point out that since an infinite timescale separation does not result in an imple-
mentable algorithm, fully understanding the behavior with a finite timescale separation is of fundamental
importance and the motivation for our work.
Beyond the work of Jin et al. (2020) considering timescale separation in gradient descent-ascent, it is worth
mentioning the work of Chasnov et al. (2019) and Heusel et al. (2017). Chasnov et al. (2019) study the impact
of timescale separation on gradient descent-ascent, but focus on the convergence rate as a function of it given
an initialize around a differential Nash equilibrium and do not consider the stability questions examined in
this paper. Heusel et al. (2017) study stochastic gradient descent-ascent with timescale separation and invoke
the results of Borkar (2008) for analysis. The stochastic approximation results the claims rely on guarantee
the convergence of the system locally to a stable critical point. Consequently, the claim of convergence to
differential Nash equilibria of stochastic gradient descent-ascent given by Heusel et al. (2017) only holds given
an initialization in a local neighborhood around a differential Nash equilibrium. In this regard, the issue of
the local stability of the types of critical point is effectively assumed away and not considered. In contrast,
we are able to combine our stability results for gradient descent-ascent with timescale separation together
with the stochastic approximation theory of Borkar (2008) to guarantee local convergence to a differential
Stackelberg equilibrium in Section 4.2. We remark that Heusel et al. (2017) empirically demonstrate that
timescale separation can significantly improve the performance of gradient descent-ascent when training
generative adversarial networks.
The final relevant line of work studying gradient descent-ascent is specific to generative adversarial
networks. The results from this literature develop assumptions relevant to generative adversarial networks
and then analyze the stability and convergence properties of gradient descent-ascent under them (see, e.g.,
works by Daskalakis et al. (2018); Goodfellow et al. (2014); Mescheder et al. (2018); Metz et al. (2017);
Nagarajan and Kolter (2017)). Within this body of work, there has been a significant amount of effort
focusing on how the stability (and, hence, convergence properties) of gradient descent-ascent in generative
adversarial networks can be enhanced with regularization methods. Nagarajan and Kolter (2017) show,
under suitable assumptions, that gradient-based methods for training generative adversarial networks are
locally convergent assuming the data distributions are absolutely continuous. However, as observed by
Mescheder et al. (2018), such assumptions not only may not be satisfied by many practical generative
adversarial network training scenarios such as natural images, but it can often be the case that the data
distribution is concentrated on a lower dimensional manifold. The latter characteristic leads to nearly purely
imaginary eigenvalues and highly ill-condition problems. Mescheder et al. (2018) provide an explanation for
observed instabilities consequent of the true data distribution being concentrated on a lower dimensional
manifold using discriminator gradients orthogonal to the tangent space of the data manifold. Further,
the authors introduce regularization via gradient penalties that leads to convergence guarantees under less
restrictive assumptions than were previously known. In this paper, we further extend these results to show
that convergence to differential Stackelberg equilibria is guaranteed under a wide array of hyperparameter
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configurations (i.e., learning rate ratio and regularization).
Nonconvex-Concave Optimization. A final related line of work is on nonconvex-concave optimiza-
tion (Lin et al., 2020a,b; Lu et al., 2020; Nouiehed et al., 2019; Ostrovskii et al., 2020; Rafique et al., 2018).
The focus in this set of works (among many others on the topic) is on characterizing the iteration complexity
to stationary points, rather than stability and asymptotic convergence as in the non-convex, non-concave
zero-sum game setting. The focus on stationary points in this body of work is reasonable since, to our
knowledge, the results obtained are for `-weakly convex-concave games, a subclass of non-convex-concave
games in which the minimizing player faces an `-weakly convex optimization problem for each fixed choice
of the maximizing player. The primary relevance of work on this problem is that a number of the algo-
rithms rely on timescale separation and variations of gradient descent-ascent. Moreover, the methods for
obtaining fast convergence rates may be relevant to future work attempting to characterize fast rates in
the non-convex, non-concave setting after there is a more fundamental understanding of the stability and
asymptotic convergence.
7.2 Historical Perspective: Dynamical Systems and Control
The study of gradient descent-ascent dynamics with timescale separation between the minimizing and max-
imizing players is closely related to that of singularly perturbed dynamical systems (Kokotovic et al., 1986).
Such systems arise in classical control and dynamical systems in the context of physical systems that either
have multiple states which evolve on different timescales due to some underlying immutable physical process
or property, or a single dynamical system which evolves on a sub-manifold of the larger state-space. For
example, robot manipulators or end effectors often have have slower mechanical dynamics than electrical
dynamics. On the other hand, in electrical circuits or mechanical systems, certain resistor-capacitor circuits
or spring-mass systems have a state which evolves subject to a constraint equation (Lagerstrom and Casten,
1972; Sastry and Desoer, 1981). Due to their prevalence, singularly perturbed systems have been studied
extensively with one of the outcomes being a number of works on determining the range of perturbation
parameters for which the overall system is stable (Kokotovic et al., 1986; Saydy, 1996; Saydy et al., 1990).
We exploit these results and analysis techniques to develop novel results for learning in games. One of
contributions of this work is the introduction of the algebraic analysis techniques to the machine learning
and game theory communities. These tools open up new avenues for algorithm synthesis; we comment on
potential directions in the concluding discussion section.
This being said, there are a couple key difference between the present setting and that of the classical
literature including the following:
1. The perturbation parameter is no longer an immutable characteristic of the physical
system, but rather a hyperparameter subject to design. Indeed, in singular perturbation
theory, the typical dynamical system studied takes the form
x˙ = g1(x, y) y˙ = g2(x, y) (26)
where  is a small parameter that abstracts some physical characteristics of the state variables. On the
other hand, in learning in games, the continuous time limiting dynamical system of gradient descent-
ascent for a zero-sum game defined by f ∈ C2(X × Y,R) takes the form
x˙ = −D1f(x, y) y˙ = τD2f(x, y) (27)
where the x–player seeks to minimize f with respect to x and the y–player seeks to maximize f with
respect to y, and τ is the ratio of learning rates (without loss of generality) of the maximizing to the
minimizing player. These learning rates—and hence the value of τ—are hyperparameters subject to
design in most machine learning and optimization applications. Another feature of (27) as compared
to (26), is that the dynamics Dif are partial derivatives of a function f , which leads to the second key
difference.
2. There is structure in the dynamical system that arises from gradient-play which reflects
the underlying game theoretic interactions between players. This structure can be exploited
in obtaining convergence guarantees in machine learning and optimization applications of game theory.
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For instance, minmax optimization is analogous to a zero sum game for which the local linearization
of gradient descent-ascent dynamics has the structure
J =
[
A B
−τB> −τC
]
where A = A> and C = C> and τ is the learning rate ratio or timescale separation parameter.
Such block matrices have very interesting properties. In particular, second order optimality conditions
for a minmax equilibrium correspond to positive definiteness of the first Schur complement S1(J) =
A − BC−1B> > 0, and of −C > 0 (Fiez et al., 2020). This turns out to be keenly important for
understanding convergence of gradient descent-ascent. Furthermore, due to the structure of J , tools
from the theory of block operators (see, e.g., works by Lancaster and Tismenetsky (1985); Magnus
(1988); Tretter (2008)) such as the quadratic numerical range can be exploited (and combined with
singular perturbation theory) to understand the effects of hyperparameters such as τ (the learning rate
ratio) and regularization (which is common in applications such as generative adversarial networks) on
convergence.
8 Discussion
In this paper, we prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of gradient descent-ascent
with timescale separation to differential Stackelberg equilibria in zero sum games. This answers a long
standing open question about provable convergence of first order methods for zero-sum games to local
minimax equilibria. Specifically, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the convergence of τ -
GDA to differential Stackelberg equilibria. A key component of the proof is the construction of a (tight)
finite lower bound on the learning rate ratio τ for which stability of the game Jacobian is guaranteed, and
hence local asymptotic convergence of τ -GDA. In addition, we provide results on iteration complexity and
convergence rate and apply the results to generative adversarial networks under mild assumptions on the
data distribution. For both differential Nash equilibira and the superset of differential Stackelberg equilibria,
we provide estimates on the neighborhood on which convergence is guaranteed.
This being said, the question of the size of the region of attraction remains open. As commented on earlier
in the paper, an alternative but related technique tackles the nonlinear system directly. The downside of
this technique is that one needs to have in hand (or be able to construct) Lyapunov functions for both the
boundary layer model (i.e., the system that arises from treating the choice variable of the slow player as being
‘static’) and the reduced order model (i.e., the system that arises from plugging in the implicit mapping from
the fast player’s action to the slow player’s action into the slow player’s dynamics). A convex combination
of these functions provides a Lyapunov function for the original system x˙ = −Λτg(x). The level sets of
this combined Lyapunov function then give a better sense of the region of attraction and, in fact, one can
optimize over the weighting in the convex combination in order to obtain better estimates of the region of
attraction. This is an interesting avenue to explore in the context of learning in games with lots of intrinsic
structure that can potentially be exploited to improve both the rate of convergence and the region on which
convergence is guaranteed.
Another significant contribution of this work is the fact that we introduce tools that are arguably new
to the machine learning and optimization communities and expose interesting new directions of research.
In particular, the notion of a guard map, which is arguably even an obscure tool in modern control and
dynamical systems theory, is ‘rediscovered’ in this paper. The is potential to leverage this concept in not
only providing certificates for performance (e.g., beyond stability to robustness) but also in synthesizing
algorithms with performance guarantees. For instance, one observation from our empirical analysis is that
convergence rate is not only limited by the eigenvalues of the Schur complement of the Jacobian, but the
fastest convergence appears to occur when there are complex components of the eigenvalues. In short, some
cycling is beneficial. Better understanding this fact from a theoretical perspective is an open question, as is
optimizing the rate of convergence by exploiting these observations.
Finally, another set of related open questions center on practical considerations for the efficient use of
first order methods. For instance, with respect to generative adversarial networks, the exponential moving
average is known to empirically reduce the negative effects of cycling. Additionally, increasing the learning
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rate ratio does lead to predominantly real eigenvalues which in turn reduces cycling. Understanding the
trade offs between not only these two hyperparameters but also regularization is very important for practical
implementations. Empirically, we study the tradeoffs between the learning rate ratio, regularization param-
eter, and the parameter controlling the degree of “smoothness” in the exponential moving average, another
common heuristic that performs well in practice. There is an open line of research related to analytically
characterizing the tradeoffs between these three hyperparameters. However, in the absence of theoretical
tools for exploring these issues, what are reasonable and principled heuristics?
To conclude, while we arguably definitively address a standing open question for first order methods for
learning in zero-sum games/minmax optimization problems, there a many open directions exposed by the
tools introduced and empirical observations discovered in this work.
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A Helper Lemmas and Additional Mathematical Preliminaries
In this appendix, we present a handful of technical lemmas and review some additional mathematical pre-
liminaries excluded from the main body but which are important in proving the results in the paper.
The following technical lemma is used in proving an upper bound on the spectral radius of the linearization
of the discrete time update τ -GDA a requirement for obtaining the convergence rate results.
Lemma 3. The function c(z) = (1− z)1/2 + z4 − (1− z2 )1/2 satisfies c(x) ≤ 0 for all z ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Since c(0) = 0 and c(1) = 14 − 1√2 ≤ 0, we simply need to show that c′(z) ≤ 0 on (0, 1) to get that
c(z) is a decreasing function on [0, 1], and hence negative on [0, 1]. Indeed, c′(z) = 14 +
1
2
√
4−2z − 12√1−z ≤ 0
since (1− z)−1/2 − (4− 2z)−1/2 ≥ 1/2 for all z ∈ (0, 1).
The following proposition is a well-known result in numerical analysis and can be found in a number of
books and papers on the subject. Essentially, it provides an asymptotic convergence guarantee for a discrete
time update process or dynamical system.
Proposition 6 (Ostrowski’s Theorem (Argyros, 1999); Theorem 10.1.2 (Ortega and Rheinboldt, 1970)).
Let x∗ be a fixed point for the discrete dynamical system xk+1 = F (xk). If the spectral radius of the Jacobian
satisfies ρ(DF (x∗)) < 1, then F is a contraction at x∗ and hence, x∗ is asymptotically stable.
The following technical lemma, due to Mustafa and Davidson (1994), is used in constructing the finite
learning rate ratio.
Lemma 4 ((Mustafa and Davidson, 1994, Lem. 15)). Let V,Z ∈ Rp×p, W ∈ Rp×q and Y ∈ Rq×q. If V and
Y −XV −1W are non-singular, then
det
([
V + Z W
X Y
])
= det(V ) det(Y −XV −1W ) det(I + V −1(I +W (Y −XV −1W )−1XV −1)Z)
For completeness (and because there is a typo in the original manuscript), we provide the proof here.
Proof. Suppose that V and Y −XV −1W are non-singular so that the partial Schur decomposition[
V W
X Y
]
=
[
V 0
X Y −XV −1W
] [
I V −1W
0 I
]
holds, and
det
([
V W
X Y
])
= det(V ) det(Y −XV −1W ). (28)
Further, [
V W
X Y
]−1
=
[
I −V −1W
0 I
] [
V −1 0
−(Y −XV −1W )−1XV −1 (Y −XV −1W )−1
]
.
Applying the determinant operator, we have that
det
([
V + Z W
X Y
])
= det
([
V W
X Y
])
det
([
I 0
0 I
]
+
[
V W
X Y
]−1 [
Z 0
0 0
])
(29)
so that
det
([
I 0
0 I
]
+
[
V W
X Y
]−1 [
Z 0
0 0
])
= det
([
V −1(I +W (Y −XV −1W )−1XV −1)Z + I 0
−(Y −XV −1W )V −1Z I
])
(30)
= det(V −1(I +W (Y −XV −1W )−1XV −1)Z + I). (31)
Combining (28) with (31) in (29) gives exactly the claimed result.
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The following lemma is Theorem 2 Lancaster and Tismenetsky (1985, Chap. 13.1). We use this lemma
several times in the proofs of Theorem 3 and 4 so we include it here for ease of reference. For a given matrix
A, υ+(A), υ−(A), and ζ(A) are the number of eigenvalues of the argument that have positive, negative and
zero real parts, respectively.
Lemma 5. Consider a matrix A ∈ Rn×n.
(a) If P is a symmetric matrix such that AP + PA> = Q where Q = Q> > 0, then P is nonsingular and
P and A have the same inertia—i.e.,
υ+(A) = υ+(P ), υ−(A) = υ−(P ), ζ(A) = ζ(P ). (32)
(b) On the other hand, if ζ(A) = 0, then there exists a matrix P = P> and a matrix Q = Q> > 0 such
that AP + PA> = Q and P and A have the same inertia (i.e., (32) holds).
Numerical and Quadratic Numerical Range. The numerical range and quadratic numerical range of
a block operator matrix are particularly useful for proving results about the spectrum of a block operator
matrix as they are supersets of the spectrum (Tretter, 2008). Given a matrix A ∈ Rn×n, the numerical range
is defined by
W(A) = {z ∈ Cn : 〈Az, z〉, ‖z‖ = 1},
and is a convex subset of C. Define spaces Wi = {z ∈ Cni : ‖z‖ = 1} for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Consider a block
operator
A =
[
A11 A12
A21 A22
]
,
where Aii ∈ Rni×ni and Aij ∈ Rni×nj for each i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Given v ∈ W1 and w ∈ W2, let Av,w ∈ C2×2 be
defined by
Av,w =
[〈A11v, v〉 〈A12w, v〉
〈A21v, w〉 〈A22w,w〉
]
.
The quadratic numerical range of A is defined by
W2(A) =
⋃
v∈W1,w∈W2
spec(Av,w)
where spec(·) denotes the spectrum of its argument.
The quadratic numerical range can be described as the set of solutions of the characteristic polynomial
λ2 − λ(〈A11v, v〉+ 〈A22w,w〉) + 〈A11v, v〉〈A22w,w〉 − 〈A12v, w〉〈A21w, v〉 = 0 (33)
for v ∈ W1 and w ∈ W2. We use the notation 〈Av,w〉 = v¯>Aw to denote the inner product. Note that
W2(A) is a (potentially non-convex) subset of W(A) and contains spec(A).
B Proof of Proposition 3
Before proving this result, we note that the result has already been shown in the literature by Jin et al.
(2020). We included the result primarily because the proof approach is different and the tools we use (in
particular, the quadratic numerical range) have not been utilized before in this type of analysis. Hence, we
view the proof technique itself as a contribution.
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Proof of Proposition 3 We leverage the quadratic numerical range to show that spec(Jτ (x
∗)) ⊂ C◦+
for any τ ∈ (0,∞). Indeed, the quadratic numerical range of a block operator matrix contains its spec-
trum (Tretter, 2008).
Recall that
W2(Jτ (x∗)) =
⋃
v∈W1,w∈W2
spec(Jv,wτ (x
∗))
where
Jv,wτ (x
∗) =
[ 〈D21f(x∗)v, v〉 〈D12f(x∗)w, v〉
〈−τD>12f(x∗)v, w〉 〈−τD22f(x∗)w,w〉
]
and Wi = {z ∈ Cni : ‖z‖ = 1} for each i = 1, 2. Fix v ∈W1 and w ∈W2 and consider
Jv,wτ (x
∗) =
[
a b
−τ b¯ τd
]
Then, the elements of W2(Jτ (x∗)) are of the form
λτ =
1
2 (a+ τd)± 12
√
(a− τd)2 − 4τ |b|2
where a = 〈D21f(x∗)v, v〉, b = 〈D12f(x∗)w, v〉 and d = 〈−D22f(x∗)w,w〉 for vectors v ∈W1 and w ∈W2.
We claim that for any τ ∈ (0,∞), Re(λτ ) > 0 for all a,b, and d where a > 0 and d > 0 since x∗ is a
differential Nash equilibrium.
Indeed, we argue this by considering the two possible cases: (1) (a−τd)2 ≤ 4|b|2τ or (2) (a−τd)2 > 4τ |b|2.
• Case 1: Suppose τ ∈ (0,∞) is such that (a − τd)2 ≤ 4|b|2τ . Then, Re(λτ ) = 12 (a + τd) > 0 trivially
since a+ d > 0.
• Case 2: Suppose τ ∈ (0,∞) is such that (a− τd)2 > 4τ |b|2. In this case, we want to ensure that
Re(λτ ) >
1
2 (a+ τd)− 12
√
(a− τd)2 − 4τ |b|2 > 0.
The last inequality is equivalent to −ad < |b|2. Indeed,
(a+ τd)2 > (a− τd)2 − 4τ |b|2 ⇐⇒ 4τad > −4τ |b|2 ⇐⇒ −ad < |b|2.
Moreover, −ad < |b|2 holds for any pair of vectors (v, w) such that v ∈ W1 and w ∈ W2 since a > 0
and d > 0.
Hence, for any τ ∈ (0,∞), spec(Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦+ since the spectrum of an operator is contained in its quadratic
numerical range and the above argument shows that W2(Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦+.
C Proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
In this appendix section, we prove Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 from Section 4. We note that the proof of
Lemma 2 starts where the proof of Lemma 1 leaves off.
C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that x∗ is a differential Stackelberg or Nash equilibrium and that 0 < τ < ∞ is such that
spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦−. For the discrete time dynamical system xk+1 = xk − γ1Λτg(xk), it is well known
that if γ1 is chosen such that ρ(I − γ1Jτ (x∗)) < 1, then xk locally (exponentially) converges to x∗ (Ortega
and Rheinboldt, 1970). With this in mind, we formulate an optimization problem to find the upper bound
γ on the learning rate γ1 such that for all γ1 ∈ (0, γ), the spectral radius of the local linearization of the
discrete time map is a contraction which is precisely ρ(I−γ1Jτ (x∗)) < 1. The optimization problem is given
by
γ = min
γ>0
{
γ : max
λ∈spec(Jτ (x∗))
|1− γλ| ≤ 1
}
. (34)
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The intuition is as follows. The inner maximization problem is over a finite set spec(Jτ (x
∗)) = {λ1, . . . , λn}
where Jτ (x
∗) ∈ Rn×n. As γ increases away from zero, each |1 − γλi| shrinks in magnitude. The last λi
such that 1− γλi hits the boundary of the unit circle in the complex plane (i.e., |1− γλi| = 1) gives us the
optimal value of γ and the element of spec(Jτ (x
∗)) that achieves it. Examining the constraint, we have that
for each λi, γ(γ|λi|2 − 2Re(λi)) ≤ 0 for any γ > 0. As noted this constraint will be tight for one of the λ,
in which case γ = 2Re(λ)/|λ|2 since γ > 0. Hence, by selecting γ = minλ∈spec(Jτ (x∗)) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2, we have
that |1− γ1λ| < 1 for all λ ∈ spec(Jτ (x∗)) and any γ1 ∈ (0, γ).
To see this is the case, let γ = minλ∈spec(Jτ (x∗)) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2 and λm = arg minλ∈spec(Jτ ) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2.
Using the expression for γ, we have that
1− 2γRe(λ) + γ2(Re(λ)2 + Im(λ)2) = 1− 22Re(λm)|λm|2 Re(λ) +
(
2Re(λm)
|λm|2
)2
|λ|2.
Now, using the fact that Re(λ)/|λ|2 > Re(λm)/|λm|2, we have
1− 4Re(λm)|λm|2 Re(λ) +
(
2Re(λm)
|λm|2
)2
|λ|2 ≤ 1− 22Re(λm)|λm|2 Re(λ) +
(
2Re(λm)
|λm|2
)2 |λm|2Re(λ)
Re(λm)
= 1− 4Re(λm)|λm|2 Re(λ) + 4
Re(λm)
|λm|2 Re(λ)
= 1
as claimed. From this argument, it is clear that for any γ1 ∈ (0, γ), |1− γ1λ| < 1 for all λ ∈ spec(Jτ (x∗)).
Now, consider any α ∈ (0, γ) and let β = (2Re(λm) − α|λm|2)−1. Observe that γ1 = γ − α so that
γ1 ∈ (0, γ). Hence,
|1− (γ − α)λm|2 =
(
1−
(
2Re(λm)
|λm|2 − α
)
Re(λm)
)2
+
(
2Re(λm)
|λm|2 − α
)2
Im(λm)
2
= 1− 4Re(λm)
2
|λm|2 + 2αRe(λm) + 4
Re(λm)
2
|λm|2 − 4αRe(λm) + α
2|λm|2
= 1− 2αRe(λm) + α2|λm|2
= 1− α
β
so that
ρ(I − γ1Jτ (x∗)) <
(
1− α
β
)1/2
.
Hence, the ρ(I − γ1Jτ (x∗)) < 1 so that an application of Proposition 6 gives us the desired result.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 2
To prove this lemma, we build directly on the conclusion of the proof of Lemma 1. Indeed, since
ρ(I − γ1Jτ (x∗)) <
(
1− α
β
)1/2
,
given ε = α4β > 0 there exists a norm ‖ · ‖ (cf. Lemma 5.6.10 in Horn and Johnson (1985))9 such that
‖I − γ1Jτ (x∗)‖ ≤
(
1− α
β
)1/2
+
α
4β
≤
(
1− α
2β
)1/2
where the last inequality holds by Lemma 3. Taking the Taylor expansion of I−γ1gτ (x) around x∗, we have
I − γ1gτ (x) = (I − γ1gτ (x∗)) + (I − γ1Jτ (x∗))(x− x∗) +R2(x− x∗)
9The norm that exists can easily be constructed as essentially a weighted induced 1-norm. Note that the norm construction
is not unique. The proof in Horn and Johnson (1985) is by construction and the construction of this norm can be found there.
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where R2(x− x∗) is the remainder term satisfying R2(x− x∗) = o(‖x− x∗‖) as x→ x∗.10 This implies that
there is a δ > 0 such that ‖R2(x− x∗)‖ ≤ α8β ‖x− x∗‖ whenever ‖x− x∗‖ < δ. Hence,
‖I − γ1gτ (x)− (I − γ1gτ (x∗))‖ ≤
(
‖I − γ1Jτ (x∗)‖+ α
4β
)
‖x− x∗‖
≤
((
1− α
2β
)1/2
+
α
8β
)
‖x− x∗‖
≤
(
1− α
4β
)1/2
‖x− x∗‖
where the last inequality holds again by Lemma 3. Hence,
‖xk − x∗‖ ≤
(
1− α
4β
)k/2
‖x0 − x∗‖ (35)
whenever ‖x0 − x∗‖ < δ which verifies the claimed convergence rate.
D Proof of Corollary 3
Let ‖ · ‖ be the norm that exists (via construction a la Horn and Johnson (1985, Lem. 5.6.10)) in the proof
of Lemma 2 which is given in Appendix C. Following standard arguments, (35) in the proof of Lemma 2
implies a finite time convergence guarantee. Indeed, let ε > 0 be given. Since 0 < α4β < 1 we have that
(1− α/(4β))k < exp(−kα/(4β)). Hence,
‖xk − x∗‖ ≤ exp(−kα/(4β))‖x0 − x∗‖.
In turn, this implies that xk ∈ Bε(x∗), meaning that xk is a ε-differential Stackelberg equilibrium for all
k ≥ d 4βα log(‖x0 − x∗‖/ε)e whenever ‖x0 − x∗‖ < δ.
Now, given that fi ∈ Cr(X,R) for r ≥ 2, I − γ1Jτ (x) is locally Lipschitz with constant L so that we can
find an explicit expression for δ in terms of L. Indeed, recall that R2(x−x∗) = o(‖x−x∗‖) as x→ x∗ which
means limx→x∗ ‖R2(x− x∗)‖/‖x− x∗‖ = 0 so that
‖R2(x− x∗)‖ ≤
∫ 1
0
‖I − γ1Jτ (x∗ + η(x− x∗))− (I − γ1Jτ (x∗))‖‖x− x∗‖ dη ≤ L
2
‖x− x∗‖2
Observing that
‖R2(x− x∗)‖ ≤ L
2
‖x− x∗‖2 = L
2
‖x− x∗‖‖x− x∗‖,
we have that the δ > 0 such that ‖R2(x− x∗)‖ ≤ α/(8β)‖x− x∗‖ is δ = α/(4Lβ).
E Proof of Theorem 3 and Corollary 2
To prove Theorem 3 and Corollary 2, we introduce some techniques that are arguably new to the machine
learning and artificial intelligence communities. The first is the notion of a guard map. A guard map can
be used to provide a certificate of a particular behavior for a dynamical system as a parameter(s) varies. A
critical point of a dynamical systems is known to be stable if the spectrum of the Jacobian at the critical
point lies in the open left-half complex plane, denoted C◦−. Hence, we construct a guard map as a function of
τ and show that it guards C◦−. Specifically we show that the existence of a τ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that ν(τ∗) = 0
and ν(τ) 6= 0 for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) is equivalent to S1(J(x∗)) > 0 and −D22f(x∗) > 0 where
S1(J(x
∗)) = S1(Jτ (x∗)) = D21f(x
∗)−D12f(x∗)(D22f(x∗))−1D21f(x∗).
Towards this end, we need to introduced some notation as well as formal definitions for important concepts
such as the guard map.
10The notation R2(x− x∗) = o(‖x− x∗‖) as x→ x∗ means limx→x∗ ‖R2(x− x∗)‖/‖x− x∗‖ = 0.
49
E.1 Notation and Preliminaries
Given a matrix A ∈ Rn1×n2 , let vec(A) ∈ Rn1n2 be the vectorization of A. We use the convention that rows
are transposed and stacked in order. That is,
vec :
— a1 —...
— an1 —
 7→
a
>
1
...
a>n1

Let ⊗ and ⊕ denote the Kronecker product and Kronecker sum respectively. Recall that A⊕B = A⊗B +
B⊗A. A less common operator, we define  as an operator that generates an 12n(n+ 1)× 12n(n+ 1) matrix
from a matrix A ∈ Rn×n such that
AA = H+n (A⊕A)Hn
where H+n = (H
>
n Hn)
−1H>n is the (left) pseudo-inverse of Hn, a full column rank dupplication matrix. A
duplication matrix Hn ∈ Rn2×n(n+1)/2 is a clever linear algebra tool for mapping a n2 (n+ 1) vector to a n2
vector generated by applying vec(·) to a symmetric matrix and it is designed to respect the vectorization
map vec(·). In particular, if vech(X) is the half-vectorization map of any symmetric matrix X ∈ Rn×n, then
vec(X) = Hnvech(X) and vech(X) = H
+
n vec(X).
Given a square matrix A, let λ+max(A) be the largest positive real eigenvalue of A and if A does not have
a positive real eigenvalue then it is zero.
Guardian maps. The use of guardian maps for studying stability of parameterized families of dynamical
systems was arguably introduced by Saydy et al. (1990). Guardian or guard maps act as a certificate for a
performance criteria such as stability.
Formally, let X be the set of all n × n real matrices or the set of all polynomials of degree n with real
coefficients. Consider S an open subset of X with closure S¯ and boundary ∂S.
Definition 6. The map ν : X → C is said to be a guardian map for S if for all x ∈ S¯, ν(x) = 0 ⇐⇒ x ∈ ∂S.
Consider an open subset Ω of the complex plane that is symmetric with respect to the real axis. Then,
elements of S(Ω) = {A ∈ Rn×n : spec(A) ⊂ Ω} are said to be stable relative to Ω.
The following result gives a necessary and sufficient condition for stability of parameterized families of
matrices relative to some open subset of the complex plane.
Proposition 7 (Proposition 1 (Saydy et al., 1990); Theorem 2 (Abed et al., 1990)). Consider U to be a
pathwise connected subset of R and A(τ) ∈ Rn×n a matrix which depends continuously on τ . Let S(Ω) be
guarded by the map ν. The family {A(τ) : τ ∈ U} is stable relative to Ω if and only if (i) it is nominally
stable—i.e., A(τ0) ∈ S(Ω) for some τ0 ∈ U—and (ii) ν(A(τ)) 6= 0 for all τ ∈ U .
In proving Theorem 3, we define a guard map for the space of n × n Hurwitz stable matrices which is
denoted by S(C◦−).
Lemma 6. The map ν : A 7→ det(AA) guards the set of n× n Hurwitz stable matrices S(C◦−).
Proof. This follows from the following observation: for A ∈ Rn×n,
vech(AX +XA>) = H+n vec(AX +XA
>) = H+n (A⊕A)vec(X) = H+n (A⊕A)Hnvech(X)
from which it can be shown that the eigenvalues of A A are λi + λj for 1 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ n1 + n2 where λi for
i = 1, . . . , n are the eigenvalues of A.
Indeed, let S be a non-singular matrix such that S−1AS = M where M is upper triangular with λ1, . . . , λn
on its diagonal. Observe that for any n×n matrix P , HnH+n (P⊗P )Hn = (P⊗P )Hn and H+n (P⊗P )HnH+n =
H+n (P ⊗P ). Hence, using properties of the Kronecker product (namely, that (A1⊗A2)(B1⊗B2) = (A1B1⊗
A2B2)), we have that
H+n (S
−1 ⊗ S−1)HnH+n (I ⊗A+A⊗ I)HnH+n (S ⊗ S)Hn = H+n (I ⊗M +M ⊗ I)Hn
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so that the spectrum of H+n (I ⊗A+A⊗ I)Hn and H+n (I ⊗M +M ⊗ I)Hn coincide. Now, since M is upper
triangular, H+n (I ⊗M + M ⊗ I)Hn is upper triangular with diagonal elements λi + λj (1 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ n)
which can be verified by direct computation and using the definition of Hn. This implies that λi + λj
(1 ≤ j ≤ i ≤ n) are exactly the eigenvalues of H+n (I ⊗A+A⊗ I)Hn.
We note that there are several other guard maps for the space of Hurwtiz stable matrices including
ν : A 7→ det(A ⊕ A). To give some intuition for this map, it is fairly straightforward to see that the
Kronecker sum A⊕A = A⊗ I + I ⊗A has spectrum {λj + λi} where λi, λj ∈ spec(A). The operator AA
is simply a more computationally efficient expression of A ⊕ A, and as such the eigenvalues of A  A are
those of A⊕ A removing redundancies. We use A A specifically because of its computational advantages
in computing τ∗.
E.2 Proof of Theorem 3
We first prove that if x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium (i.e., S1(Jτ (x∗)) > 0 and −D22f(x∗) > 0),
then there exists a finite τ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞), x∗ is exponentially stable for x˙ = −Λτg(x)
(i.e., spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦−). Towards this end, we construct a guard map for the space of n × n Hurwtiz
stable matrices and explicitly construct the τ∗ using it.
Then we prove the other direction. That is, if there exists a finite τ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞),
x∗ is exponentially stable for x˙ = −Λτg(x), then x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. We prove this
by contradiction.
E.2.1 Proof that if x∗ is a differential Stackelberg then finite τ∗ exists
Towards this end, for a critical point x∗, let
−Jτ (x∗) =
[−D21f(x∗) −D12f(x∗)
τD>12f(x
∗) τD22f(x
∗)
]
=
[
A11 A12
−τA>12 τA22
]
and define
S1 = S1(−Jτ (x∗)) = A11 −A12A−122 A>12.
Note that this is equivalent to the first Schur complement of −J(x∗) (i.e., when τ = 1) since the τ and τ−1
cancel, and by assumption the first Schur complement of −J(x∗) is positive definite. Suppose that x∗ is a
differential Stackelberg equilibrium so that −S1 > 0 and −A22 > 0.
Polynomial guard map with family of matrices parameterized by τ . By Lemma 6, ν : A 7→
det(A  A) is a guard map for S(C◦−). Indeed, using the fact that the determinant is the product of the
eigenvalues of a matrix and the fact that spec(AA) = {λi + λj , 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n, λi, λj ∈ spec(A)}, we have
that
det(AA) =
∏
1≤j≤i≤n
(λi + λj) =
∏
1≤i≤n
2Re(λi)(4Re
2(λi) + 4Im
2(λi))
∏
1<i<j<n:
λi 6=λ¯j
(λi + λj).
Hence, consider S¯(C◦−), det(A  A) = 0 if and only if A  A is singular if and only if A has a purely
imaginary eigenvalue—that is, if and only if A ∈ ∂S(C◦−).11 Now, consider the parameterized family of
matrices −Jτ (x∗), parameterized by τ . By an abuse of notation, let ν(τ) = det(−Jτ (x∗)−Jτ (x∗)). If we
consider the subset of this family of matrices that lies in S(C◦−) (this subset could a priori be empty thought
we show it is not), then for any τ such that −Jτ (x∗) is in this subset, we have that ν(τ) = 0 if and only if
−Jτ (x∗)  (−Jτ (x∗)) is singular if and only if −Jτ (x∗) ∈ ∂S(C◦−). Hence, ν(τ) = det(−Jτ (x∗)  −Jτ (x∗))
guards S(C◦−).
In particular, if we envision −Jτ (x∗) as the input to ν : A 7→ det(A A) and simply vary τ (holding all
the entries of −Jτ (x∗) otherwise fixed), then ν : τ 7→ det(−Jτ (x∗) (−Jτ (x∗))) can be thought of simply as
11Indeed, this holds since the only scenarios in which det(AA) = 0 are such that the eigenvalues of A do not lie in S¯(C◦−).
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a function of τ which guards the set of Hurwitz stable matrices via the reasoning describe above. Indeed,
by slightly overloading the notation for ν,
ν(τ) := ν0 + ν1τ + · · ·+ νp−1τp−1 + νpτp = ν(−Jτ (x∗))
Hence, for intuition, observe that as τ decreases (towards zero) stability is first lost when at least one
eigenvalue of −Jτ (x∗) reaches the imaginary axis, at which point ν(τ) = 0.
There are two cases to consider:
Case 1: ν(τ) is an identically zero polynomial. In this case, −Jτ (x∗) is in the interior of the complement
of the set of Hurwitz stable matrices for all values of τ > 0—that is, −Jτ (x∗) ∈ int(Sc(C◦−)) for all
τ ∈ R+ = (0,∞).
Case 2: ν(τ) is not an identically zero polynomial. In this case, ν(τ) has finitely many zeros. If ν(τ) has
no positive real roots, then as τ varies in R+, −Jτ (x∗) does not cross ∂S(C◦−—i.e., the boundary of
the space of n× n Hurwitz stable matrices. Hence, {−Jτ (x∗) : τ ∈ R+} ⊂ Sc(C◦−) or {−Jτ (x∗) : τ ∈
R+} ⊂ int(Sc(C◦−)). It suffices to check −Jτ (x∗) ∈ Sc(C◦−) or −Jτ (x∗) ∈ int(Sc(C◦−)) for an arbitrary
τ ∈ R+.
On the other hand, if ν(τ) has ` ≥ 1 real positive zeros, say 0 < τ1 < · · · < τ` = τ∗, then by
Proposition 7, −Jτ (x∗) ∈ S(C◦−) for all τ > τ∗ if and only if −Jτ (x∗) ∈ S(C◦−) for arbitrarily chosen
τ > τ∗. We choose the largest positive root τ` because we are guaranteed that ν(τ) stops changing
sign for τ > τ∗. Further, the largest neighborhood in R+ for which −Jτ (x∗) ∈ S(C◦−) is (τ`,∞).
Recall that we have assumed that x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium (i.e., S1 > 0 and −A22 > 0).
We will show next (by way of explicit construction of τ∗) that we are always in case 2.
Construction of τ∗. We note that there are more elegant, simpler constructions, but to our knowledge
this construction gives the tightest bound on the range of τ for which −Jτ (x∗) is guarnateed to be Hurwitz
stable. Recall that
−Jτ (x∗) =
[−D21f(x∗) −D12f(x∗)
τD>12f(x
∗) τD22f(x
∗)
]
=
[
A11 A12
−τA>12 τA22
]
and
S1 = A11 −A12A−122 A>12.
Let Im denote the m×m identity matrix.
Claim 1. The finite learning rate ratio is τ∗ = λ+max(Q) where
Q = −(A11 ⊗A−122 ) + 2
[
(A12 ⊗A−122 )Hn2 (In1 ⊗A−122 A>12)Hn1
] [A¯−122 0
0 −S¯−11
] [
H+n2(A
>
12 ⊗ In2)
H+n1(S1 ⊗A12A−122 )
]
(36)
with A¯22 = A22 A22 and S¯1 = S1  S1.
Proof. Recall that ν(τ) = det(−Jτ (x∗) (−Jτ (x∗))) is a guard map for S(C◦−).
We apply basic properties of the Kronecker product and sum as well as Schur’s determinant formula to
obtain a reduced form of the guard map. To this end, we have that
−Jτ (x∗) (−Jτ (x∗)) =
 A11 A11 2H+n1(In1 ⊗A12) 0τ(In1 ⊗ (−A>12))Hn1 A11 ⊕ τA22 (A12 ⊗ In2)Hn2
0 2τH+n2(−A>12 ⊗ In2) τ(A22 A22)

Now, we apply Schur’s determinant formula to get that
ν(τ) = τn2(n2+1)/2 det(A22 A22) det
([
A11 A11 2H+n1(In1 ⊗A12)
τ(In1 ⊗ (−A>12))Hn1 A11 ⊕ τA22 +M1
])
(37)
where
M1 = −2H+n2(−A>12 ⊗ In2)(A22 A22)−1(A12 ⊗ In2)Hn2
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From here, we apply Lemma 4 to further reduce the guard map. First, note that
A11 ⊕ τA22 = A11 ⊗ In2 + In1 ⊗ τA22.
Let V = In1⊗τA22, Z = A11⊗In2 +M1, Y = A11A11, W = −τ(In1⊗A>12)Hn1 , and X = 2H+n1(In1⊗A12).
Using the two properties of the Kronecker product (B1⊗B2)(B3⊗B4) = (B1B3⊗B2B4) and (B1⊗B2)−1 =
(B−11 ⊗B−12 ), we have that
Y −XV −1W = A11 A11 + 2H+n1(In1 ⊗A12)(In1 ⊗A22)−1(In1 ⊗A>12)Hn1 (38)
= A11 A11 + 2H+n1(In1 ⊗A12A−122 A>12)Hn1 (39)
= A11 A11 +H+n1((In1 ⊗A12A−122 A>12) + (A12A−122 A>12 ⊗ In1))Hn1 (40)
= S1  S1 (41)
where (40) holds since H+n1(In1 ⊗ A12A−122 A>12)Hn1 = H+n1(A12A−122 A>12 ⊗ In1)Hn1 . Now, define V −1 +
V −1W (Y −XV −1W )−1XV −1 = τ−1M2 where
M2 = In1 ⊗A−122 − 2(In1 ⊗A−122 A>12)Hn1(S1  S1)−1H+n1(In1 ⊗A12A−122 )
so that applying Lemma 4 we have
ν(τ) = τn2(n2+1)/2 det(A22 A22) det(S1  S1) det(In1 ⊗A22) det(τIn1n2 +M2(A11 ⊗ In2 +M1)) (42)
The assumptions that S1 > 0 and −A22 > 0 together imply that det(S1  S1) 6= 0 and det(In1 ⊗ A22) 6= 0.
Hence, ν(τ) = 0 if and only if det(τIn1n2 + M2(A11 ⊗ In2 + M1)) = 0 since 0 < τ < ∞. The determinant
expression is exactly an eigenvalue problem.
Since by assumption the Schur complement of J(x∗) and the individual Hessian −D22f(x∗) are positive
definite (i.e., x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium), Thus, the largest positive real root of ν(τ) = 0 is
τ∗ = λ+max(−M2(A11 ⊗ In2 +M1))
where λ+max(·) is the largest positive real eigenvalue of its argument if one exists and otherwise its zero. Using
properties of the Kronecker product and duplication matrices, it can easily be seen that Q = −M2(A11 ⊗
In2 +M1).
The result of this claim concludes the proof that if x∗ is a differential Stackelberg, then there exists a
finite τ∗ ∈ [0,∞) such that for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞), spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦−.
E.2.2 Proof that existence of finite τ∗ implies that x∗ is a differential Stackelberg
The proof of this direction is argued by contradiction. Consider a critical point x∗ (i.e., where g(x∗) = 0
such that −C ≡ −D22f(x∗) and S1 ≡ S1(J(x∗)) = D21f(x∗) −D12f(x∗)(D22f(x∗))−1D>12f(x∗) have no zero
eigenvalues—that is, det(S1) 6= 0 and det(C) 6= 0.
Suppose that there exists a τ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞), spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦−, yet x∗ is
not a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. That is, either −S1 or C have at least one positive eigenvalue.
Without loss of generality, let −S1 have at least one positive eigenvalue.
Since det(S1) 6= 0 and det(C) 6= 0, by Lemma 5.b, there exists non-singular Hermitian matrices P1, P2
and positive definite Hermitian matrices Q1, Q2 such that −S1P1 − P1S1 = Q1 and CP2 + P2C = Q2.
Further, −S1 and P1 have the same inertia, meaning
υ+(−S1) = υ+(P1), υ−(−S1) = υ−(P1), ζ(−S1) = ζ(P1)
where for a given matrix A, υ+(A), υ−(A), and ζ(A) are the number of eigenvalues of the argument that
have positive, negative and zero real parts, respectively. Similarly, C and P2 have the same inertia:
υ+(C) = υ+(P2), υ−(C) = υ−(P2), ζ(C) = ζ(P2).
Since −S1 has at least one strictly positive eigenvalue, υ+(P1) = υ+(−S1) ≥ 1.
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Define
P =
[
I L>0
0 I
] [
P1 0
0 P2
] [
I 0
L0 I
]
(43)
where L0 = (D
2
2f(x
∗))−1D>12f(x
∗) = CD>12f(x
∗). Since P is congruent to blockdiag(P1, P2), by Sylvester’s
law of inertia (Horn and Johnson, 1985, Thm. 4.5.8), P and blockdiag(P1, P2) have the same inertia, meaning
that υ+(P ) = υ+(blockdiag(P1, P2)), υ−(P ) = υ−(blockdiag(P1, P2)), and ζ(P ) = ζ(blockdiag(P1, P2)).
Consider the matrix equation −PJτ (x∗)− J>τ (x∗)P = Qτ for −Jτ (x∗) where
Qτ =
[
I L>0
0 I
] [
Q1 P1D12f(x
∗)− S1L>0 P2
(P1D12f(x
∗)− S1L>0 P2)> P2L0D12f(x∗) + (P2L0D12f(x∗))> + τQ2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bτ
[
I 0
L0 I
]
which can be verified by straightforward calculations.
Observe that Qτ > 0 is equivalent to Bτ > 0 and both matrices are symmetric so that Bτ > 0 if and
only if Q1 > 0 and S2(Bτ ) > 0 where
S2(Bτ ) = P2L0D12f(x
∗) + (P2L0D12f(x∗))> + τQ2
− (P1D12f(x∗)− S1L>0 P2)>Q−11 (P1D12f(x∗)− S1L>0 P2).
Now, S2(Bτ ) is also a real symmetric matrix, and hence, it is positive definite if and only if all its eigenvalues
are positive. To determine the range of τ such that S2(Bτ ) is positive definite, we can formulate an eigenvalue
problem to determine the value of τ such that the matrix S2(Bτ ) becomes singular. This is analogous to the
guard map approach used in the proof in the previous subsection for the other direction of the proof, and
in this case, we are varying τ from zero to infinity and finding the point such that for all larger τ , S2(Bτ ) is
positive definite. Intuitively, such an argument works since τ scales the positive definite matrix Q2. Towards
this end, consider the eigenvalue problem in τ given by
0 = det
(
τI −Q−12
(
(P1D12f(x
∗)− S1L>0 P2)>Q−11 (P1D12f(x∗)− S1L>0 P2)
− P2L0D12f(x∗)− (P2L1D12f(x∗))>
))
.
Let τ0 be the maximum positive eigenvalue, and zero otherwise. Then, since eigenvalues vary continuously,
for all τ ∈ (τ0,∞), Qτ > 0 so that by Lemma 5.a we conclude that P and −Jτ (x∗) have the same inertia,
but this contradicts the stability of −Jτ (x∗) for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) since υ+(P ) ≥ 1.
E.3 Proof of Corollary 2
Suppose that x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium so that by Theorem 3, there exists a τ∗ ∈ (0,∞)
such that spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦− for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞). Now that we have a guarantee that −Jτ (x∗) is Hurwitz
stable for any τ ∈ (τ∗,∞), we apply Hartman-Grobman to get that the nonlinear system x˙ = −Λτg(x) is
stable in a neighborhood of x∗. Fix any τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) and let γ = arg minλ∈spec(Jτ (x∗)) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2. Then,
applying Lemma 1, for any γ1 ∈ (0, γ), τ -GDA converges locally asymptotically to x∗.
On the other hand, suppose that there exists a τ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦− for all
τ ∈ (τ∗,∞). Then by Theorem 3, if x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, since
spec(−Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦− for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞), if we let γ = arg minλ∈spec(Jτ (x∗)) 2Re(λ)/|λ|2, then by Lemma 1
τ -GDA converges locally asymptotically to x∗ for any choice of γ1 ∈ (0, γ).
F Proof of Proposition 4
The structure of this proof is as follows. We begin by introducing general background for analyzing general
singularly perturbed systems. Following this, we consider the linearization of the singularly perturbed system
that approximates the simultaneous gradient dynamics and describe how insights made about this system
translate to the corresponding nonlinear system. Finally, we analyze the stability of the linear system around
a critical point to arrive at the stated result. The analysis is primarily from Kokotovic et al. (1986).
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Analysis of General Singularly Perturbed Systems. Let us begin by considering a general singularly
perturbed system for x ∈ Rn, z ∈ Rm, and a sufficiently small parameter ε > 0 given by
x˙ = f(x, z, ε, t), x(t0, ε) = x0, x ∈ Rn
εz˙ = g(x, z, ε, t), z(t0, ε) = z0, z ∈ Rm
(44)
where f and g are assumed to be sufficiently many times continuously differential functions of the arguments
x, z, ε, and t. Observe that when ε = 0, the dimension of the system given in (44) drops from n + m to n
since z˙ degenerates into the equation
0 = g(x¯, z¯, 0, t) (45)
where the notation of x¯, z¯ indicates that the variables belong to the system with ε = 0. We further require
the assumption that (45) has k ≥ 1 isolated roots, which for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k} are given by
z¯ = φ¯i(x¯, t).
We now define an n-dimensional manifold Mε for any ε > 0 characterized by the expression
z(t, ε) = φ(x(t, ε), ε), (46)
where φ is sufficiently many times continuously differentiable function of x and ε. For Mε to be an invariant
manifold of the system given in (44), the expression in (46) must hold for all t > t∗ if it holds for t = t∗.
Formally, if
z(t∗, ε) = φ(x(t∗, ε), ε)→ z(t, ε) = φ(x(t, ε), ε) ∀t ≥ t∗, (47)
then Mε is an invariant manifold for (44). Differentiating the expression in (47) with respect to t, we obtain
z˙ =
d
dt
φ(x(t, ε), ε) =
dφ
∂x
x˙. (48)
Now, multiplying the expression in (48) by ε and substituting in the forms of x˙, z˙, and z from (44) and (46),
the manifold condition becomes
g(x, φ(x, ε), ε, t) = ε
∂φ
∂x
f(x, φ(x, ε), ε, t), (49)
which φ(x, ε) must satisfy for all x of interest and all ε ∈ [0, ε∗], where ε∗ is a positive constant.
We now define
η = z − φ(x, ε).
Then, in terms of x and η, the system becomes
x˙ = f(x, φ(x, ε) + η, ε, t)
εη˙ = g(x, φ(x, ε) + η, ε, t)− ε∂φ
∂x
f(x, φ(x, ε) + η, ε, t).
Remark 3. One interesting observation is that the above system is exactly the continuous time limiting sys-
tem for the τ -Stackelberg learning update in Fiez et al. (2020) under a simple transformation of coordinates.
Observe that the invariant manifold Mε is characterized by the fact that η = 0 implies η˙ = 0 for all x for
which the manifold condition from (49) holds. This implies that if η(t0, ε) = 0, it is sufficient to solve the
system
x˙ = f(x, φ(x, ε), ε, t), x(t0, ε) = x0.
This system is often referred to as the exact slow model and is valid for all x, z ∈Mε and Mε known as the
slow manifold of (52).
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Linearization of Simultaneous Gradient Descent Singularly Perturbed System. We now consider
the singularly perturbed system for simulataneous gradient descent given by
x˙ = −D21f1(x, z)
εz˙ = −D2f2(x, z).
(50)
Let us linearize the system around a point (x∗, z∗). Then,12
D1f1(x, z) ≈ D1f1(x∗, z∗) +D21f1(x∗, z∗)(x− x∗) +D12f1(x∗, z∗)(z − z∗)
D2f2(x, z) ≈ D2f2(x∗, z∗) +D21f2(x∗, z∗)(x− x∗) +D22f2(x∗, z∗)(z − z∗).
(51)
Defining u = (x − x∗) and v = (z − z∗) and considering a point (x∗, z∗) such that D1f1(x∗, z∗) = 0 and
D2f2(x
∗, z∗) = 0, then linearized singularly perturbed system is given by
u˙ = −D21f1(x∗, z∗)u−D12f1(x∗, z∗)v
εv˙ = −D21f2(x∗, z∗)u−D22f2(x∗, z∗)v.
(52)
To simplify notation, let us define Jτ as follows
Jτ =
[
D21f1(x
∗, z∗) D12f1(x∗, z∗)
ε−1D21f2(x∗, z∗) ε−1D22f2(x
∗, z∗)
]
=
[
A11 A12
ε−1A21 ε−1A22
]
along with
w˙ =
[
u˙
v˙
]
and w =
[
u
v
]
.
Then, an equivalent form of (52) is given by
w˙ = −Jτw. (53)
In what follows, we make insights about the behavior of the nonlinear system given in (50) around a critical
point (x∗, z∗) by analyzing the linear system given in (53). Recall that if (x∗, z∗) is asymptotically stable with
respect to the linear system in (53), then it is also asymptotically stable with respect to the nonlinear system
from (50). Moreover, to determine asymptotic stability, it is sufficient to prove that spec(Jτ ((x
∗, z∗)) ⊂ C◦+.
In what follows, we specialize the general analysis of singularly perturbed systems to the singularly perturbed
linear system given in (53).
Stability of Critical Points of Simutaneous Gradient Descent. The manifold condition from (49)
for the system in (53) is given by
A21u+A22φ(u, ε) = ε
∂φ
∂u
(A11u+A12φ(u, ε)). (54)
We claim that (54) can be satisfied by a function φ that is linear in u. Indeed, defining
v = φ(u, ε) = −L(ε)u
and then substituting back into (49), we get the simplified manifold condition of
A21 −A22L(ε) = −εL(ε)A11 + εL(ε)A12L(ε). (55)
Before we prove that an L(ε) always exists to satisfy (55), consider the change of variables
η = v + L(ε)u.
12Here, the ≈means, e.g., D1f1(x, z) = D1f1(x∗, z∗)+D21f1(x∗, z∗)(x−x∗)+D12f1(x∗, z∗)(z−z∗)+O(‖x−x∗‖2+‖z−z∗‖2),
and similarly for D2f2(x, z).
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The change of variables transforms the system from (53) into the equivalent representation[
u˙
η˙
]
=
[
A11 −A12L(ε) A12
R(L, ε) A22 + εL(ε)A12
] [
u
η
]
(56)
where
R(L, ε) = A21 −A22L(ε) + εL(ε)A11 − εL(ε)A12L(ε). (57)
Consider that R(L, ε) = 0. Then, the system from (56) has the upper block-triangular form[
x˙
η˙
]
=
[
A11 −A12L(ε) A12
0 A22 + εL(ε)A12
] [
x
η
]
, (58)
which has the effect of generating a replacement fast subsystem given by
εη˙ = (A22 + εLA12)η.
We now proceed to show that an L(ε) such that R(L, ε) = 0 always exists.
Lemma 7. If A22 is such that det(A22) 6= 0, there is an ε∗ such that for all ε ∈ [0, ε∗], there exists a solution
L(ε) to the matrix quadratic equation
R(L, ε) = A21 −A22L(ε) + εL(ε)A11 − εL(ε)A12L = 0 (59)
which is approximated according to
L(ε) = A−122 A21 + εA
−2
22 A21A0 +O(ε
2), (60)
where
A0 = A11 −A12A−122 A21. (61)
Proof. To begin, observe that for ε = 0, the unique solution to (59) is given by L(0) = A−122 A21. Now,
differentiating R(L, ε) from (59) with respect to ε, we find
A22 + εL(ε)A12
dL
dε
− εdL
dε
(A11 −A12L(ε)) = L(ε)A11 − L(ε)A12L(ε).
The unique solution of this equation at ε is
dL
dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
= A−122 L(0)(A11 −A12L(0)) = A−222 A21A0.
Accordingly, (60) represents the first two terms of the MacLaurin series for L(ε).
We remark that L(ε) as defined in (60) is unique in the sense that even though R(L, ) as given in (59)
may have several real solutions, only one is approximated by (60).
The characteristic equation of (58) is equivalent to that for the system from (53) owing to the similarity
transform between the systems. The block-triangular form of (53) admits a characteristic equation given by
ψ(s, ε) =
1
εm
ψs(s, ε)ψf (p, ε) = 0, (62)
where
ψs(s, ε) = det(sI − (A11 −A12L(ε))) (63)
is the characteristic polynomial of the slow subsystem, and
ψf (p, ε) = det(pI − (A22 + εA12L(ε))) (64)
is the characteristic polynomial of the fast subsystem in the timescale p = sε. Consequently, n of the
eigenvalues of (53) denoted by {λ1, . . . , λn} are the roots of the slow characteristic equation ψs(s, ε) = 0
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and the rest of the eigenvalues {λn+1, . . . , λn+m} are denoted by λi = νj/ε for i = n+ j and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
where {ν1, . . . , νm} are the roots of the fast characteristic equation ψf (p, ε) = 0.
The roots of ψs(s, ε) at ε = 0, given by the solution to
ψs(s, 0) = det(sI − (A11 −A12L(0))) = 0, (65)
are the eigenvalues of the matrix A0 defined in (61) since L(0) = A
−1
22 A21 as shown in Lemma 7. The roots
of the fast characteristic equation at ε = 0, given by the solution to
ψf (p, 0) = det(pI −A22) = 0 (66)
are the eigenvalues of the matrix A22. We now proceed by characterizing how closely the eigenvalues of the
system at ε = 0 approximate the eigenvalues of the system from (53) as ε→ 0.
If det(A22) 6= 0, then as ε → 0, n eigenvalues of the system given in (53) tend toward the eigenvalues
of the matrix A0 while the remaining m eigenvalues of the system from (53) tend to infinity with the rate
1/ε along asymptotes defined by the eigenvalues of A22 given as spec(A22)/ε as a result of the continuity of
coefficients of the polynomials from (63) and (64) with respect to ε.
Now, consider the special (but generic) case in which the eigenvalues of A0 are distinct and the eigenvalues
of A22 are distinct, but A0 and A22 may have common eigenvalues. Then, taking the total derivative of (62)
with respect to ε we have that
∂ψs
∂s
ds
dε
+
∂ψs
∂ε
= 0
Now, observe that ∂ψs/∂s 6= 0 since the eigenvalues of A0 = A11 − A12A−122 A21 are distinct.13 For each
i = 1, . . . , n, this gives us a well-defined derivative ds/dε (by the implicit mapping theorem) and hence, with
s(0) = λi(A0), the O(ε) approximation of s(ε) follows directly. That is,
λi = λi(A0) +O(ε), i = 1, . . . , n1
Similarly, taking the total derivative of ψf (p, ε) = 0 and again applying the implicit function theorem, we
have
λi+n1 = ε
−1(λj(A22 +O(ε)), i = 1, . . . , n2
where we have used the fact that p = sε.
G Proof of Theorem 4
Let x∗ be a stable critical point of 1-GDA which is not a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. Without loss of
generality, suppose that S1(−J(x∗)) has at least one eigenvalue with strictly positive real part.
Since both S1(−J(x∗)) and D22f(x∗) have no zero valued eigenvalues, by Lemma 5.b, there exists non-
singular Hermitian matrices P1, P2 and positive definite Hermitian matrices Q1, Q2 such that S1(−J(x∗))P1+
P1S1(−J(x∗)) = Q1 and D22f(x∗)P2 +P2D22f(x∗) = Q2. Further, S1(−J(x∗)) and P1 have the same inertia,
meaning
υ+(S1(−J(x∗))) = υ+(P1), υ−(S1(−J(x∗))) = υ−(P1), ζ(S1(−J(x∗))) = ζ(P1)
where for a given matrix A, υ+(A), υ−(A), and ζ(A) are the number of eigenvalues of the argument that
have positive, negative and zero real parts, respectively. Similarly, D22f(x
∗) and P2 have the same inertia:
υ+(D
2
2f(x
∗)) = υ+(P2), υ−(D22f(x
∗)) = υ−(P2), ζ(D22f(x
∗)) = ζ(P2).
Recall that we assumed S1(−J(x∗)) has at least one eigenvalue with strictly positive real part. Hence,
υ+(P1) = υ+(S1(−J(x∗))) ≥ 1.
Define
P =
[
I L>0
0 I
] [
P1 0
0 P2
] [
I 0
L0 I
]
13Recall that having distinct eigenvalues is a generic condition for a matrix an n1×n1 matrix, though not explicitly required
for the asymptotic results; its only a condition for the big-O approximation λi = λi(A0) + O(ε) for i = 1, . . . , n1 and λi =
ε−1(λj(A22) +O(ε)) where i = n1 + j for j = 1, . . . , n2.
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where L0 = (D
2
2f(x
∗))−1D>12f(x
∗). Since P is congruent to blockdiag(P1, P2), by Sylvester’s law of iner-
tia (Horn and Johnson, 1985, Thm. 4.5.8), P and blockdiag(P1, P2) have the same inertia, meaning that
υ+(P ) = υ+(blockdiag(P1, P2)), υ−(P ) = υ−(blockdiag(P1, P2)), and ζ(P ) = ζ(blockdiag(P1, P2)). Consider
now the Lyapunov equation −PJτ (x∗)− J>τ (x∗)P = Qτ for −Jτ (x∗) where
Qτ =
[
I L>0
0 I
] [
Q1 P1D12f(x
∗) + S1(−J(x∗))L>0 P2
(P1D12f(x
∗) + S1(−J(x∗))L>0 P2)> P2L0D12f(x∗) + (P2L0D12f(x∗))> + τQ2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bτ
[
I 0
L0 I
]
which can be verified by straightforward calculations.
Since υ+(P1) ≥ 1, we have that υ+(P ) ≥ 1. Now, we find the value of τ0 such that for all τ > τ0, Qτ > 0
so that, in turn, we can apply Lemma 5.a, to conclude that spec(−Jτ (x∗)) 6⊂ C◦−. Indeed, observe that
Qτ > 0 is equivalent to Bτ > 0 and both matrices are symmetric so that Bτ > 0 if and only if Q1 > 0 and
S2(Bτ ) > 0 where
S2(Bτ ) = P2L1D12f(x
∗) + (P2L1D12f(x∗))> + τQ2
− (P1D12f(x∗) + S1(−J(x∗))L>0 P2)>Q−11 (P1D12f(x∗) + S1(−J(x∗))L>0 P2).
Now, S2(Bτ ) is also a real symmetric matrix, and hence, it is positive definite if and only if all its eigenvalues
are positive. To determine the range of τ for which Qτ > 0, we simply need to solve the eigenvalue problem
0 = det(τI −Q−12 ((P1D12f(x∗) + S1(−J(x∗))L>0 P2)>Q−11 (P1D12f(x∗) + S1(−J(x∗))L>0 P2)
− P2L1D12f(x∗)− (P2L1D12f(x∗))>)).
and extract the maximum eigenvalue, namely,
τ0 =λmax(Q
−1
2 ((P1D12f(x
∗) + S1(−J(x∗))L>0 P2)>Q−11 (P1D12f(x∗)
+ S1(−J(x∗))L>0 P2)− P2L1D12f(x∗)− (P2L1D12f(x∗))>)).
Hence, as noted previously, by Lemma 5.a, we conclude that for all τ ∈ (τ0,∞), spec(−Jτ (x∗)) 6⊂ C◦−.
To provide some context for the proof approach, it follows the same idea as the proof of Theorem 3 in
Appendix E.2.2. Indeed, to determine the range of τ such that S2(Bτ ) is positive definite, we can formulate
an eigenvalue problem to determine the value of τ such that the matrix S2(Bτ ) becomes singular. We vary τ
from zero to infinity in order to find the point such that for all larger τ , S2(Bτ ) is positive definite. Intuitively,
such an argument works since τ scales the positive definite matrix Q2.
H Proof of Theorem 7
As in Mescheder et al. (2018), we only apply the regularization to the discriminator. In the following proof,
we use ∇x(·) to denote the partial gradient with respect to x of the argument (·) when the argument is the
discriminator D(·;ω) in order prevent any confusion between the notation D(·) which we use elsewhere for
derivatives.
To prove the first part of this result, we following similar arguments to Theorem 4.1 of (Mescheder
et al., 2018). To prove the second part, we leverage the concept of the quadratic numerical range. For both
components of the proof, we will use the following form of the Jacobian of the regularized game. Indeed,
first observe that the structural form of J(τ,µ)(x
∗) is
J(τ,µ)(x
∗) =
[
0 B
−τB> τ(C + µR)
]
(67)
where B = D12f(x
∗), C = −D22f(x∗) and R = D22Ri(x∗). This follows from Assumption 2-a., which implies
that D(x;ω∗) = 0 in some neighborhood of supp(pD) and hence, ∇xD(x;ω∗) = 0 and ∇2xD(x;ω∗) = 0 for
x ∈ supp(pD). In turn, we have that D21f(x∗) = 0.
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Proof that x∗ = (θ∗, ω∗) is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. For any fixed µ ∈ [0,∞), then
we first observe that x∗ is also a critical point of the unregularized dynamics. Indeed, by Assumption 2-
a., D(x;ω∗) = 0 in some neighborhood of supp(pD) and hence, ∇xD(x;ω∗) = 0 and ∇2xD(x;ω∗) = 0 for
x ∈ supp(pD). Further, D2Ri(θ, ω) = µEpi(x)[D2(∇xD(x;ω))∇xD(x, ω)] for i = 1, 2 where p1(x) = pD(x)
and p2(x) = pθ(x). Thus, using the above observation that ∇xD(x;ω∗) = 0, we have that D2Ri(θ∗, ω∗) = 0
for i = 1, 2 meaning that the derivative of the regularizer with respect to ω is zero at x∗ = (θ∗, ω∗) which
in turn implies that D1f(x
∗) = 0 and −D2f(x∗) = 0. Hence, x∗ is a critical point of the unregularized
dynamics as claimed. Further, C+µR > 0 which follows from Lemma D.5 in (Mescheder et al., 2018). From
Lemma D.6 in (Mescheder et al., 2018), due to Assumption 2-c., if v 6= 0 and v 6∈ Tθ∗MG, then Bv 6= 0
which implies that B can only be rank deficient on Tθ∗MG. Using this fact along with the structure of the
Jacobian as in (67), we have that the Schur complement of J(τ,µ)(x
∗) is equal to B>(C + µR)−1B > 0 since
C + µR > 0. Hence, x∗ = (θ∗, ω∗) is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof of stability. Examining (67), it is straightforward to see that the quadratic numerical range
W2(J(τ,µ)) has eigenvalues of the form
λτ,µ =
1
2 (τ(c+ µr))± 12
√
(−τ(c+ µr))2 − 4τ |b|2
where b = 〈D12f(x∗)v, w〉, c = 〈−D22f(x∗)w,w〉 and r = 〈D22Ri(x∗)w,w〉 for vectors v ∈ W1 ∩ (Tθ∗MG)⊥
and w ∈W2 ∩ (Tω∗MD)⊥ where U⊥ denotes the orthogonal complement of U . We claim that for any value
of µ ∈ [0, µ1] and any τ ∈ (0,∞), Re(λτ,µ) > 0. Indeed, we argue this by considering the two possible cases:
(1) (τ(c+ µr))2 ≤ 4|b|2τ or (2) (τ(c+ µr))2 > 4τ |b|2.
• Case 1: Suppose that (τ(c + µr))2 ≤ 4|b|2τ . Then, Re(λτ,µ) = 12 (τ(c + µr)) > 0 trivially since
c+ µr > 0.
• Case 2: Suppose that (τ(c+ µr))2 > 4τ |b|2. In this case, we want to ensure that
Re(λτ ) >
1
2 (τ(c+ µr))− 12
√
(−τ(c+ µr))2 − 4τ |b|2 > 0.
which is true since
(τ(c+ µr))2 > (−τ(c+ µr))2 − 4τ |b|2 ⇐⇒ 0 > −4τ |b|2
This concludes the proof.
I Proof of Proposition 5
This proposition follows immediately from observing the structure of the Jacobian: for any matrix of the
form
−J =
[
0 −B
B> −C
]
at least one eigenvalue will be purely imaginary if n2 < n1/2 where B ∈ Rn1×n2 and C ∈ Rn2×n2 . Indeed,
by Lyapunov’s stability theorem for linear systems (Hespanha, 2018, Theorem 8.2), a matrix A is Hurwitz
stable if and only if for every symmetric positive definite Q = Q> > 0, there exists a unique symmetric
positive definite P = P> > 0, such that A>P +PA = −Q. Hence, −J is Hurwitz stable if and only if there
exists a P = P> > 0 such that
0 < Q =
[
0 −B
B> C
] [
P1 P2
P>2 P3
]
+
[
P1 P2
P>2 P3
] [
0 B
−B> C
]
=
[ −BP>2 − P2B> −BP3 + P1B + P2C
B>P1 + CP>2 − P3B> B>P2 + CP3 + P>2 B + P3C
]
Since this is a symmetric positive definite matrix, the block diagonal components must also be symmetric
positive definite so that −BP2−P2B> > 0.14 Recall that B ∈ Rn1×n2 and P2 ∈ Rn2×n1 . Hence, a necessary
14If a block matrix Q with block entries Qij for i, j ∈ {1, 2} is positive definite symmetric, then Qii > 0 for i = 1, 2.
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condition for this matrix to be positive definite is that n2 ≥ n1/2 for −BP2 − P2B> to have full rank; of
course this is not sufficient, but it is necessary. It is easy to see this argument is independent of whether a
learning rate ratio τ 6= 0 or regularization is incorporated.
J Extensions in the Stochastic Setting
Let x˜(t) be the asymptotic pseudo-trajectories of the stochastic approximation process {xk}. That is, x˜(t)
are linear interpolates between the sample points xk generated by the stochastic τ -GDA process, and are
defined by
x˜(t) = x˜(tk) +
(t− tk)
γk
(x˜(tk+1)− x˜(tk))
where tk = tk + γk and t0 = 0.
Assumption 3. The stochastic process {wk} is a martingale difference sequence with respect to the increasing
family of σ-fields defined by
Fk = σ(x`, w`, ` ≤ k), ∀k ≥ 0,
so that E[wk+1| Fk] = 0 almost surely for all k ≥ 0. Furthermore, there exists c1, c2 ∈ C(Rd,R>0) such that
Pr{‖wk+1‖ > v| Fk} ≤ c1(xk) exp(−c2(xk)v), n ≥ 0
for all v ≥ v˜ where v˜ is some sufficiently large, fixed number.
Proposition 8. Suppose that Assumption 3 holds and that x∗ is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium. Let
γk = 1/(k + 1)
β where β ∈ (0, 1]. There exists a τ∗ ∈ (0,∞) and an 0 ∈ (0,∞) such that for any fixed
 ∈ (0, 0], there exists functions h1() = O(log(1/)) and h2() = O(1/) so that when T ≥ h1() and
k0 ≥ Kτ where Kτ is such that 1/γk ≥ h2() for all k ≥ Kτ , the stochastic iterates of τ -GDA with stepsize
sequence γk and timescale separation τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) satisfy
Pr{‖x˜(t)− x∗‖ ≤  ∀t ≥ tk0 + T + 1| x˜(tk0) ∈ B(x∗)} = 1−O(k1−β/20 exp(−Cτkβ/20 ))
for some constant Cτ > 0.
The proof largely follows from the proofs of Theorem 1.1 and 1.2 in (Thoppe and Borkar, 2019), combined
with the existence of a finite timescale separation parameter obtained via Theorem 3. Indeed, since x∗ is
a differential Stackelberg equilibrium, by Theorem 3 there exists a range of τ—namely, (τ∗,∞)—such that
for any τ ∈ (τ∗,∞), x∗ is a locally asymptotically stable equillibrium for x˙ = −Λτg(x). Hence, fixing any
τ ∈ (τ∗,∞), a converse Lyapunov theorem can be applied to construct a local Lyapunov function. Let
V : Rn → R be this Lyapunov function so that there exists r, r0, 0 > 0 such that r > r0, and
B(x
∗) ⊆ V r0 ⊂ N0(V r0) ⊆ V r
for any  ∈ (0, 0] where, for a given q > 0, V q = {x ∈ dom(V ) : V (x) ≤ q} and N0(V r0) is an 0–
neighborhood of V r0—i.e., N0(V r0) = {x ∈ Rn| ∃y ∈ V r0 , ‖x − y‖ ≤ 0}. From here, the result follows
from an application of the results in the work by Thoppe and Borkar (2019).
The utility of this result is that it provides a guarantee in the stochastic setting for a more reasonable
and practically useful stepsize sequence. However, constructing the constants such as Kτ , Cτ and 0 is
highly non-trivial as can be seen in the work of Thoppe and Borkar (2019) and similar works in the area of
stochastic approximation (Borkar, 2008). One direction of future work is examining the Lyapunov approach
for directly analyzing the nonlinear singularly perturbed system; it is known, however, that the stochastic
singularly perturbed systems have much weaker guarantees in terms of stability (Kokotovic et al., 1986,
Chap. 4).
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K Further Details on Related Work
In this section, we provide further details on the discussion from Section 7 regarding the results presented
by Jin et al. (2020) on the local stability of gradient descent-ascent with a finite timescale separation. The
purpose of this discussion is to make clear that Proposition 27 from the work of Jin et al. (2020) does not
disagree with the results we provide in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 and is instead complementary. In what
follows, we recall Proposition 27 of Jin et al. (2020) in separate pieces in the terminology of this paper
and delineate its meaning from our results on the stability of gradient descent-ascent with a finite timescale
separation.
To begin, we consider the component of Proposition 27 from Jin et al. (2020) which says that given
any fixed and finite timescale separation τ > 0, a zero-sum game can be constructed with a differential
Stackelberg equilibrium that is not stable with respect to the continuous time limiting system of τ -GDA given
by the dynamics x˙ = −Λτg(x).
Proposition 9 (Rephrasing of Jin et al. 2020, Proposition 27(a)). For any fixed τ > 0, there exists a
zero-sum game G = (f,−f) such that spec(Jτ (x∗)) 6⊂ C◦+ for a differential Stackelberg equilibrium x∗.
We now explain the proof. Let us consider any  > 0 and the game
f(x, y) = −x2 + 2√xy − (/2)y2. (68)
At the unique critical point (x∗, y∗) = (0, 0), the Jacobian of the dynamics is given by
Jτ (x
∗, y∗) =
[ −2 2√
−2τ√ τ
]
.
Moreover, observe that (x∗, y∗) is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium and not a differential Nash equilib-
rium since D21f(x
∗, y∗) = −2 ≯ 0, −D22f(x∗, y∗) =  > 0 and S1(J(x∗, y∗)) = 2 > 0. Finally, the spectrum
of the Jacobian is
spec(Jτ (x
∗, y∗)) =
{−2 + τ±√τ22 − 12τ+ 4
2
}
.
Let us now fix τ as any arbitrary positive value. Then, consider the game construction from (68) with
 = 1/τ . For the fixed choice of τ and subsequent game construction, we get that
spec(Jτ (x
∗, y∗)) = {(− 1± i√7)/2} 6⊂ C◦+.
This in turn means the differential Stackelberg equilibrium is not stable with respect to the dynamics
x˙ = −Λτg(x) for the given choice of τ . Since the choice of τ was arbitrary, this is a valid procedure to
generate a game with a differential Stackelberg equilibrium that is not stable with respect to x˙ = −Λτg(x)
given a choice of τ beforehand.
This result contrasts with that of Theorem 3 in the following fundamental way. In the proof of Proposi-
tion 9, τ is fixed and then the game is constructed, whereas in Theorem 3 the game is fixed and then the
conditions on τ given. To illustrate this point, consider the game construction from (68) with  fixed to be
an arbitrary positive value. It can be verified that spec(Jτ (x
∗, y∗)) ⊂ C◦+ for all τ > 2/. This means that
given the differential Stackelberg equilibria in this game construction, there is indeed a finite τ∗ such that
the equilibrium is stable with respect to x˙ = −Λτg(x) for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞). Put concisely, Proposition 9 is
showing that there is exists a continuum of games for which a differential Stackelberg equilibrium is unstable
with an improper choice of finite learning rate ratio τ . On the other hand, Theorem 3 is proving that given
a game with a differential Stackelberg equilibrium, there exists a range of suitable finite learning rate ratios
such that the differential Stackelberg equilibrium is guaranteed to be stable.
We now move on to examining the portion of Proposition 27 from Jin et al. (2020) which says that given
any fixed and finite timescale separation τ > 0, a zero-sum game can be constructed with a critical point
that is not a differential Stackelberg equilibrium which is stable with respect to the continuous time limiting
system of τ -GDA given by x˙ = −Λτg(x).
Proposition 10 (Rephrasing of Jin et al. 2020, Proposition 27(b)). For any fixed τ , there exists a zero-sum
game G = (f,−f) such that spec(Jτ (x∗)) ⊂ C◦+ for a critical point x∗ satisfying g(x∗) = 0 that is not a
differential Stackelberg equilibrium.
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In a similar manner as following Proposition 9, we now explain the proof of Proposition 10 and then
contrast the result with Theorem 4. Again, consider any  > 0, along with the game construction
f(x, y) = x21 + 2
√
x1y1 + (/2)y
2
1 − x22/2 + 2
√
x2y2 − y22 . (69)
At the unique critical point (x∗, y∗) = (0, 0), the Jacobian of the dynamics is given by
Jτ (x
∗, y∗) =

2 0 2
√
 0
0 −1 0 2√
−2τ√ 0 −τ 0
0 −2τ√ 0 2τ

Observe that (x∗, y∗) is neither a differential Nash equilibrium nor a differential Stackelberg equilibrium
since D21f(x
∗, y∗) = diag(2,−1) and −D22f(x∗, y∗) = diag(, 2) are both indefinite. The spectrum of the
Jacobian is
spec(Jτ (x
∗, y∗)) =
{2− τ±√τ22 − 12τ+ 4
2
,
−1 + 2τ±√4τ22 − 12τ+ 1
2
}
.
Now, fix τ as any arbitrary positive value, then consider the game construction from (69) with  = 1/τ . For
the fixed choice of τ and resulting game construction given the choice of , we have that
spec(Jτ (x
∗, y∗)) = {1± i
√
7, 1± i
√
7} ⊂ C◦+.
This indicates that the non-equilibrium critical point is stable with respect to the dynamics z˙ = −Λτg(z)
where z = (x, y) for the given choice of τ . Similar to the proof of Proposition 9, since the choice of τ was
arbitrary, the procedure to generate a game with a non-equilibrium critical point that is stable with respect
to z˙ = −Λτg(z) is valid given a choice of τ beforehand.
The key distinction between Proposition 10 and Theorem 4 is analogous to that between Proposition 9
and Theorem 3. Indeed, the proof and result of Proposition 10 rely on τ being fixed followed by the game
being constructed. On the other hand, in Theorem 4 the game is fixed and then the conditions on τ given.
To make this clear, consider the game construction from (69) with  fixed to be an arbitrary positive value.
It turns out that spec(Jτ (x
∗, y∗)) 6⊂ C◦+ for all τ > 2/ since
Re
(2− τ±√τ22 − 12τ+ 4
2
)
< 0.
As a result, given the unique critical point of the game there is a finite τ0 such that the non-equilibrium
critical point is not stable with respect to x˙ = −Λτg(x) for all τ ∈ (τ0,∞). In summary, Proposition 10 is
showing that there is exists a continuum of games for which a non-equilibrium critical point is stable given
an unsuitable choice of finite learning rate ratio τ . In contrast, Theorem 4 is showing that given a game with
a non-equilibrium critical point, there exists a range of finite learning rate ratios such that it is not stable.
To recap, the discussion in this section is meant to explicitly contrast Proposition 27 from the work of Jin
et al. (2020) with Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 since they may potentially appear contradictory to each other
without close inspection. The result of Jin et al. (2020) shows that (i) given a fixed finite learning ratio,
there exists a game for with a differential Stackelberg equilibria that is not stable and (ii) given a fixed
finite learning ratio, there exists a game with a non-equilibrium critical point that is stable. From a different
perspective, we show that (i) given a fixed game and differential Stackelberg equilibrium, there exists a range
of finite learning rate ratios for which the equilibrium is stable (Theorem 3) and (ii) given a fixed game and
a non-equilibrium critical point, there exists a range of finite learning rate ratios for which the critical point
is not stable (Theorem 4).
L Experiments Supplement
In this section we present several experiments not included in the body of the paper along with supplemen-
tal simulation results and details for the experiments presented in Section 6. We study a torus game in
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Section L.1 and examine the connection between timescale separation and the region of attraction. Then,
in Section L.2, we return to the Dirac-GAN game and consider the non-saturating objective function. In
Section L.3, we explore a generative adversarial network formulation using the Wasserstein cost function with
a linear generator and quadratic discriminator for the problem of learning a covariance matrix. We finish
in Section L.4 by presenting further results and details on our experiments training generative adversarial
networks on image datasets.
L.1 Location Game on the Torus
We use the example in this section to further study the role of timescale separation on the regions of attraction
around critical points. Consider the zero-sum game defined by the cost
f(x1, x2) = −0.15 cos(x1) + cos(x1 − x2) + 0.15 cos(x2). (70)
This game can be interpreted as a location game on the torus. Specifically, the first player seeks to be far
from the second player but near zero, while the second player seeks to be near the first player. This is a
non-convex game on a non-convex strategy space. The critical points are given by the set15:
{x : g(x) = 0} = {(0, 0), (pi, pi), (pi, 0), (0, pi), (−1.646,−1.496), (1.646, 1.496)}.
The critical points (0, 0) and (pi, pi) are the only differential Stackelberg equilibrium and neither is a differential
Nash equilibrium. The differential Stackelberg equilibrium at (0, 0) is stable for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) where
τ∗ = 0.74 and the differential Stackelberg equilibrium (pi, pi) is stable for all τ ∈ (τ∗,∞) where τ = 1.35.
The rest of the critical points are unstable for any choice of τ . We remark that we computed τ∗ for each
differential Stackelberg equilibrium using the construction from Theorem 3 in Section 3 and it again gave
the exact value of τ∗ such that the system is stable for all τ > τ∗.
In Figure 13a, we show the trajectories of τ -GDA with γ1 = 0.001 and τ ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10} given the initializa-
tions (x01, x
0
2) = (2,−1) and (x01, x02) = (1.9,−2.1) overlayed on the vector field generated by the respective
timescale separation parameters. We observe that as the timescale separation τ grows, the rotational dy-
namics in the vector field dissipate and the directions of movement become sharp. As we mentioned in
previous examples, τ -GDA moves directly to the zero line of −D2f(x1, x2) and then along that line to an
equilibrium given sufficient timescale separation. The warping of the vector field that occurs as a result of
timescale separation impacts the equilibrium that the dynamics converge to from a fixed initial condition
and the neighborhood on which τ -GDA converges to an equilibrium. In other words, the region of attraction
around critical points depends heavily on the timescale separation τ .
To illustrate this fact, in Figure 13b we show the regions of attraction for each choice of timescale sepa-
ration. The vector fields are again shown for each τ ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10}, but now with colors overlayed indicating
the equilibria that the dynamics converge to given an initialization at that position. This experiment was
generated by running τ -GDA with a dense set of initial conditions chosen uniformly over the strategy space.
Positions in the strategy space without color did not converge to an equilibrium in the fixed horizon of
20000 iterations with γ1 = 0.04. This happens when τ -GDA is not initialized in the local neighborhood of
attraction around a stable equilibrium. For the choice of τ = 1, (0, 0) is the only stable equilibrium. How-
ever, as demonstrated in Figure 13a, τ -GDA fails to converge to the equilibrium from the initial conditions
(x01, x
0
2) = (2,−1) and (x01, x02) = (1.9,−2.1). This behavior is further demonstrated over the strategy space
in Figure 13b and highlights the local nature of the guarantees since convergence is only assured given an
initialization in a suitable local neighborhood around a stable critical point. On the other hand, τ -GDA con-
verges to an equilibrium from any initial condition for τ ∈ {2, 5, 10} as can be seen by Figure 13b. Notably,
the equilibrium to which the learning dynamics converge depends on the timescale separation and initial con-
dition. To give a concrete example, consider the initial conditions shown in Figure 13a of (x01, x
0
2) = (2,−1)
and (x01, x
0
2) = (1.9,−2.1). For the initial condition (x01, x02) = (2,−1), τ -GDA converges to the equilibrium
at (0, 0) for each τ ∈ {2, 5, 10}. Yet, for the initial condition (x01, x02) = (1.9,−2.1), τ -GDA converges to the
equilibrium at {(0, 0), (pi, pi), (pi, pi)} for the respective choices of τ ∈ {2, 5, 10}. In other words, the region
of attraction around the critical points changes so that from a fixed initial condition τ -GDA may converge to
distinct equilibrium depending on the initial condition. From Figure 13b, we see that the region of attraction
15Note that because the joint strategy space is a torus, (±pi,±pi) = (∓pi,±pi), (pi, 0) = (−pi, 0), and (0,−pi) = (0, pi).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 13: Experimental results for the torus game defined in (70) of Appendix L.1. In Figure 13a, we overlay
multiple trajectories produced by τ -GDA onto the vector field generated by the choice of timescale separation
selection τ . The shading of the vector field is dictated by its magnitude so that lighter shading corresponds
to a higher magnitude and darker shading corresponds to a lower magnitude. Figure 13b demonstrates the
effect of timescale separation on the regions of attraction around critical points by coloring points in the
strategy space according to the equilibrium τ -GDA converges. We remark that areas without coloring indicate
where τ -GDA did not converge in the time horizon.
around (x01, x
0
2) = (1.9,−2.1) grows from τ = 1 to τ = 2 and τ = 4, but then shrinks at τ = 10. This example
highlights that timescale separation has a fundamental impact on the region of attraction around critical
points and as τ grows it is possible for the region of attraction around an equilibrium to shrink. Collectively,
this motivates explicit methods for trying to shape the region of attraction around desirable equilibria.
L.2 Dirac-GAN and Regularization: Non-Saturating Formulation
In Section 6.4, we presented experiments for the Dirac-GAN game studied by Mescheder et al. (2017)
using the original generative adversarial network formulation of Goodfellow et al. (2014). In this section,
we revisit the Dirac-GAN game using the non-saturating generative adversarial network formulation also
proposed by Goodfellow et al. (2014). While we refer the reader back to Section 6.4 for complete details on
the Dirac-GAN, we do recall some key components of the formulation. Recall that the zero-sum game which
arises from the original objective with regularization µ > 0 is defined by the cost
f(θ, ω) = `(θω) + `(0)− µ
2
ω2.
As discussed in Section 6.4, the unique critical point of the game is (θ∗, ω∗) = (0, 0) and it corresponds
to the local Nash equilibrium of the unregularized game and a differential Stackelberg equilibrium of the
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(a) (b)
(d)
Figure 14: Experimental results for the Dirac-GAN game defined in (71) of Appendix L.2. Figure 14a
shows trajectories of τ -GDA for τ ∈ {1, 4, 8, 16} with regularization µ = 0.3 and τ = 1 with regularization
µ = 1. Figure 14b shows the distance from the equilibrium along the learning paths. Figure 14d shows
the trajectories of τ -GDA overlayed on the vector field generated by the respective timescale separation and
regularization parameters. The shading of the vector field is dictated by its magnitude so that lighter shading
corresponds to a higher magnitude and darker shading corresponds to a lower magnitude.
regularized game. Moreover, the equilibrium is stable with respect to the continous time dynamics for all
τ > 0 and µ > 0 so that the discrete time update τ -GDA converges with a suitable learning rate γ1.
The non-saturating generative adversarial network formulation proposed by Goodfellow et al. (2014) in
the context of the Dirac-GAN game corresponds to player 1 maximizing `(−θω) instead of minimizing `(θω).
This results in the general-sum game defined by the costs
(f1(θ, ω), f2(θ, ω)) = (−`(−θω) + `(0)− µ
2
ω2,−`(θω)− `(0) + µ
2
ω2). (71)
As shown by Mescheder et al. (2018), the unique critical point of the game remains at (θ∗, ω∗) = (0, 0).
Moreover, it can be observed that Jτ (θ
∗, ω∗) in this formulation is identical to that from (25) so this game is
locally equivalent to the zero-sum game that arises from the original objective proposed by Goodfellow et al.
(2014). This is despite the fact that the non-saturating objective was motivated by global concerns (vanishing
gradients early in the training process) rather than local considerations. In Figure 14 we present experiments
with τ -GDA for the regularized Dirac-GAN game with the non-saturating objective and `(t) = −`(1+exp(−t)).
We observe similar behavior as the experiments with the standard objective and refer back to Section 6.4
for the insights we draw from the simulation. This experiment is primarily included for completeness and
to motivate our use of the non-saturating objective in the generative adversarial networks experiments we
perform on image datasets in Section 6.5.
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L.3 Generative Adversarial Network: Learning a Covariance Matrix
We now consider a generative adversarial network formulation presented by Daskalakis et al. (2018) for
learning a covariance matrix. This is a simple example with degeneracies much like the Dirac-GAN game,
but it can be generalized to arbitrary dimensional strategy spaces and has served as a benchmark for
comparing convergence rates in a number of recent papers on learning in games. Often, the example is
used to show that gradient descent-ascent cycles and converges slowly. However, by and large, timescale
separation is not considered. We show that gradient descent-ascent converges fast in this game with suitable
timescale separation and further explore the interplay between timescale separation, regularization, and rate
of convergence. We primarily follow the notation of Daskalakis et al. (2018) when describing the problem.
The objective of this problem is to learn a covariance matrix using the Wasserstein GAN formulation.
The real data x is drawn from a mean-zero multivariate normal distribution with an unknown covariance
matrix Σ. The generator is restricted to be a linear function of the random input noise z ∼ N (0, I) and
is of the form GV (z) = V z. The discriminator is restricted to the set of all quadratic functions, which
we represent by DW (x) = x
>Wx. The parameters of the generator and the discriminator are given by
W ∈ Rd×d and V ∈ Rd×d, respectively. For the given generator and discriminator classes the Wasserstein
GAN game is defined by the cost
f(V,W ) = Ex∼N (0,Σ)[x>Wx]− Ez∼N (0,I)[z>V >WV z].
As shown by Daskalakis et al. (2018), the cost function can be simplified to be expressed as
f(V,W ) =
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
Wij
(
Σij −
d∑
k=1
VikVjk
)
.
With this cost, the individual gradients for gradient descent-ascent are given by
g(V,W ) = (−(W +W>)V,−(Σ− V V >)).
From the individual gradients, it is clear that the critical points of the game are given by (V,W ) such that
V V > = Σ and W +W> = 0. Moreover, given the form of g(V,W ), the game Jacobian at any critical point
(V ∗,W ∗) is of the form
Jτ (V
∗,W ∗) =
[
0 D12f(V
∗,W ∗)
−τD>12f(V ∗,W ∗) 0
]
.
Consequently, the eigenvalues of the game Jacobian are purely imaginary and the critical points are not
stable. To fix this problem, Daskalakis et al. (2018) regularized both the generator and discriminator. We
only regularize the discriminator in this example. The cost function of the zero-sum game with regularization
µ > 0 is given by
f(V,W ) =
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
Wij
(
Σij −
d∑
k=1
VikVjk
)
− µ
2
Tr(W>W ). (72)
The individual gradients for gradient descent-ascent in this regularized game are then
g(V,W ) = (−(W +W>)V,−(Σ− V V >) + µ
2
W ).
We begin by considering the simplest form of this problem, which is that d = 1. The critical points with
this restriction are (V ∗,W ∗) = (σ, 0) and (V ∗,W ∗) = (−σ, 0) and the game Jacobian evaluated at them is
Jτ (V
∗,W ∗) =
[
0 −2σ
2τσ τµ
]
.
Each critical point is a local Nash equilibrium of the unregularized game and a differential Stackelberg
equilibrium of the regularized game since −D22f(V ∗,W ∗) = µ > 0 and S1(J(V ∗,W ∗)) = 4σ2/µ > 0.
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(a) d = 1, µ = 0.5 (b) d = 1, µ = 0.75 (c) d = 1, µ = 1
(d) (e) (f)
(g) d = 5, µ = 1 (h) d = 10, µ = 1 (i) d = 20, µ = 1
(j) Legend for Figures 15a, 15b, 15c, 15g, 15h, and 15i.
Figure 15: Experimental results for the generative adversarial network formulation for learning a covariance
matrix defined by the cost from (72) of Section L.3. Figures 15a, 15b, and 15c show the distance from the
equilibrium along the learning paths of τ -GDA with d = 1. Figures 15d, 15e, and 15f show the trajectories of
the eigenvalues of Jτ (x
∗) as a function of the τ , respectively. Figures 15g, 15h, and 15i show the distance
from the equilibrium along the learning paths of τ -GDA with d = 5, 10, 20.
Furthermore, spec(Jτ (V
∗,W ∗)) = {(τµ ±
√
τ2µ2 − 16τσ2)/2} so that each critical point is stable for all
τ ∈ (0,∞) and µ ∈ (0,∞) since spec(Jτ (θ∗, ω∗)) ⊂ C◦+. Thus, given a suitably chosen learning rate γ1, the
discrete time update τ -GDA locally converges to an equilibrium. For this reason, we focus on studying the rate
of convergence for the problem as a function of timescale separation and regularization. Figures 15a, 15b,
and 15c show the distance from an equilibrium along the learning path of τ -GDA with τ ∈ {1, 5, 10, 25} given
a fixed initial condition with learning rate γ1 = 0.001 and regularization µ ∈ {0.5, 0.75, 1}, respectively.
Moreover, Figures 15d, 15e, and 15f show the trajectories of the eigenvalues for Jτ (V
∗,W ∗) as a function of
τ for the regularization parameters µ ∈ {0.5, 0.75, 1}. Finally, Figures 16a, 16b, and 16c show the trajectories
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(a) d = 1, µ = 0.5
(b) d = 1, µ = 0.75
(c) d = 1, µ = 1
Figure 16: Experimental results for learning a covariance matrix defined by the cost from (72) of Section L.3.
We overlay the trajectories produced by τ -GDA onto the vector field generated by the choices of τ and µ.
The shading of the vector field is dictated by its magnitude so that lighter shading corresponds to a higher
magnitude and darker shading corresponds to a lower magnitude.
of τ -GDA overlayed on the vector field generated by the respective timescale separation and regularization
parameters.
From the eigenvalue trajectories, we see that as µ grows, the eigenvalues become purely real at a smaller
value of τ . Moreover, as µ increases, the magnitude of the real and imaginary parts of the eigenvalues
decreases. We observe the effect of this on the convergence, where the dynamics do not cycles as much for
larger µ. Again, we see the trade-off between timescale separation, regularization, and convergence. For
example, despite the eigenvalues being purely real with µ = 1 and τ = 25 so that there is no rotational
dynamics, the convergence is slower than for µ = 0.75 where there is some non-zero imaginary piece of the
eigenvalues.
Figures 15g, 15h, and 15i show the distance from a critical point along the learning path of τ -GDA with
τ ∈ {1, 5, 10, 25} given a fixed initial condition with learning rate γ1 = 0.001, regularization µ = 1, and the
dimension of the problem d among the set {5, 10, 20}, respectively. The primary purpose of showing this set
of results is simply to be clear that the behavior for d = 1, which is easier to explain and visualize, transfers
over to higher dimensional formulations of this problem. This is to be expected since the problem dimension
is not necessarily fundamental to the convergence rate, but rather it depends on the conditioning of Σ and
each Σ was chosen so that the behavior was comparable for each choice of dimension.
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L.4 Generative Adversarial Networks: Image Data
In this section we provide additional results and details from the experiments we ran training generative
adversarial networks on the CIFAR-10 and CelebA datasets. In Figure 17 we show more generated samples
on each of the datasets. We ran our simulations based on the work of Mescheder et al. (2018) and used
the publicly available code from the link https://github.com/LMescheder/GAN_stability. We refer the
readers to (Mescheder et al., 2018) for details on the implementation and architectures, as we primarily only
changed the learning rates used to run the experiments. For the networks, we ran the experiments using the
architecture provided in the gan training/models/resnet.py file of the repository. In Figure 18 we include the
hyperparameters we used for the experiments. To be clear, we used the same exact setup for both training
CIFAR-10 and CelebA datasets. We computed the Frechet Inception Distance using 10k samples from the
real and generated data. For both experiments and across the set of hyperparameters we did the evaluation
using a fixed random noise vector to make for an equal comparison and a fixed set of real images which were
randomly selected. The evaluation was done using the training data. We used the FID score implementation
in pytorch available at https://github.com/mseitzer/pytorch-fid.
(a) CIFAR-10 generated sample images (b) CelebA generated sample images
Figure 17: Generated sample images with τ = 4 and β = 0.9999
Hyperparameter Value(s)
Objective NSGAN
Batch Size 64
Latent Distribution z ∈ R256
Generator Learning Rate 0.0001
Timescale Separation τ {1, 2, 4, 8}
Learning Rate Decay (1 + x)−0.005
Optimizer RMSprop
RMSprop Smoothing Constant α 0.99
RMSprop  10−8
Regularization µ {1, 10}
EMA Parameter β {0.99, 0.999, 0.9999}
Figure 18: Hyperparameters for GAN experiments on CIFAR-10 and CelebA
70
